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JOURNAL

OF THE

GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Vol. VI]

NOVEMBER, 1948

[Part 1

SLAVERY AS KNOWN TO EARLY BUDDHISTS

By B. C. LAW

SLAVERY is a very old institution. It existed, even in its worst form, in Egypt, Sumeria, Chaldea, Babylonia, Assyria, Phoenicia, Greece and Rome, China and Persia. It existed in different forms and degrees when Megasthenes visited India as Greek ambassador. A regular trade in slaves was carried on in all these countries. It is rightly observed that slavery and idolatry of various kinds and forms darkened the social and religious life of the ancient peoples, and that they were the two dreaded evils against which the human soul cried for relief, release, and emancipation.

If Megasthenes had paid the highest compliment to India on the ground that no person was held as a slave and all were treated as free, even the foreigners not being used as slaves, it was, as Rhys Davids sought to explain, for the reason that the kind and form of slavery which existed then in India was nothing when compared with the Greek or the Roman form.¹ But the better explanation seems to be that the Greek ambassador distinguished simply between *de jure* and *de facto* slaves. In India of his time all men were held equal and all Indians passed as free citizens in the eye of law. He did not omit to mention

¹ *Buddhist India*, p. 55.

that both the philosophic view and the law of the land combined to see all men free in India, allowing property to be unevenly distributed²

In corroboration of the above testimony of Megasthenes we may cite the bold pronouncement in the Kauṭīliya *Arthasāstra*, that servitude shall not be the condition of an Aryan, although it may be proper for the *Mlecchas* to sell or hold children to slavery³. Accordingly it prescribes the following laws to safeguard the position of slaves and to merit the admiration of all right-thinking men.

Employing a slave to carry the dead or to sweep urine or the leavings of food, etc., keeping a slave naked or hurting or abusing him or violating the chastity of a female slave shall cause the forfeiture of the value paid for him or her. When a man commits or helps another to commit rape with a female slave he shall not only forfeit the purchase value but also pay a certain amount of money to her and a fine of twice the amount to the government. The ransom necessary for a slave to regain his freedom is equal to what he has been sold for. Failure to set a slave at liberty on the receipt of a required amount of ransom shall be punished. If a pregnant female slave is sold or pledged without any provision for her confinement, her master shall be punished, as well as the abettor. Selling or mortgaging the life of a slave once liberated shall be punished with fine.

The statement in the *Arthasāstra* regarding the slave-trade among the *Mlecchas* has its strong support in an incidental statement of the Buddha, purporting to say that the Yonas, Kambojas, Gandhāras, and other peoples of the Frontier countries admitted just two social grades of mas-

² McCrindle, *Ancient India*, pp. 38 and 211.

³ *Arthasāstra* (Revised and edited by R. Shāma Śāstrī), 1919, p. 181 : *Mlecchānāmadoṣāḥ prajāṃ vikṛetumādhātum vā. Na trevarjasya dāsabbāvaḥ.*

ters and slaves (*ayya, dāsa*) without meaning an impassable social barrier between the two :

*ayyo hutvā dāso hoti, dāso hutvā ayyo hoti.*⁴

They are typically the peoples of the *Uttarāpatha* or North-Western India who are described in the *Mahābhārata*, XII, 207, 43 as terrible Mleccha tribes :—

Uttarāpatha-janmānaḥ kīrtayiṣyāmi tān api.

Yauna-Kāmboja-Gāndhārāḥ Kirātā-Barbaraiḥ saha. (43)

They are again the peoples whom the Pali scholiast Buddhaghosa characterises as Persianised in their social organization (*Pārasaka-vaṇṇā* or *Pārisaka-vaṇṇā*)⁵.

The Vidhurapaṇḍita Jātaka speaks of the four kinds of slaves :

(1) those born of slave parents or begotten on slave women (*antojātā*),⁶ (2) those purchased with money (*dhana-kēitā*), (3) those reduced to slavery under coercion by bandits (*karamarānītā*) and (4) those who took slavery of their own accord (*sāmaṃdāsabyamupagatā*).

Slavery might be incurred through capture⁷ or commuted death sentence or debt⁸ or voluntary self-degradation⁹ or judicial punishment¹⁰.

The *Manusamhitā* (viii. 415) distinguishes seven kinds of slaves: (1) those who are captured during the war, (2) those who serve in return for maintenance, (3) those who are born in the house, (4) those who are bought, (5) those who are received as gifts, (6) those who are inherited from the father, and (7) those who are made slaves by court sentence.

⁴ *Majjhima Nikāya*, ii, p. 149.

⁵ *Papañca-sūdanī*, III, p. 410.

⁶ *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, i, p. 300.

⁷ *Jāt.* IV, 220 ; V, 497.

⁸ *Ibid.*, VI, 521.

⁹ *Vinaya*, I, 72 ; *Sumaṅgala*, I, 168.

¹⁰ *Jātaka*, I, 200.

The *Arthasāstra* list is made up of at least ten kinds of slaves, while Nārada's law book recognizes a still larger number. Thus the number of classes increased in time, and slavery assumed a feudal character since, perhaps, it received a legal sanction from the Brahmin law givers headed by Manu.¹¹

There is a mention of six kinds of slaves in the Jain literature also. They are as follows: (1) slaves from very birth (*gabbha*); (2) those who were bought (*kīya*); (3) those who were unable to pay their debts (*aṇaya*); (4) those who were made slaves during famine (*dubbbhikkha*); (5) those who could not pay fine (*sāvarāba*); and (6) those who were taken prisoners (*ruddha*)-vide *Piṇḍa Niryukti*, 319; *Mahānisīha Sūya*, p. 28; J. C. Jain, *Life in Ancient India as depicted in the Jain Canons*, p. 107.

The individuals, captured in predatory raids were reduced to slavery¹². They became slaves of their own accord¹³. Children born to slaves were also slaves. In the majority of cases we find that the slaves were employed as household servants. They were also employed to cultivate lands. In the house of a pious Brāhmaṇa named Dhammapāla even the slaves and labourers gave alms and observed the precepts and fasts¹⁴. The slaves were regarded as the property of the master¹⁵. The Sonananda Jātaka¹⁶ speaks of manumitted slaves.

The Jātakas contain instances where the slaves were bought for 700 kahāpaṇas¹⁷. Traffic in human beings (*satta-*

¹¹ Manu, VIII, 413; *Sūdraṃ tu kārāyēd dāsyāṇi kṛtām akṛtām eva vā; dāsyāyaiva hi sṛṣṭo 'sau Brāhmaṇasya Svayambhuvā*;

¹² *Jātaka*, iv, 220.

¹³ *Vinaya Texts*, i, 191.

¹⁴ *Jāt.* iv, 50.

¹⁵ *Visayha Jātaka*, *Jātaka*, iii, 129.

¹⁶ *Jātaka*, No. 582.

¹⁷ *Jātaka*, iii, 848.

vaṇijjā, *manussavikkaya*)¹⁸ implied slave trade. According to the Milinda, rooms in a well-laid city or town had to be made for the residence of the various classes of people, including slaves and slave-girls¹⁹.

The Pali work *Apadāna* refers to household servants (*peṣṣikā*)²⁰. The slaves (*Dāsa-kammakaras*) laboured for others in return of some payment (*bhataka*), whether in kind or in money²¹. The profession of a slave was hereditary. The agriculture labourers received the customary wages. The day labourers returned to their own houses in the evening.²² The slave or servant was an adjunct in all households, capable of rendering domestic service. The male and female slaves were domestic servants who resided in the houses of their masters and performed all household duties.²³ Children born of slave parents generally took to the same profession²⁴. There was a home-born slave by the name of Bīraṇi²⁵. The captives or prisoners of war could be enslaved. A beautiful maiden, whenever caught as a prisoner of war, was used as a slave²⁶ (*dāsībhogena bhuñjissanti*). Slaves, specially female, were given away as gifts (*dānaṃ*)²⁷. A village superintendent was made a slave of the village because he slandered the villagers, before the king²⁸. Ministers condemned to death by the king for jealousy were given away as slaves²⁹ (*dāse katvā adāsi*). Attendants and menials belonged

¹⁸ *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, iii, 208.

¹⁹ *Milinda*, p. 331.

²⁰ *Apadāna*, II, 357 foll.

²¹ *Jātaka*, II, 139; III, pp. 129, 257, 26 & 414; V, 212; 298;
•Cf. *Asāraṅga Sūtra*, I, 2, 5, 1.

²² *Jātaka*, iii, 145.

²³ *Ibid.* I, pp. 200, 225, 350.

²⁴ *Ibid.* I, p. 451;

²⁵ *Jātaka*, vi, p. 117.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, IV, p. 220.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, vi, pp. 462, 464, 503, etc.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, I, p. 200.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, VI, p. 339.

to the category of slaves³⁰. A master had an absolute right over his slave³¹. A female slave was considered as one of the members of the household³². A master was courteous enough to accept the words of his slave with due honour³³. Slaves were permitted to learn reading and writing and handicrafts along with the sons of their masters³⁴. Sometimes they were appointed as store-keepers or guards of property³⁵. In some instances the suffering and happiness of the slaves were linked up with those of their masters.³⁶ For the slightest fault a slave was beaten, imprisoned and branded³⁷. A female slave was thrown down at the door of the house and beaten with rope-ends by her master because she could not bring home her wages³⁸. The slaves could be rightfully given away to another³⁹. Some runaway slaves were seeking opportunity to free themselves from the clutches of their masters⁴⁰. Slaves could regain freedom on payment⁴¹ or through voluntary manumission by their masters⁴². A slave was ordinarily engaged in cooking⁴³, fetching water⁴⁴, pounding and drying rice⁴⁵, carrying food and watching the field⁴⁶, giving alms⁴⁷, handing plates and dishes,

³⁰ *Ibid.*, iv, pp. 320, 362.

³¹ *Psalms of the Brethren*, p. 360 ; *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³² *Ibid.*, iii, p. 162.

³³ *Ibid.*, v, pp. 485-86.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, I, p. 451.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, I, p. 225.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, vi, p. 285.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, I, p. 451.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 402.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, vi, 285.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, I, pp. 452, 458.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, vi, p. 547.

⁴² *Ibid.*, v, p. 318.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, v, 105.

⁴⁴ *Jātaka*, v, 284, 413.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 484.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, iii, 163.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, iv, 67.

bringing spittoon and fetching fans during meals⁴⁸, and sweeping the yards and stables⁴⁹. Slavery was so common that not only the kings and wealthy people but also the Brahmins and recluses and villagers and farmers kept slaves in their custody⁵⁰.

Slaves (*dāsā*) were drawn from all classes under various circumstances. Their lot was miserable and their status low. But in spite of all that, they occupied a position in society. They could not be regarded as impure because they had to work for their masters in manifold household duties like helping their masters in dressing and undressing, assisting in the care of their bodies, preparing and serving food and cleansing the house. They were not counted as a caste.

Female slaves could be emancipated only with the consent of their masters. The position of a female slave was rather pitiful. A slave woman like a Roman slave-girl was the property of her master who had every control over her. She was generally ill-treated. A painful instance of ill-treatment is found in the *Majjhima Nikāya*. A woman named Kālī was the maid servant of a householder's wife living at Śrāvastī. She was skilful, and capable of doing her duties well. Kālī in order to test whether the fame of her mistress as a gentle and considerate lady was due to her or not once rose late in the morning. Her mistress showed her dissatisfaction at this. On the second day she rose up late and was rebuked. On the third day she rose up still very late and was so severely beaten by her mistress that her head was broken⁵¹.

⁴⁸. *Ibid.*, I, 453.

⁴⁹. *Ibid.*, vi, 138.

⁵⁰. *Ibid.*, ii, 428 ; iii, 101 ; v, 105 ; vi, 117.

⁵¹. *Majjhima Nikāya*, i, pp. 125 ff. ; Cf. *Vimānavatīhu Commentary*, pp. 206 ff.

In addition to other household duties, a slave-woman husked paddy⁵², pounded rice⁵³, and went to market⁵⁴.

A slave-woman could obtain freedom if she could prove herself worthy of it. A daughter of Anāthapiṇḍika's slave was given freedom when she defeated a Brahmin in argument and proved herself to be a woman of religious disposition⁵⁵.

The consent of the master was necessary for the marriage of his female slaves. Pasenadi, king of Kosala, had to secure the consent of the master before he could marry Mallikā, the daughter of a slave woman.

Maid-servants being of low birth were naturally uncultured and of low spirits. Some of them were in the habit of stealing coins or articles. But the influence of the Buddha's *dharma* had a splendid effect on their character⁵⁶.

It is not a fact that the Buddha had not exerted himself in the interest of the slaves and servants. The fact that bondage and indebtedness were held as positive disqualifications for admission into the Buddhist religious order and fraternity⁵⁷ is not to be pressed as an argument. The slaves and debtors were excluded because the Buddha wanted to see Brotherhood founded by him as an association of free men. Among the philosophers and religious teachers who pleaded for the cause of equality and liberty, the Buddha ranked foremost if he was not the pioneer of the movement. He described servitude (*dāsavyathā*) as a most painful state of woe along with debt (*inaṃ*), imprisonment (*bandhanāgāraṃ-prison*), illness (*rogaṃ*), and journey

⁵² *Dhammapada Commy.*, iii, 321.

⁵³ *Jātaka* No. 45.

⁵⁴ *Dhammapada Commy.*, i, 208.

⁵⁵ *Therīgāthā Commy.* pp. 199 ff.

⁵⁶ *Dhammapada Commy.* I, 208 ff.; *Mahāvairsa*, 214; *Vimānavatthu Commy.*, 45-47, 91-92.

⁵⁷ *Vinaya Piṭaka*, i, p. 76—*Na bhikkhave ināyiko pabbājetabbo Na bhikkhave dāso pabbājetabbo.*

through a wilderness⁵⁸ (*kantāraddhānamaggam*). He completely refrained from accepting male and female slaves (*Dāsī-dāsa-paṭiggahāṇā paṭivirato*)⁵⁹. He prohibited traffic in human beings (*satteranijjā*) or slave-trade on the part of the *upāsakas*⁶⁰. In accordance with a clear Jātaka maxim no man should offer himself to slavery. In order to ameliorate the condition of slaves and servants (*dāsa-kammākārā*) the Buddha laid down the five essential duties of a noble householder towards them, namely, "employing them according to their capacity, giving them proper meals and wages, attending them in times of illness, sharing with them delicacies and special dishes, and occasionally granting them leave"⁶¹.

It may be said that the religious movement in India prior to Manu was directed to obtain emancipation from all kinds of bondage, physical, moral, intellectual or spiritual. A change took place along with the Brahmanical re-action against liberal and progressive thoughts. Slavery, instead of being abolished, came to be regarded as a necessary social institution. The classes of slaves increased in number, and there is no evidence of any attempt being made to improve their position in life.

⁵⁸ *Dīgha Nikāya*, i, p. 73

⁵⁹ *Dīgha*, i, p.5.

⁶⁰ *Anguttara Nikāya*, iii, p. 208 : *Imā kbo bhikkhave pañca vaṇṇijā upāsakena akaraṇīyāti.*

⁶¹ *Dīgha Nikāya*, iii, p. 191.

"Yathābalāni kammanta-samvidhānena, bhatta-vettanānuppadānena, gilānupaṭṭhānena acchariyānāni vasānāni sambibhāgena, samaye vossaggena."

MARRIAGE IN OLD AND MEDIEVAL BENGAL ACCORDING TO SMṚTI NIBANDHAS

By SURES CHANDRA BANERJI

(Continued from Vol. V. Pt. 4)

DIVORCE in the truest sense of the term means a complete dissolution of the marriage tie. We have seen above that even in cases where a marriage is void *ab initio*, which is good ground for divorce, the wife is not deprived of her maintenance so that the marriage is not dissolved. At best, the desertion of the wife in the circumstances mentioned above means only a judicial separation of the bed and board of the husband and wife who cannot claim a restitution of conjugal rights against each other.

Divorce proper, however, seems to have been enjoined even by Raghunandana, on the strength of certain authorities in extreme cases of adultery of wives. Instead of being punished physically the wife shall be deserted for the following offences:—

1. Commission of adultery with a man of inferior caste resulting in her pregnancy.
2. Adultery with disciple (of the husband?) and son.
3. Addiction to other heinous vices and causing waste of wealth.

As regards the punishment for the first offence the verdict of Bṛhaspati is the severest. He says that she may either be deserted or even killed. Raghunandana is not so unrelenting in this matter because he cites a verse that such a wife may be purified by penances so long as she does not conceive. Anyway, none of the texts dwelling upon the desertion of the wife for her adultery makes any provision whatsoever for her maintenance. Thus adultery seems to be the only ground for proper divorce according to the smṛti digests of Bengal.

So far as the prohibitory rules in marriage are concerned the doctrine of *factum valet* applies to a great extent.

In all the above cases except where a marriage is void the marriage, once performed, is not invalidated by the mere non-observance of the directory rules. Even in the guardianship of marriage, which is one of the most important factors, *factum valet* operates to the fullest extent in the Bengal school. The one great condition for a person to be fit for offering a girl in marriage is that he must be free from the defects of insanity, 'apostacy, etc. as pointed out above. Otherwise according to Nārada, the act done by him will be regarded as not done. Raghunandana, the practical jurist of Bengal, here shows a flash of originality in construing Nārada's authority as annulling only such acts as betrothal, etc. when done by persons having any of the above draw-backs. He argues that the ceremony of marriage being the primary thing can never be annulled, when once performed, due simply to such secondary things as the defects of the giver.⁵⁴ He is, however, not clear as to the results of a marriage where the person offering the girl is not included in the list of legal guardians.

The *smṛti* writers of Bengal have made a good deal of astrological speculation about the auspicious times for marriage. The months from Āṣāḍha to Kārtika and the months of Pauṣa and Caitra are prohibited in general as marriage, in these months is supposed to forebode different kinds of misfortune, but the two months last named are particularly tabooed. In abnormal circumstances, however, such as war, imminent death of parents, and the girl's exceeding the highest limit of marriageable age one should not

⁵⁴ यदि तु विवाहो निवृत्तस्तदा प्रधानस्य निवृत्तत्वेन तत्प्रकारिवैकल्यान्न तस्य पुनरावृत्तिरिति—*Udvāha-tattva*. p. 121.

wait for auspicious time. But Raghunandana seems to be inclined to the view that in all cases particularly bad times such as Mālamāsa and Sankrānti etc. are to be avoided at any cost even if bad months are left out of consideration. A girl should be married away within the even number of years from conception in her mother's womb. According to Raghunandana one should take into account the solar month i.e., the period of Sun's stay in a Zodiac. This means that in citing the mantras in a marriage one should mention the solar month in which the ceremony takes place. From the work of Gopāla Nyāyapañcāna it seems that Śrīnātha-ācārya-Cūḍāmaṇi held the opposite view that the lunar month should be mentioned. On certain authorities Raghunandana shows that although gifts in general are condemned by night yet for the gift of a girl night is the best time. Marriage by day is strictly prohibited.

It is an interesting part of the discussion on marriage as to what is the precise point of time when a Hindu marriage can be technically said to be complete. While neither his predecessors nor his successors bother themselves much about this particular question Raghunandana, with the true insight of a jurist, tries to determine the particular act which completes the ceremony of marriage. A marriage is said to come to an end with the change of the bride's gotra to that of her husband. But there is a good deal of controversy regarding the exact point of time when the Gotra is changed. While according to Laghuhārīta⁵⁵ a bride's Gotra is changed after the ceremony of Saptapadīgamana (i.e. taking of seven steps together by the bridegroom and the bride) she takes the new Gotra after Pāṇi-grahaṇa (bridegroom's taking the hands of the

⁵⁵ स्वगोत्राद्भक्ष्यते नारी विवाहात् सप्तमे पदे—quoted in the *Udvāha-tattva* p. 186.

bride) according to Bṛhaspati. The view that the father's gotra of a married woman is not changed so long as her śrāddha called Sapiṇḍikaraṇa is not performed, has been characterised by Raghunandana as being applicable only to persons belonging to certain limited branches of certain Vedas. The injunction of Gobhila³ which requires a woman after Sapta-padī-gamana to salute her husband by the "gotra" raises the doubt as to whose gotra should be mentioned by the said woman—that of her father or that of her husband. Here Raghunandana, on the authority of Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa, who was probably one of his paternal ancestors, interprets Gobhila's text as referring to the husband's gotra and not to that of the father of the girl as interpreted by Bhavadeva and some other writers. Again, on Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa's authority Raghunandana proves that the marriage ceremony of the Brāhmaṇas belonging to the Sāma-veda comes to an end with this salutation by the wife. The ceremony of Yajurvedī Brāhmaṇas, however, is complete with the sitting together of the bride and the groom on a piece of bull-skin.

The acceptance of bride's price (Śulka) by the father of the bride is so severely condemned that the father receiving Śulka is said to fall into worst of hells and also to plunge seven generations into sin. This practice is prohibited even for Śūdras. The silence of Bengal writers on bridegroom's dowry can perhaps be explained by the wide prevalence of Kulinism in Bengal. As stated above it was at one time considered very good for a girl to have a Kulin husband. Among the Kulins again a great rigidity attached to the rule that a Kulin girl, belonging to a particular section (Mela), must be married to a Kulin Brāhmaṇa

³³ अनुमंत्रिता गुहं गोत्रेणाभिवादयेत्— *Gobhila Grhya-sūtra*, Ed. Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkara, Calcutta, 1908. Vol. I. p. 335 (II. 3.18).

of the same section. These rules naturally resulted in the comparative dearth of bridegrooms. Hence the demand for Kulin bridegrooms was far in excess of the supply of brides. Thus the question of supply and demand adjusted the respective prices of bridegrooms and brides. While the latter were extremely cheap the former had to be purchased at a very high price which was very often prohibitive with the result that sometimes a poor Brāhmaṇa became utterly destitute in marrying his daughter to a Kulin husband. There seems to have been a social necessity for condemning the practice of accepting bride's price. Partly from fear of degradation and partly to elevate their position in society the Brāhmaṇas at one time selected Kulin bridegrooms for their daughters. This resulted in the plurality of wives in the case of Kulins and a dearth of brides for the non-kulins so that the latter in their quest for suitable brides were compelled to resort to the reprehensible practice of purchasing girls.

On the authority of Yājñavalkya Raghunandana ordains that with regard to the offering of their sisters in marriage only those of the brothers who are initiated shall have the sole authority in the absence of other preferential guardians. The same verse of Yājñavalkya requires all brothers, irrespective of initiation, to contribute Turiyaka of Nijāṁśa (own share) towards the marriage of sisters. Now the word Turiyaka has puzzled many writers both of the Dāyabhāga and Mitākṣarā schools. The sum and substance of the elaborate, and sometimes bewildering, discussion of the Mitākṣarā on the word Turiyaka is that it means a fourth part of the share that would have been allotted to the girl concerned had she been a male child. Thus when there are four brothers and one sister the ancestral property shall be divided into five equal parts and the brothers shall spend an amount equivalent to $\frac{1}{4}$ of $\frac{1}{5}$ of the property in the marriage of the sister. The remaining portion of $\frac{1}{5}$ i.e.

$\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{20}$ ($= \frac{9}{20}$) shall be equally distributed among the brothers. In arriving at this conclusion, which is certainly very plausible, the *Mitākṣarā* raises many other interpretations that may possibly be put on this word and cleverly demonstrates the absurdity of each. The *Dāyabhāga*, followed by no less a person than Raghunandana himself, cuts the Gordian Knot and takes the word to imply 'Vivāhoca-dravya' or things sufficient for the ceremony of marriage. *Sūlapāṇi*'s view is rather vague.

The Bengal school had always a strong disfavour for the idea of giving any share of paternal property to girls and in this case also perhaps the psychology working behind the distorted meaning of the word *Turīyaka*, which can mean nothing but a fourth part, was that by accepting the real meaning the Bengal jurists might expose themselves to the risk of allotting a definite share of the property to girls. It is probable that to obviate all sorts of complications that might arise in future they resorted to this ludicrous way of explaining *Yājñavalkya*'s text.

The husband cannot use his wife for sexual gratification whenever he likes. In this matter he must have a great consideration for the feelings of his wife. It is his bounden duty to cohabit with his wife after each of her monthly courses until she conceives. In doing so he must avoid the festive occasions (*Parva-varjam*).

Among the faults of wives are mentioned drinking, association with undesirable persons, separation from husband, sauntering here and there, untimely sleep, and residence at others' houses. A woman during separation from her husband, who may leave home on some errands, shall, besides praying for his welfare, abstain from excessive decorations but must not, in any case, altogether forsake ornaments lest she should look like a widow.

We can have glimpses of some very interesting customs in connection with marriage some of them being

utterly inexplicable. The father of a girl shall not take his meal at her house till a son is born to her⁵⁷. The prohibition is stricter when the girl is married according to the Brāhma form of marriage. The rule prohibiting a girl from eating at the husband's house after taking meal at her father's residence appears meaningless unless we take it to imply that a newly married girl should not eat at both places in the course of the same day. But the object of this injunction is obscure though it may be supposed to have some justification from the hygienic point of view.

The peculiar sound known as Huludhvani⁵⁸ made by women on festive occasions is regarded in Bengal as very auspicious in marriage also. None of the authoritative

Customs
superstitions
connection
marriage.
and
in
with

Nibandhakāras of Bengal excepting Raghunandana refers to Huludhvani—a fact which probably shows that it was too well-known to need any Śāstric injunction.

Raghunandana with his meticulous attention to details could not perhaps remain satisfied without pointing out the authority on which this custom was based. Raghunandana citing the authority of the southerners seems to support the view that sneezing, though generally regarded as very ominous, is auspicious, in the seven acts viz. Vivāha etc. It seems to have been customary for both the bridegroom and the bride to get shaved before marriage only the cutting of nails being prescribed for the bride. In sacred rites such as marriage the uttering of words like Svasti Puṇyāha etc. by Brāhmaṇas is considered very auspicious. The

⁵⁷ It may be noted that this custom prevails even to-day particularly in some parts of East Bengal.

⁵⁸ The term Ululi meaning the same thing occurs in the *Atharvaveda* (III. 19.6). The later lexicographers spell the word variously as Hulahuli, Hulibuli and Huluhulu. Also see *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (III. 19.3) and *Naiṣadha-carita*, XIV. 51. For an interesting and informative discussion on Huludhvani see K. K. Handiqui: *Eng. Tr. of the Naiṣadha-carita*, pp. 541-2.

modes of uttering these words differ in the cases of different castes.

Raghunandana refers to the custom of wearing on the forehead the mark of mixture of cowdung, cow's urine, curd and sandal paste as this mark is supposed to bring good luck and cause freedom from diseases. But he is not clear as to the person who should wear it although from the commentary it seems to have been a rule for the bride.

The custom of the bride and bridegroom looking at each other's face known as Jambula-mālikā or Mukha-Çandrikā⁵⁹ during the progress of the ceremony is hinted at by Raghunandana.

⁵⁹ The custom of the bride and the groom looking at each other's face known as Mukha-candrikā and Śubha-dṛṣṭi in eastern and western Bengal respectively, still prevails as an indispensable part of the ceremony. It is, however, not known how the word Jambula-mālikā, obviously meaning a garland of Jambula (*Ketaki*) flowers, acquired the sense of Mukha-candrikā which means Mukha-darśanam according to Raghunandana. By quoting a verse from the *Harivamśa*, which contains the word Jambula-mālikā Raghunandana remarks that the verse refers to the practice of bringing the bride and the groom face to face, in which garlands of flowers were used. This suggests that the term Jambula-mālikā, originally meaning a garland, gradually came to signify the part of the ceremony in which such a garland was to be used. Nilakanṭha, however, in his commentary on the *Harivamśa* interprets Jambula-mālikā as jesting compliments addressed to the bridegroom by his female relatives (वरपक्षीयस्त्रीणां परिहासवचनं तेषां मालिका श्रेणी), but does not speak of the particular point of the ceremony when these jesting complements were actually addressed to the bride-groom. This interpretation of Nilakanṭha seems to imply that the practice of the female relatives of the bridegroom accompanying him to the bride's house prevailed in those times, otherwise the presence of the former at the marriage ceremony, which as a general rule, was performed at the bride's house becomes unlikely. The fact that Raghunandana says nothing in this connection about these female relatives of the bridegroom accompanying him in the bridal procession probably indicates that the custom incourse of time died out at least in Bengal. It may be added that in a Bengal marriage no female used to accompany the bridegroom to the bride's house though of late the custom is found rather widely particularly in western Bengal and rarely also in the eastern part of the Province. The Bengal writers preceding and succeeding Raghunandana is silent on Mukha-candrikā.

Among the customs after marriage is mentioned the practice of the mother-in-law receiving the daughter-in-law with clothes, refreshments etc. The mother-in-law should moreover engage her to religious duties, cooking and supervision of the household articles. It is interesting to note that these customs survive in Bengal even to-day although sometimes in slightly modified forms. These modifications are very often ludicrous and indicate the degeneration of the present day Hindus who are concerned only with the letter and not the spirit of the rules. For example, fathers, unable to disoblige the daughter's new relation, takes meals at the houses of daughters and pays a pice or two as if to show that they have taken food in exchange of money which they can do everywhere. But this is only self-deception. Again we see that a girl when leaving her father's house for the first time after marriage is provided with some quantity of foodstuff for her use at the time of taking her first meal at the husband's house. But these articles are seldom or never used for this purpose.

Besides those mentioned above many other customs, popularly known as *Strī-ācāra*, are observed in a Bengal marriage of the present day. Some of them may probably be traced to the primitive stage of civilisation. For instance, sometimes we meet with certain charms designed to enable the wife to have the husband completely under her control (cf. *Vaṣī-karaṇa-mantras*). These lead one to suppose that customs of this nature probably mark a compromise between the Aryan and the non-Aryan practices.

The texts do not show any sign of these customs having any legal force so that a breach of these rules has got nothing to do with the validity or otherwise of a marriage. But these women's practices or *Strī-ācāras* are more than law to women who will consider a marriage irregular without the observance of these minor customs.

With regard to the place where marriage can be performed nothing is specifically mentioned so far as Sāmavedi marriage is concerned. The Yajurvedi Places suitable for the ceremony of marriage. Brāhmaṇas should hold the ceremony in the compound of the main residential house after thoroughly cleansing and purifying the compound and placing fire in it.

The importance of marriage as a sacrament is no less than that of other saṃskāras as Upanayana etc. It will be erroneous to suppose that the Hindus Importance of marriage. looked upon marriage as merely a means of sexual enjoyment. Nor was marriage regarded as an act that could be done absolutely at one's sweet will. In the well-disciplined and regulated life of the Hindus marriage was a sacred and bounden duty of every Dvija (twice born) in the second stage (Gārhaṣṭhya-āśrama) of life. For the Śūdra there was only one stage of the householder. A householder without a wife was a contradiction in terms for "house" has been declared as nothing but the wife herself.⁶⁰ Thus a householder without a wife is without a house so to say. In fact the words Sahadharminī and such other synonyms of Bhāryā imply that the wife is the counterpart of a man and without her his life is imperfect, so much so that a man without his wife is precluded from performing many of the rites enjoined by the Śāstras. These are the reasons why marriage at the due time is very strongly advocated. One should never remain out of one or other of the four Āśramas; otherwise he will be doomed to perdition. This point is emphasised by Raghunandana but is not dwelt upon by the earlier and later writers. This seems to indicate that at least in Raghunandana's time in Bengal life-long celibacy was looked down. It will be seen later that one might remain a bachelor for whole life but in that case he would have to abandon the

⁶⁰ न गृहं गृहमित्याहुर्गृहिणी गृहमुच्यते—*Īdvāha-tattva*.

duties of a householder and perform those of a sannyāsin. The āśramas are four for Brāhmaṇas, three for Kṣatriyas, two for Vaiśyas and only one for Śūdras. The above rule clearly indicates that one should not defer marriage as well as other Saṁskāras when they become due.

Here a question naturally arises as to what should be the position of an old widower who by losing his wife becomes an Anāśramin or fallen from āśramas. Here Raghunandana cites an authority which designates a widower aged forty-eight and above as Raṇḍāśramin so that when he loses his wife he is fallen from the Gṛhasthāśrama no doubt but for him is created a fifth āśrama called Raṇḍā. This is certainly an ingenious contrivance evidently designed to enable such a man to perform certain śāstric duties which a man without an āśrama is not entitled to do. By citing this authority Raghunandana seems to discourage the reprehensible practice of marrying one's daughter to an old man who may even be an octogenarian. Marriage being such an important institution we find certain noteworthy exceptions to the rule of Parivedana and also certain other important rules. It has been pointed out above that although Parivedana is highly sinful yet a man marrying before his elder brother who willingly abstains from marriage when it is due does not incur any sin whatsoever. Then again impurity (Aśauca) consequent upon the death of parents, though an obstacle to the performance of most of the religious duties, does not stand in the way of one's marriage when it is one's due. So long as a suitable bride is not available a man fit for marriage should perform the duties of a snātaka. If he is a sannyāsin he will, of course, be devoted to the duties of Sannyāsa and shall not take a wife like the Gṛhastha.

The sacredness of the institution of marriage is emphasised by Śrīnātha, who cites a number of authoritative texts in support of his view, by saying that only that man

has a right to marry who, with untarnished Brahmacharya, prosecuted the Vedic studies strictly according to the rules enjoined by the Śāstras. This necessarily implies, as Śrīnātha points out, that a man, once fallen from Brahmacharya, must perform the requisite penances before he can be entitled to enter into the second stage of life, viz., Gārhasthya. These rules at once show that marriage in those times required a great sense of responsibility in one who intended to marry and was not an arbitrary and rash act of thoughtless young men.

Śrīnātha further holds, on the authority of Manu and others, that the second stage of life or Gārhasthya, of which the taking of a wife forms an essential part, is superior to the three other āśramas. It is the Gārhastha who is expected to support the members of other āśramas so as to enable them to go on with their own duties by providing them with food and shelter whenever necessary.

Many are the benefits accruing from the proper gift of a daughter in the midst of tumultuous sounds of various musical instruments, these last being supposed to drive away all evils. Besides attaining heaven for eternity the giver of a daughter in marriage enjoys many other advantages in the world hereafter.

Kanyā Sampradāna—Merits of.

Raghunandana's attitude is that it is marriage and not mere betrothal that causes a man's ownership over the bride so that a contract of betrothal can be avoided under certain circumstances and there can be no specific performance though damages are sometimes allowed to the aggrieved party. Although there are authorities prohibiting a man from withholding the marriage of a girl who is betrothed yet such withholding is allowed if it is for the interest of the girl, e.g. when the nominated bridegroom proves to be impotent and otherwise an undesirable person. If a man after paying Śulka to the girl, who is betrothed to himself,

Effects of betrothal.

goes away to a foreign land and does not return within a year the girl may be married away to another man. The contract of betrothal is irrevocable under special circumstances. A bridegroom refusing to marry a faultless girl betrothed to him shall have to undergo pecuniary punishment besides being compelled to marry that particular girl. The father withholding a girl after betrothal without sufficient cause and thus violating the contract shall suffer punishment besides paying, with interest, whatever money was spent by the proposed bridegroom in giving ornaments etc. to the bride. In the event of the bride's death the person to whom she was betrothed shall take back what-ever he gave the bride after, of course, adjusting the expenses incurred in this connection by both parties. Thus betrothal is sometimes an irrevocable contract and the welfare of the girl in question plays a considerable part in making such a contract irrevocable.

The position of slaves, described by Raghunandana in the *Udvāha-tattva*, is rather interesting. Slaves are of two kinds—

Slavery and marriage.

1. *Bhaktadāsa*—one becoming a slave for food.

2. *Baḍavākṛta*—one becoming a slave by marrying the woman slave of somebody.

Woman-slaves are also of two classes:—

1. A woman not originally a slave but enslaved by the master of the slave who marries her.

2. A woman who herself becomes a slave.

The first kind of woman-slave naturally becomes the slave of her husband's master. A woman slave of one master, i.e. a woman slave of the second class, being married to a man slave of the other remains a slave of her own master, but her husband's master may have proprietary rights over her at the permission of the former. The man slave in this case is not transferred to his wife's master.

The children born of such a union should be distributed equally among the two masters. Those begotten on a woman slave by any person (who is not a slave) except her husband are in the possession of her master and not of the person giving birth to them.

The way in which Raghunandana deals with slavery here tends to show that slavery prevailed in his time and that slaves were regarded as mere chattels.

Eight forms of marriage seem to have been recognised in India from a very remote date. In the form called Brāhma the bridegroom is invited
Forms of marriage. and the girl, adorned with ornaments according to the father's capacity, is given away to him. The child born of such a union is believed to sanctify not only itself but also ten generations both upwards and downwards, i.e. twenty-one generations in all.

The Daiva is that form in which the girl is given away to a R̥tvik engaged in sacrifices and in the Ārṣa form the giver of the girl presents a couple of cows received from the bridegroom. The children of these couples sanctify fourteen and six generations respectively.

That form of marriage is called Prājāpatya in which the gift of the girl is preceded by the words meaning "Practise religion jointly." The children born of such a couple purify six generations.

In an Āsura marriage the giver of the girl accepts from the bridegroom money exceeding the amount prescribed by Śāstras and a Gāndharva marriage takes place at the mutual agreement of the bridegroom and the bride independently of their respective guardians.

The bridegroom's forcibly taking away the bride constitutes the Rākṣasa marriage while in the eighth and the meanest form, viz. Paisāca, a man willing to marry a girl outrages her modesty while she is asleep, intoxicated, or otherwise loses control over herself.

The first five (or according to some four) forms were regarded as approved forms and the rest as disapproved ones.

From this account we are not in a position to know which forms were actually in vogue in the Hindu society of Bengal as depicted by Raghunandana. But unlike the writers of Dharmaśāstras Raghunandana and his predecessors and successors in Bengal *smṛti* say nothing about the suitability of particular forms to particular castes.

By quoting a series of *smṛti* texts and introducing subtle discussions of a purely academic nature Nāṇḍimukha or Vṛddhi Śrāddha. Raghunandana concludes that the beginning of the ceremony of marriage is marked by the Nāṇḍimukha or Vṛddhi Śrāddha which is obligatory. This Śrāddha is to be performed by the father in the recognised ceremonies (Saṁskāras) of both the son and the daughter. In the case of the son the father should perform Śrāddha only on the occasion of his marrying for the first time and not in his subsequent marriages if any, which cannot be included among Saṁskāras because he becomes Samskṛta by the first marriage; it is enjoined that Vṛddhi-Śrāddha should be performed only once before a particular Saṁskāra.

In Vṛddhi-Śrāddha the father should offer piṇḍas to his three male ancestors in each of the paternal and maternal lines. As regards the Śrāddha of the three maternal ancestors it is inferred from a verse of Vṛddhi-Yājñavalkya. The father being unable to perform Vṛddhi-śrāddha due to his sojourn abroad or any physical indisposition his son or any one specifically empowered by the Śāstras may perform it as his representative though not formally appointed by him. Persons other than the father shall perform the Śrāddha of the ancestors of the father and not of those of themselves, that is to say, they will perform Śrāddha exactly of those persons to whom the father, if able,

would have offered piṇḍas. In the event of the father's death or subsequent marriages of the son the son himself shall perform Vṛddhi-śrāddha. He will not, of course, offer piṇḍas to the father who may be alive. Without Vṛddhi-Śrāddha Vivāha remains impure; hence it must be performed also by grand-father etc. who may have to give away their grand-daughter in marriage. The mother, however, herself making Kanyā-sampradāna shall not perform this Śrāddha to which woman as a class are not entitled.

Here Raghunandana raises a controversy as to whether a Sāmavedi Brāhmaṇa should perform Vṛddhi-Śrāddha separately of the female ancestors. By introducing a series of arguments and counter-arguments he shows that no separate Śrāddha of any female is to be performed in any case except in her death anniversaries.

SANSKRIT DRAMA IN A COMPARATIVE LIGHT

By K. C. PANDEY

(Continued from Vol. V. pt. 4.)

Unity of Fable or Action

Unity of fable in the sense of its oneness, according to Aristotle, consists not in the whole series of incidents being related to one man or one time, but in its being logically connected with one end, in each succeeding member of the series being necessarily or probably being connected with the preceding. Tragedy is the highest product of the imitative art. Artistic imitation is imitation of one thing only, not only in the case of the art of painting but also in that of tragedy. The only difference in the latter case is that it imitates not one thing but one action. This must be a whole, the parts of which are so related with one another that if any one of them be displaced or taken away the whole will become wholly different or changed.

Unities of Time and Place

The unity of place and the unity of time imply such division of the original plot into presentable and unrepresentable that the presentable part which has to be addressed to the eyes and not to the ears, is concerned with incidents which may be represented as happening in one single place and at one single time. They also imply conveying information through the ears to the audience about such incidents as are unrepresentable in or through action by such means as chorus, messenger and prologue etc.

The unities of time and place were necessary in Greek drama because of its peculiar constitution. Chorus was an important part of it. It remained in the orchestra even

during the interval between two episodes. It was represented by a group of elders who were sympathisers of the hero and therefore to whom he expressed his thoughts and feelings. It represented spectators in the drama. The whole tragedy, therefore, from prologue to exode was naturally one single continuous scene without any break such as could permit the change of place and time.

Conception of Action in English Drama

English dramatists have considerably modified Aristotelian conception of Dramatic Action. They do not recognise "manners" or moral habits and sentiments, the discussive energy of reason, as the sources of dramatic action. The heroes of English tragedies are not necessarily men of strict moral principles. Some of them have no moral principles. English dramatists present "Character" manifesting itself in action such as logically leads them to tragic end. They, substitute character for manners. They present an individual whose individuality is made up of a multiplicity of physical, intellectual, moral and even immoral tendencies. These tendencies of an individual constitute his character. According to Aristotle, manners were not essential for tragedy. For, he recognised even such tragedies as are without manners. Thus while, according to Aristotle there could be a tragedy without manners, according to English dramatists there can be no tragedy without character.

Comparison

If we retain Aristotelian conception of perfect action, which implies perfect agent; and substitute *basic mental state* or *basic emotion* for character in the English conception of tragic action, we would have a clear conception of action in Sanskrit Drama. Action in Sanskrit Drama is a series of actions, which springs from a basic emotive tendency,

aroused by a situation, in which an ideal person finds himself. With such a conception of action in his mind, Sanskrit Dramatist, cannot logically present the hero as meeting a tragic end. Hence there is no tragedy in Sanskrit.

Similarity in the Method of Treatment of the Subject Matter

Bharata does not expound a theory of Drama. He does not treat drama philosophically. He is not concerned with any metaphysical, ethical or logical principles, in terms of which he has to present his views. His point of view is practical and not theoretical. He does not expound, but speaks aphoristically to instruct the would be dramatists.

Let us, therefore, see on what lines, he wants the would be dramatists to be instructed. Suppose some one specially gifted to write a drama discovers a story, historical or otherwise, fit in every way for dramatic presentation. The question arises: what should he do to dramatise it? Should he reproduce all the historical facts or should he modify them in some way? If the latter be the case, on what lines should the modification proceed?

The first thing for dramatisation of a set of events, historical, contemporary or imaginative, is to fix upon what is going to be the object of achievement, and who is to be represented to achieve it. In short, first of all the plot should be analysed with a view to determine upon the hero of the piece and the object of his achievement. The value of such an analysis is obvious. Once the hero is chosen, he has naturally got to receive more attention and has to be kept in the forefront, relegating all others, whatever their importance, into the back-ground. Such a question, therefore as is generally raised in the case of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, "who is the hero of the piece, Brutus or Caesar" cannot arise in the case of Sanskrit drama.

Once the plot has been analysed in the above manner, more attention has naturally to be given to the central theme. The main story represents the hero achieving one of the goals recognised by the Indian Society. But no achievement is possible without any serious effort on the part of the ambitious. Action, therefore, is an essential part of the story. Hence the question that naturally arises, is, how is the action to be presented or what is the method to be followed in the presentation thereof, i. e. what method does Bharata, as interpreted by Abhinava, suggest for adoption in this case?

The reply is that the presentation of action has to be in consonance with the basic mental state, which is primarily intended to be presented. Therefore, only as much action as can go with such mental state, lead to it and reveal it as far as possible, admits of presentation in a Sanskrit Drama. It is, however, necessary for maintaining the unity of the story as a whole, not entirely to ignore or leave out those portions, which do not go with the intensity of emotion or feeling. Accordingly the action has to be divided into two kinds. (i) that which is to be actually presented on the stage (*Dṛśya*) and (ii) that which is simply to be hinted at or communicated (*Sūcya*).

The former is to be kept very distinct from the latter. For it is on this basis that the dramatic story is divided into acts (*Aṅka*) and the informative scenes of different kinds which, according to the need of the occasion are introduced, either in the beginning or at the end of different acts, such as (i) *Viṣkambhaka*, (ii) *Cūlikā*, (iii) *Aṅkāśya*, (iv) *Aṅkāvatāra* and (v) *Praveśaka*. Accordingly such actions, as long journey, battle, rebellion, feast etc. are not to be presented.

This method of division of action of the plot is accepted by Aristotle. The means of communicating the unrepresentable according to Aristotle are prologue, chorus and messengers.

Unities of Time and Place Maintained in each Act

We shall be able to understand better the importance of this method of presentation in the eyes of Sanskrit dramatists, if we take into account the following facts:—

Sanskrit dramatist takes the greatest possible care not to introduce anything on the stage, which is likely to shock the spectator's sense of reality of the presented. The stage, being of the limited size and the drama being intended to be presented within a fixed duration of time, he does not present on the stage all such things as do not fit in with the temporal and spatial limitations of the stage presentation. He, therefore, naturally has to content himself with giving information about such things as big battles, long journeys and rebellion etc., through the informative scenes.

He has to maintain the unity of time and consequently of space within each act of drama. For, the dramatic action, according to Indian dramaturgist, has to be divided into five parts, on the basis of five stages of action; and each stage has to be presented in a separate act. The continuity of the dramatised story has to be maintained, after the end of an act through introduction¹ of Bindu (recollection of purpose) which is like a thread and strings together the various stages of action, presented separately in separate acts.

The action and events, presented in an act ought to be such as do not extend over more than five Muhūrtas². For, that is just the duration of time, for which the actors can act and spectators can³ witness the performance at a stretch, without feeling any inconvenience, due to interference with the daily natural routine. Thus, if the events and action connected with one stage of action be such as

¹ *A. Bb. Ch.* 19 (20?) V. 13 (MS). ² *S. C.*, 635.

³ *A. Bb. Ch.* 19 (20) V. 34. (MS).

consistently with unity of time, cannot be presented in one act, there are two ways of dealing with such a part of story—

(i) It may be split up into two acts.

(ii) The less important parts of it may be presented in inforamatory scene⁴.

It may be pointed out here that the inforamatory scene also cannot cover a period of more than a year⁵. And even if in the original story the events be scattered over a longer period, the dramatist has to modify the plot so as to compress them within the prescribed time.

Just as the principle of unity of time is maintained within an act so the principle of unity of place also is upheld within the same. The scenes of action within an act cannot lie so far apart from one another as cannot be reached by the hero within the time necessary for presentation of act. If they be far distant from one another they have to be presented in separate acts. If after an event or action that is presented in an act, there is to be presented another which is related to a far distant place, so that the hero cannot reach within the time limit of an act, the act should terminate with the presentation of the hero as starting on his journey. But if the hero has got the means of transport e.g. aeroplane such as can enable him to reach far distant places within the prescribed time, the scenes of action lying far apart may be presented within the same act.⁶

Thus it is clear that the statement of Professor Keith in his "Sanskrit Drama" that Sanskrit dramatists were ignorant of the principles of unities of time and place, is based upon his own ignorance of the dramatic technique in Sanskrit drama.

⁴ N. S. 228.

⁵ N. S. 228.

⁶ A. Bb. Ch. 19 (20) (?) V. 30 (MS).

As regards the principle of unity of action in Sanskrit drama, we have to say only this much that if there is a principle that a Sanskrit dramatist cannot violate, it is this principle. Sanskrit dramatist aims at presenting a basic mental state in such a manner as to bring about the identification of the aesthete with the focus of the situation so as to make him experience the emotion of the hero. He, therefore, cannot introduce any action, which is not in harmony with the basic mental state.

Unity of action in Sanskrit Drama is both *subjective* and *objective*. It is subjective in so far as the whole series of actions springs from a single subjective principle, the basic emotion. It is objective in so far as the series of actions is logically related to a single end. The Sanskrit conception of unity of action presents an advance on Greek and English conceptions. For the latter recognise objective unity only.

Analysis of the Main Plot

Any action, if conceived of as complete, has five parts—
 (i) Before any action, that is to lead to any considerable achievement, is actually begun, there has to be clear consciousness of what is intended to be achieved, eagerness and determination to get it and decision as regards the ways and means of attainment. (ii) Once the action is planned out, the next stage will naturally be the actual beginning of the execution of the plan. (iii) This will naturally give rise to some hope of attaining the wished for. These three stages are common to every action, whether it is going to be a failure or a success. (iv) After this stage there arises the difference between the tragic and the comic or non-tragic action. In the former case the ambitious reaches as near his goal as he ever can and then he meets some such obstacle or hindrance as he can never get over and, therefore,

begins to recede from it. This can be represented to be the fourth stage of action. (v) And then he meets his doom. But in the comic or non-tragic action, though undoubtedly the pursuant of his goal meets difficulties, but they are not such as he cannot overcome; or, such are his inner and outer resources that he gets over all of them and becomes certain to achieve the objective. The final stage is naturally the realisation of what he had set his heart on.

In a good drama, which has to present action as a unity, and the action of which has to be complete in itself, these five stages are clearly distinguishable. In all Shakespearean dramas all these stages of action are clearly distinguishable. In fact each of the five acts of a drama is intended to present one of the five stages of action. It is interesting to note in this connection that this is just the basis of division of the main plot into acts (Aṅkas) in Sanskrit drama. And a good drama (Nāṭaka) can never have less than five acts. When there are more than five acts, the additional acts present some one or the other of these five stages, which could not be well presented in one act. But more than two acts can never be occupied with the presentation of the same stage. It is because of this that the number of acts in a drama can never exceed ten.⁷

These stages in the case of a comedy in English are generally called (i) cause, (ii) growth, (iii) height, (iv) consequence and (v) close. In the case of a tragedy, however, the last two are differently called, because of the difference in the turn that action takes. They are called (i) fall, because it represents the fall from the height which is reached by the hero; and (ii) catastrophe, because herein he meets his doom. In Sanskrit also they are called by words which have almost the same implication as the first five,

mentioned above. They are—(i) Ārambha, (ii) Yatna, (iii) Prāptyāśā (iv) Niyatāpti and (v) Phalāgama.⁸

Comparing the division of action into different stages by Bharata and Aristotle, we find that while Bharata divides action into five stages, Aristotle does so into three. But Aristotle's subdivision of the middle is such as includes additional stages admitted by Bharata and English dramatists.

(i) There is perfect agreement between Bharata and Aristotle in the conception of the first stage. Both give it names which imply the same thing. One calls it *Prārambha*. The other calls it beginning. (ii) The middle is subdivided by Aristotle into (1) complication, (2) resolution, (3) revolution and (4) discovery. The last two are implied in resolution. In Sanskrit we have three parts of the middle—(i) Yatna, the use of the chosen means by the hero, or some one closely connected with him, for the attainment of the desired end. Aristotle has nothing corresponding to it. Of course complication presupposes it. (ii) Prāptyāśā corresponds to Aristotelian conception of complication inasmuch as it involves ignorance of some particulars on the part of hero; it implies that there is a cover which shrouds certain facts; it implies reversal in fortune of the principal character. (iii) Niyatāpti corresponds to resolution or disentanglement. For, it is concerned with the removal of shroud, clearing of mystery, as a result of which the hero becomes certain to realise his objective.

This is, however, to be noted here that there is nothing in Sanskrit, corresponding to fall and catastrophe in English tragedy, because in Sanskrit we have no tragedy in the strict sense of it in English. We have already explained why we have no tragedy in Sanskrit.

⁸ D, R. 5.

Thus though Sanskrit drama differs from both English and Greek dramas, particularly tragedies, in respect of the object that it presents and the effect that it aims at producing in the spectator, yet there is fair similarity in the treatment of the subject matter and the technique adopted for it.

WHITEHEAD AND SANKARA

By P. NAGARAJA RAO

(Continued from Vol. V Pt. 4)

It is a reciprocal "superimposition. When the body is ill or well one says I am ill or well, when it lacks the sense of sight or hearing, one says, I am blind or I am deaf. We too well know that the senses belong to the category of the not-self, as any piece of external matter. In spite of the diametrically opposing characteristics we still identify the one with the other. It is further argued with great cogency and persuasive skill that unless there is superimposition on the ātman of the anātman, it is not possible to have knowledge or *vyavahāra*. Unless one identifies himself with his sense organs, one cannot become the knowing subject. The subject-object relation presupposed in knowledge implies and necessitates the assumption of *māyā*. Thus Śaṅkara points out that in everything we need *māyā*. Even the effort to transcend *māyā* has to be made in the world of *māyā*.⁸³

An adequate description of *māyā* in terms of finite categories, the advaitin has not been able to give us. He holds that *māyā* is not real because it is destroyed at the time of Brahman realisation. It is not unreal because we cognise it. So it is difficult to brand it as unreal and relegate it to the category of the barren woman's son and horns of a hare.

It cannot be described as the Real and the unreal, for such a description violates the Law of contradiction. Nor can it be described as non-real-cum-non-unreal, because it is of a positive nature. For want of any description the

⁸³ Śaṅkara's commentary on *Vedānta sūtra*. *Adhyāsa bhāṣya*.

advaitin describes it as indeterminable or *anirvacanīya*. It may be urged against the advaitin that his concept of *māyā* is not intelligible. He admits it and says, why expect perfect intelligibility from what is itself called *avidyā*? Practical efficiency belongs to *māyā* and *māyā* alone and not to Brahman. The advaitin's metaphysics is like that of Kant, critical. He finds the accepted canons of logic and the categories of thought self-contradictory and discrepant. The ultimate truth which the advaitin accepts rests on intuitive realisation. There is always an unexplained element in all theories. The doctrine of *māyā* does not recklessly accept any and every position, nor does it dogmatise about anything. It examines every category and tenet and shows up the inner contradictions. The term *māyā* expresses the limitation of human knowledge. Finite knowledge is possible only in limits, our understanding is hedged in by limitations and when we cross the fence we are not able to describe. The English Absolutist Bradley tells us, that 'to show how and why the universe is, so that finite existence belongs to it, is utterly impossible. That would imply an understanding of the whole, not practicable for a mere part'.

Whitehead makes a few observations on this aspect. He says, 'the certainties of science are a delusion. They are hedged around with unexplored limitations' 'Our handling of scientific doctrines is controlled by the diffused metaphysical concepts of our epoch. Even so, we are continually led into errors of expectation. Also, whenever some new mode of observational experience is obtained the old doctrines crumble into a fog of inaccuracies'.⁸⁴ After a few pages he again points out 'but for all these differences, human thought is now endeavouring to express analogous elements in the composition of nature. It only dimly discerns, it misdescribes, and it wrongly associates'.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ *Adventures of Ideas* p. 198.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p. 203.

Thus there is always the difficulty to get a fully explained universe.

• The indeterminable nature of *māyā* in terms of finite categories should not lead us to the conclusion that the advaitin is a sceptic and an agnostic. Here, unlike Bradley, Śaṅkara does affirm the reality of the spirit. Though it is not knowable, it can be realised by intuition. It is the reality behind all the things. 'Scepticism,' Bradley describes as follows 'I mean by scepticism the mere denial of any known satisfactory doctrine, together with the personal despair of any future attainment'.⁸⁶

There is no such despair in Śaṅkara. Brahman is the only real existent. It is the reality of the appearance. The world is not a pure conceptual construct but an objective entity. In the words of an independent advaita thinker the world is not a *dr̥ṣṭi-śr̥ṣṭi* but *anābhāsa*. He explains the term *ābhāsa* as *avicārita samsiddhi*, i.e. that which is established till the final realisation.⁸⁷

The term appearance is not a libel. In a celebrated passage Bradley brings out the significance of appearance. "That the glory of this world in the end is appearance leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it a show of some fuller splendour; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movements of atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories."⁸⁸

So far we have seen how Whitehead's definition of religious experience fits in with the advaita metaphysics. Brahman is something which stands beyond, behind and within the flux of immediate things. 'We have also seen how Brahman is related to the immediate flux of things'.

⁸⁶ Bradley *Essays in Truth and Reality*; p. 445.

⁸⁷ Sūreśvara's *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārttika*.

⁸⁸ Bradley *Principle of logic*: Vol II p. 591 (1922).

Further the religious experience is declared to be⁸⁹ something which is real, yet waiting to be realised, 'something which is a remote possibility and yet the greatest of present facts.'⁹⁰

This idea is integral to the advaita conception of release or mokṣa.

In its conception of mokṣa the advaita view scores over other systems. Most of the theistic systems describe mokṣa as attained by the grace of the Lord. In the language of the theistic passages of the Upaniṣads, mokṣa is represented as due to Īśvara's grace (prasāda). It is derivative. Man's virtue and ethical life prepare him for the liberation. There is a gulf between man and God, between Time and Eternity. The difference is a difference in kind and not of degree. Liberation is a supernatural gift of the Lord to the aspiring spiritual aspirant. It is not native to the soul of man. Man has essentially creaturiness. He can never become liberated from finitude except through Lord's grace.⁹⁰

Such a position is not acceptable to Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara posits that mokṣa is native to man and not derivative. Man and Brahman are not two different kinds of entities. One can evolve into another. Evolution in the inorganic field and in the animal world is automatic and is guided by natural laws. Even in the world of nature modern Biologists are of opinion that there are no burlesque mutations. Julian Huxley in his recent volume of collected essays says 'With the new knowledge of the last twenty years the overwhelming consensus of biology has returned to support Darwin's original view of extreme gradualness of all evolutionary change.'⁹¹

⁸⁹ *Science and the Modern world* : p. 238.

⁹⁰ Theistic Christianity and all the theistic schools of Vedānta hold to this view.

According to Rāmānuja the *Gītā* is the book of devotion demanding self-surrender to the Lord's will.

⁹¹ Julian Huxley. *On living in a Revolution*, p. 47. (1944).

Even a sceptical historian like Gibbon writes as follows, 'I shall not, I trust, be accused of superstition, but I must remark, that even in this world, the natural order of events will some times afford the strong appearance of moral retribution.'

But evolution at the human level is not physical. The process becomes conscious. Man has reached his biomechanical limit. Development can take place only on the side of values, and not in physical power. Julian Huxley observes that with man evolution takes a different turn, with him values and ideals come into being. The criteria is their satisfaction. 'The quest for truth and knowledge, virtue, beauty and aesthetic expression and its satisfaction through the channels of science and philosophy, mysticism and morality, literature and arts, becomes one of the modes or avenues of evolutionary progress. A tendency in this direction had been manifested earlier in evolution. On the whole, biological progress in its later stages had been more concerned with independence of the environment than with control over it....We may anticipate that in the remote future that human control over the environment will become increasingly devoted to securing greater independence—in other words, greater freedom from material exigencies—and both of them together to securing a greater degree of self-realisation and of the satisfaction of the human values'⁹².

Aristotle observed 'that without virtue man is the most dangerous animal.' But his high destiny is not the gift of any supernatural entity but can be had by his own effort. The Gītā says 'let a man raise the self by the self and not let the self become depressed, for, verily, is the self the friend of the self and also the self the self's enemy.'⁹³

⁹² *Ibid* p. 52.

See: *Hibbert Journal* Julian Huxley 'Philosophy in a World at War' Nov. 1942.

⁹³ *Gītā* VI-5.

The Buddha asked his disciples to take their refuge in the self. 'Be ye, as those who have the self as their light, Be ye, as those who have the self as their refuge.' Betake yourself to no external refuge. Hold fast to the truth as to a refuge.⁹⁴

The charter of advaita says 'that thou art' and not 'that thou wilt become.' Brahman realisation is not something that is produced but it is there all the time waiting to be realised. It is the art of self discovery.⁹⁵

The illustration given is that of a prince brought up as hunter from infancy, discovering afterwards that he is of royal blood.⁹⁶ In the words of Vidyāranya, it is like the laying of one's hand on a forgotten golden ornament which is all the time resting on one's own neck. Śaṅkara proclaims that which is produced is bound to be destroyed. He holds that it is not produced. 'It is present, because it is eternal and is not dependent on the effort of human beings.'⁹⁷ It is real, but not realised. It is a making known and not a bringing into being. The kingdom of heaven comes not by observation. It is not hither nor thither, but is within us. It is the birth right of man. It is real; if it comes into being it cannot be real. 'That which is

⁹⁴ *Mahāparinibbāna sūta.* 33.

⁹⁵ The English poet Robert Browning gives expression to the advaita concept of mokṣa in the following lines, *Paracelsus*.

'Truth lies within ourselves ; it takes no rise.

From outward things, whate'er you may believe,

There is an inmost centre in us all

Where Truth abides in fullness ; and to know

Rather consists in opening a way,

When the imprisoned splendour may escape

Than in effecting entry for a light,

Supposed to be without.'

⁹⁶ Śaṅkara on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* II, 1, 1.

⁹⁷ Śaṅkara on *Vedānta sūtra* I, 1, 1.

'Bhūtam brahma jijñāsyam.

eternal cannot be achieved by action.⁹⁸ As the *Gītā* puts it 'the unreal never is, the real never is not.'⁹⁹

The *Chāndogya* declares 'that all beings visit Brahman world, day after day but not one realises it.'¹⁰⁰ If Brahman is so near us and if its realisation does not involve an ecstatic flight to some distant land, why do people not take advantage of it? Spinoza has answered the question for us, 'If the way of salvation lay ready to hand and could be found without toil, would it be neglected by nearly every one.' His answer is, 'all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare.'¹⁰¹

The Upaniṣads do not minimise the difficulty involved in the attainment of release. Śankara holds the view that the direct instrument for mokṣa is jñāna. Ethical excellence and ceremonial purity are only aids to jñāna. By jñāna we mean realisation and not mediate knowledge. Mere mediate knowledge does not take us very far.¹⁰² The sage Nārada approached Sanatkumāra for instruction in that art which would give him freedom and abiding peace. He confessed to Sanatkumāra that he was learned in all the arts. He said, I know the *Rgveda* the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāma-veda*, the *Atharvaveda* as the fourth legend and ancient lore (itihāsa-purāṇa) as the fifth, veda of the vedas i.e., Grammar etc.....He concluded saying that he was only the knower of *mantras* and not *ātman*.¹⁰³ Brahman realised is not through intellectual process. It is a type of illumination. For Brahman reali-

⁹⁸ *Muṇḍaka* II, 12 'nastyakṛtaḥ kṛtena'

⁹⁹ *Gītā* II 16.

¹⁰⁰ *Chāndogya*, VIII, 2.

¹⁰¹ Spinoza *Ethics* concluding passage.

¹⁰² *Varābhopaniṣad*—

asti brahmeti ced paroḥṣajñānam eva tat

aham brahmeti ced veda sākṣātkāras sa ucyate.

¹⁰³ *Chāndogya*, VII, 1, 3.

sation intellectuality paves the way, ceremonial purity (karma) and ethical excellence lead to the purification of the mind. On the intellectual side the training consists of the study and discussion of the Upaniṣads with the help of a guru who has some experience of spiritual-life. The study must enable us to meditate upon self. It must give us that knowledge which destroys *māyā* which is the cause of all sufferings. We must also understand that the prime purport of all scriptures is the identity of the ātman with self. The intellectual discipline must enable us to discriminate between the eternal and the transient. At the intellectual stage it must be of the nature of a conviction. *Śravaṇa* i.e., the study of scripture gives us this knowledge. The second stage is called *manana* i.e. arguing within oneself as to how and why the vedantic teaching alone is true. In this stage, what has been learnt from others is turned into a conviction. Rational reflection has a very important place in advaita.¹⁰⁴

After reflection we have *nididhyāsana*. It is a continued and prolonged meditation of the advaitic truth till the time of realisation. If this is not done, the conviction will peter away by the unconscious reassertion of old habits of thought and desires. It is here we feel the need to check our impulses and train them well. Śāṅkara is not for the thwarting of our desires, but is for training them and harnessing them to proper ends. That is the purpose of morality. A mere natural life is not likely to lead man to realisation. The unregenerate life of man must be overcome. This can be achieved by a healthy kind of disinterestedness as advocated by the *Gītā*. The central point of the *Gītā* is that a certain amount of renunciation is necessary and good in every act for its being done well.¹⁰⁵ In the words of A. Huxley 'disinterestedness helps us to break our unregenerate self-hood.'

¹⁰⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* II, 4, 5.

¹⁰⁵ This is the stand taken by Mahatma Gandhi in his commentary on the *Gītā*. He appropriately calls it *anāsakti yoga*.

It is this self-hood that constitutes the most heavy and hardly translucent substance which cuts off most of the light of Reality and distorts what little it permits to pass. Śāṅkara enumerates the necessity for the practice of six virtues;¹⁰⁶ the control of the mind and the senses. These two lead to the temperance of thought. Temperance of act i.e. *Uparati* leads to renunciation in fact. The next one is fortitude. It is courage to endure the opposites. The last two are powers of concentration and faith (*saṁādhānam* and *śraddhā*). This gives us necessary strength to realise Brahman. The moral training coupled with intellectual knowledge makes the aspirant desire liberation.

After a strenuous moral training as the *Gītā* puts it, the individual has to abstract his senses from the multiplicity of objects. Further he has to put down firm by the surging and distracting desires that trouble the mind. A highly concentrated self can hear the inner voice. The *Gītā* asks us to be *ekākī* and *have yatacitta*.¹⁰⁷ It is only after this that realisation follows, when the individual gets behind the real self and goes down in the deep he establishes contact with the primary reality that is called *sākṣātkāra* or spiritual experience.

Now we have seen how spiritual realisation is the greatest of present facts and yet it is a remote possibility. The self is covered with many layers. The function of knowledge is to unveil the deepest layers of man's being and get into enduring contact with it. It is an experience and not a mere knowledge. It is an act of awareness. The important point about Śāṅkara is that mokṣa is not a super-natural gift but a natural evolution. It is not through divine election, but through natural evolution that man attains

¹⁰⁶ Huxley *Grey eminence*. p. 55.

¹⁰⁷ *Gītā*. VI—10.

¹⁰⁸ Śāṅkara 'anubhavārūḍham eva ca vidyāphalam.'
 9n *Vedānta sūtra*: III, 4, 15.

mokṣa. It is by the concentrated effort of man's entire self, illumined by knowledge that he attains release. The son of man becomes God; through the crucifixion we have the resurrection.

The nature of mokṣa though it is in the very nature of man is most difficult to attain because of man's selfish nature. The *Gītā* says¹⁰⁹ 'amongst thousands of men scarcely one strives for perfection, and of those who strive and succeed scarcely one knows the truth.'¹⁰⁹ In our activities we must try to be godlike. Aristotle observed, 'It is right that though we are mortal we should seek as far as possible to live as though we were immortal.'¹¹⁰

The third part in the definition of religious experience describes it 'as something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.'¹¹¹

The advaitin describes Brahman realisation as the supreme object of human life. It is held that it is the biggest thing in the world. Sanatkumāra instructs Nārada that what is great is bliss, there is no bliss in the small. (Yo vai bhūmā tat sukham nālpe sukham asti, bhūmaiva sukham.) It is held as the supreme value of life. Lord Kṛṣṇa says 'that on gaining which one feels there is no greater gain.'¹¹² Sage Āpastamba observes 'there is no greater gain than the true awareness of self.'¹¹³ 'Seek ye first the kingdom of heaven all other things will be added unto you.' That is the strain in which the Upaniṣads and Śāṅkara speak about the significance and value of realisation.

¹⁰⁹ *Gītā*, VII. 3.

¹¹⁰ S. Radhakrishnan, *India and China* p. 66.

¹¹¹ *Science and the Modern world* : p. 238.

¹¹² *Gītā* VI, 22.

¹¹³ *Āpastamba sūtra* : I, 22.

It is Brahman realisation that gives meaning to all that passes. Without it, it has no significance. All the things of the world are for it.

In a celebrated dialogue Yājñavalkya instructs his wife in the art of self-realisation and its significance. The spiritual aspirant Maitreyī when confronted by the separation of her husband and the bestowal of his goods put the question, 'If now, sir, this whole earth filled with wealth were mine, would I be immortal thereby?' 'No,' said Yājñavalkya, 'as the life of the rich, even so would your life be; of immortality, however, there is no hope through wealth.'¹¹⁴

Then said Maitreyī 'what should I do with that, through which I may not be immortal?'¹¹⁵ It is after this question that Yājñavalkya instructs her. He points out in his discourse that all our love is not merely for the object which we say we love; be it the son, the wife or the husband. It is the love of the self that makes us love things. He concludes 'verily, not for love of all is all dear, but for love of the soul all is dear.'¹¹⁶ What does it profit a man, as Christ put it, 'if he gains the whole world and loses his self.' The love of humanity and many things in this world is possible because of the love of self. The German Vedāntin Dr. Deussen towards the end of his tour in India said in a gathering in Bombay that the gospels quite correctly establish as the highest morality 'love your neighbour as yourself.' But why should I do so since by the order of nature I feel pleasure and pain only in myself, not in my neighbour. The answer is not in the Bible, but it is in the Upaniṣads, in the great formula *tattvamasi*. You love your neighbour as yourself because you are your neighbour. The ātmā is sarvasya ātma (it is 'the soul of all souls).

¹¹⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* : II, 4, 2.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid* II, 4, 3.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid* II, 4, 5.

Advaita metaphysics holds the view that all the bits of pleasures we get from our contact with the objects of the world are due to the Reality behind it which is consciousness, bliss and 'infinitude.'

Again, Yājñavalkya instructs his royal pupil the philosopher king of India Janaka 'that on a part of just this (Brahman) bliss' other creatures have their living.' (etas-yaivānandasya anyāni bhūtāni mātṛāmupajīvanti). He adds 'this is the highest achievement. This is the highest world. This is the highest bliss.'¹¹⁷ It is this that gives meaning to all that is in the world of space and time. It is the final good and still it is very difficult for unregenerate men to attain it. As the *Gītā* puts, it, human imagination and life being incurably earth-bound, is limited to the human. As a consequence of it we confuse and overlay our souls with thick layers of unreality. We continuously live 'at the plane of unreality. So we do not reach outside the range of the worlds of sense and reason. We get nettled into the meshes of our reason and passions. We become giddy with the power of our wealth and scientific knowledge. We declare in the language of the *Gītā* 'I am the Lord of all (Īśvara) and I enjoy myself. I am prosperous and mighty.'¹¹⁸

This I have gained to day; and that longing I will fulfill. This wealth is mine, and that also shall be mine hereafter. 'This foe I have slain and others too I shall slay'. I am rich and of high birth, who is there like unto me.' While hugging such thoughts to his mind the wretched human forgets that the Lord might say 'Thou fool, this night shall thy soul be required of thee.'

If men continue to live at this level of unreality they do not see the light. The sense of unreality increases by what it feeds on. Men begin to live the life of the impulses.

¹¹⁷ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* IV, 3, 32.

¹¹⁸ *Gītā* XVI. V. 14.

They don't check their impulses, or suppress their wishes. They find no need to mortify their flesh. They live to the full capacity of their nature. They keep their faculties at the concert pitch. They live an all round life. Appolo gets his due, Venus also gets her due. This unregenerate life at the level of unreality has no chance of spiritual experience. It is a hopeless quest for them. They are never after it. If you tell them that 'blessed are those that hunger after spiritual experience' they reply, we have no appetite for that excellent fare. Lord Kṛṣṇa refers to them as the lost souls. He says, these unregenerate souls 'being deluded from birth to birth never attain me.'¹²⁰ The quest is hopeless for these men and it eludes their apprehension. 'Many are called but few are chosen.' The few must choose themselves.

The Upaniṣads and Śāṅkara both insist on a discriminative wisdom as the cause of philosophic enquiry and hold the view that detachment is necessary for it. The *Kaṭha* declares that the path of self realisation is 'like the sharp edge of a razor difficult to cross and hard to tread.'¹²¹ It warns us to be wide awake and not allow the devil to take possession of us. We must be sentinels forever on guard against the stratagems of the enemy. The devil has a hundred hide-outs from which it will be springing up. Eternal vigilance is the price not only of political liberty but of spiritual realisation. Good life is indispensable to it. If spiritual realisation is non-derivative and so easy, why do men not take to it? It gives them eternal bliss. The answer is then men are doped in their fancy happiness. So they continue to live at the level of unreality. The awakening is necessary. It is obtained by critical enquiry and realised by unremitting endeavour.

¹¹⁹ *Gītā*: XVI, V 13, 14, 15.

¹²⁰ *Gītā*: XVI, V, 20.

¹²¹ *Kaṭha*: I, III, 14.

We have seen so far what religious experience is and how it is the ultimate ideal and final good. In the language of the Upaniṣads, realisation frees us from fear and secures abhaya (freedom from fear). It ferries us across the ocean of sorrow. It gives us sānti. Man is created for this vision.

It is men with this experience that are able to reform the world. They do not have any longing whatsoever. They regard entire world as their home. They have no individual good to pursue. 'Considerations of mine and thine weigh only with the little minded; to the large hearted the whole world is a single house hold.'¹²² They go about the universe scattering love on the pavements of the universe even though it is unrequited. In the words of S. Radhakrishnan these men are the creative spirits who disclose the reality of the spirit at vast interval of time through the power of their life and teaching. They have seen God face to face and reflect clearly the divine purpose and practice it. Their wisdom is enlightenment and their knowledge is power. They 'add to the invisible forces of goodness' in the world. They have 'stamped infinity' on the thought and the life of the country.

These seers after their spiritual realisation do not remain indifferent to the human situation and misery. The seer is not a mere spectator. The realised soul by his example and activity brings good to mankind. It is of these men of spiritual realisation, rapt in intimate union with Brahman, the ocean of infinite bliss and knowledge, the poet said, 'their family is for ever sanctified, their mothers blessed. They are the peace-makers and the salt of the earth.'¹²³

¹²² *ayaṁ nijaḥ paro veti gaṇanā laghucetasāṁ : udāracaritānāṁ tu vasudhaiva kuṭumbakam.*

¹²³ *Kulaṁ pavitraṁ, janani kṛtārthā, vasundharā punyavati ca teṇa, Apāra śaṁvit sukhasāgare' smin līnam pare brahmaṇi yasya cetah.*

Peace or *sānti* is the main characteristic of realisation. It is one ineffable joy. As the Upaniṣad puts it, fear arises only from the existence of a second.

We have so far examined Whitehead's celebrated definition of religion and the advaitin's concept. We have also noted how the description of religious experience is integral to advaita metaphysics. Whitehead agrees with the advaitin in affirming the importance of the concept of peace. He describes it at great length and holds the view that it alone completes civilisation. He says 'a society is to be termed civilised whose members participate in the five qualities—Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art, Peace.'¹²⁵ It is peace 'which shall bind together the other four 'qualities, so as to exclude from our notion of civilisation the restless 'egotism with which they have often in fact been pursued.'¹²⁶ 'Apart from it (peace),' Whitehead holds, the pursuit of 'Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art' can be ruthless, hard, cruel.'¹²⁷ He does not equate peace with 'tenderness' and 'love.' He does not think it is impersonal. He says that 'impersonality is too dead a notion and 'tenderness' too narrow.'

He describes peace as follows, 'The peace that is here meant is not the negative conception of anaesthesia. It is a positive feeling which crowns the 'life and motion' of the soul. It is hard to define and difficult to speak of. It is not a hope for the future, nor is it an interest in present details. It is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, unverbaised and yet momentous in its coordination of values. Its first effect is the removal of the stress of acquisitive feeling arising from the soul's preoccupation with itself. Thus peace

¹²⁴ *dvitīyād vai bhayam bhavati.*

¹²⁵ *Adventures of Ideas* : p. 367.

¹²⁶ *Ibid* p. 367.

¹²⁷ *Ibid* p. 366.

carries with it a surpassing of personality. There is an inversion of relative values.'¹²⁸

He continues 'Its (peace) emotional effect is the subsidence of turbulence which inhibits. More accurately, it preserves the springs of energy, and at the same time masters them for the avoidance of paralysing distractions.'¹²⁹

'The experience of peace is largely beyond the control of purpose. It comes as a gift. The deliberate aim at peace very easily passes into its bastard substitute, Anaesthesia. In other words, in the place of a quality of 'life and motion', there is substituted 'their destruction. Thus peace is the removal of inhibition and not its introduction. It results in a wider sweep of conscious interest. It enlarges the field of attention''¹³⁰

'It is a barrier against narrowness. One of its fruits is that passion whose existence Home denied, the love of mankind as such.'¹³¹

Whitehead further holds the view 'that there can be no real halt of civilisation in the indefinite repetition of a perfected ideal. Staleness sets in. And this fatigue is nothing other than the creeping growth of anesthesia, whereby that social group is gradually sinking towards nothingness'¹³²

Decay, transition, loss, displacement belong to the essence of the creative advance...¹³³ It keeps vivid the sensitiveness to the tragedy; and it sees the tragedy as a living agent persuading the world to aim at fineness beyond the faded level of surrounding fact. Each tragedy is the disclosure of an ideal what might have been, and was not'.¹³⁴

¹²⁸ *Adventures of Ideas* : p. 367.

¹²⁹ *Ibid* p. 367.

¹³⁰ *Ibid* p. 368.

¹³¹ *Adventures of Ideas* : p. 368.

¹³² *Ibid* ; p. 368.

¹³³ *Ibid* : p. 368-369.

¹³⁴ *Ibid* : p. 369.

Whitehead's description of peace and that of the advaitin are similar to some extent. The points of agreement are as important as the points of difference. Peace (*śānti*) is the final description of realisation. It is not negative, nor an unconscious state of mind. It is plenitude itself. It is bliss, knowledge and consciousness. Peace is declared to be the absolute requisite of well being. The *Gītā* declares 'he that has no peace—whence has he happiness.'¹³⁵ The sense of *śānti* born of spiritual realisation makes one realise the universal nature of self. He desires the good of all (*sarvabhūtahite rataḥ*). He has not egoistic feeling, he sees every where the universal self. The realisation of peace is the chief characteristic of spiritual experience. Śaṅkara regards it as native to the soul, which requires only to be unfolded. It is not a gift, not a present from above. The man who has realised peace goes above the relative distinctions of morality which obtains in the world of duality. He is no longer troubled by external standards. He is a law unto himself. As Burns observed 'the little men need rules and nothing else, the great men are a law unto themselves. He has no conflict. He no longer worries in the words of the Upaniṣads'. Have I done aught that is sinful, or neglected aught that is good.'¹³⁶

The man of peace has a universal vision. Some enlightened Christian missionaries and fanatical theists criticise the ethics of the perfection of self-realisation as non-moral because it does not admit of the distinction of the good and the evil. The state of spiritual perfection is no doubt beyond the region of good and evil.

But that is not an invitation to practise unethical conduct. The man of spiritual life has all his egoistic and acquisitive feeling burnt away. They are the chief sources of bad

¹³⁵ *Gītā* : II, 56.

¹³⁶ *Taittirīya* : II, 9.

conduct. With them all evil goes. Nothing bad can result from him. He has the source of all evil destroyed in him. He has no separatist feeling which is the basis of all distinctions and preferences. The strain of choosing the right and wrong and living the right ethical life is confined to the world of plurality. The advaitin envisages a stage beyond this. Spiritual experience transmutes conduct to that stage. After this experience the individual loses his self consciousness. He has no 'I'ness (*mamatā*). It is only when we are self conscious that our love to others is particularistic and not universal. The love which an individual bestows on others is exclusive. At this stage he loves with some strain. The law of love is still external to him. He has feelings of self-approbation and self-condemnation. The strain of ethical life is still present before him. As a result of spiritual realisation he transcends this dual point of view and relative distinctions. The selflessness or the unselfishness of the realised soul is the perfect one. The unselfishness of the soul that is conscious of its unselfishness is not the highest. It is moral but not spiritually perfect. We must forget the self-conscious nature of the moral agent also to be perfect. The *Mahābhārata* puts it well.

It asks us first to 'forswear all selfishness and then forswear that by which we do.'¹³⁷ At this stage law and love become one. It is only men with such realisation that can say 'There can be no happiness for any of us, until it is won for all?' 'If blood is to be shed, let it be ours.'

They exhort us to cultivate the quiet courage of dying without killing. Thus we see the ethic of self perfection is supra moral.

¹³⁷ *Mahābhārata* : XII 337-40

tyaja dharmam adharmam ca, ubhe satyāṅte tyaja
ubhe satyāṅte tyaktvā yena tyajati tat tyaja.

¹³⁸ Mahatma Gandhi. 'For man lives freely only by his readiness to die it needs it be at the hands of his brother, never by killing him'.

The metaphysical presupposition of Whitehead's system is responsible for the differences between his concept of peace and that of Śāṅkara. Whitehead conceives peace in terms of a dynamic process and not a static realisation. It is consistent with his conception of reality as a process. He holds that 'there is not the indefinite repetition of a perfect ideal.' He inveighs against the conception of the ideal of static perfection. He holds that there is room for indefinite progress and continuous emergence of novelty. 'Decay transition, loss, and displacement belong to the essence of creative advance.' Śāṅkara does not agree with such an ideal. The advaitin distinguishes between progress and perfection. The temporal order of events is not the fundamental character of reality. Time is not an ultimate philosophical category for Śāṅkara as in Whitehead. For Whitehead there is nothing beyond the historical process. Evolution for him takes place and develops in the historical process through the interactions of several factors. The advaitin does not equate progress and perfection, time and eternity. The difference between them is not only a matter of degree. The two are two different dimensions. Perfection is not completed progress, nor eternity mere everlasting time. Progress with its corollary is confined according to the advaitin to the phenomenal world. Progress belongs to the historical and temporal process. The purpose of history and man is not completely realised in the historical process and temporal order. Perfection refers to the ultimate ideal of man. It is eternal and not everlasting. 'Time is real only as the vehicle of values. Values abide and things endure.' Spinoza following such a line of thought identifies perfection with Reality. He said 'by reality and perfection, I mean one and the same thing.'

Things change in this world of ours. Progress and regress are the characters we ascribe to them in the light

of some purposes. Progress as a concept is intelligible only when viewed in the light of purposes. Purposes are manifold, and they differ from men to men. The craze for the doctrine of progress is characteristic of some of our contemporary British philosophers. They in their anxiety to be ever on the move have set their gods also on the motion.

As a result of it we have evolving gods. Progress and perfection do not belong to the same level of experience. Time and eternity are different levels. Radhakrishnan observes that perfection is not attained within the time order or within the limits of the historical process. 'It is victory over time, a triumphant passage from the historical to the super historical.'¹³⁹ Perfection, Śaṅkara describes as the means by which one 'arrives at a goal without travelling.'¹⁴⁰ It is a change of out-look.¹⁴¹ It is in short a transcendental state. It has no change or 'progress. It is perfection itself.

¹³⁹ *Philosophy*: 1937 p. 264.

¹⁴⁰ 'anadhvagāḥ adhvasu pārayiṣṇavaḥ'.

¹⁴¹ 'avagatireva gatiḥ.'

SOME OF THE OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF THE ADVAITA PHILOSOPHY ACCORDING TO SUREŚWARA*

By VEERAMANI PRASAD UPADHYAYA

INDIA has produced many systems of philosophy and even one system has been interpreted in several ways so as to give rise to numerous schools on the whole. Attempts have been made at presenting the fundamental doctrines of these systems in English by many European and Indian scholars, who with a gift for lucid expressions and admirable command over the language have succeeded in popularising the real spirit of the general phases of these philosophical thoughts. The advaita view, as enunciated by the illustrious founder of the school, namely, Śaṅkara, has been brought out in general and its importance among the various systems of Indian Philosophy also has been envisaged and emphasised. But it remains still an unful-filled task to set forth the salient features of differences, worked out by the subsequent interpreters and followers of Śaṅkara. Without the valuable works of his disciples and followers, who expounded his thought in various ways, the advaita system would not have occupied the important place, which it does now.

It is a matter of supreme satisfaction that in the recent years a large and increasing improvement has been manifested in the general taste of the reading public and interested scholars for the advaita system of philosophy, which is responsible for new expositive works constantly pouring out in the field. It is universally admitted that the mass of the advaita literature grew rapidly and enormously in the Post-Śaṅkara period as a result of keen competitions

* This is a portion from the D. Litt. Thesis of the author on Śureśwara.

going on between different schools of Vedānta and of controversies tenaciously carried on by their staunch adherents by way of charges and counter-charges. It is no doubt a fact that for those, chiefly interested in philosophical thoughts, argumentation or wordy warfare has no great value and what is of supreme importance is the principal tenets of the system. Nevertheless, the enormous works of the Post-Śaṅkara period, belonging to the said kind of literature, cannot be ignored; since in them are embedded the developments and the interesting interpretations of the underlying principles of the advaita system. Sundry minor metaphysical controversies, which once intensely agitated the keenest intellects, may now possess only a historical interest for the superficial readers. But to bring the individual doctrines and differences of views, wrapped up in them, into proper light is the need of the day, as the general tenets and broad outlook of the advaita system have already been brought out and lucidly presented in English by eminent scholars. So what we more particularly need at present is an authorwise specialisation in the works of the prominent Post-Śaṅkara Advaitins. An attempt in this direction, that is, at the presentation of the philosophy of advaita with special reference to any one or more of the Post-Śaṅkara advaitins has been already started by Dr. Asutosh Sāstri and Dr. T.M.P. Mahādevan.

The above-named writers, however, have made an exposition of the advaita doctrines as developed and expounded by writers of much later period among Post-Śaṅkara advaitins. But nothing critically valuable has been done so far about the immediate successors of Śaṅkara, who are traditionally accepted to be his direct disciples and exponents of different schools of interpretations obtaining in the realm of advaitism. There is a yawning gulf between Śaṅkara and his direct disciples on the one hand and the

great names in the history of advaita, such as Vidyāraṇya,¹ Madhusūdana Saraswatī,² Citsukhācārya³ and others. So an exposition of the advaita philosophy as understood and interpreted by Śaṅkara's direct successors remains an unexplored field. Of all his direct disciples, traditionally admitted to be so, Sureśvara figures as the most prominent, and he has also left behind a number of works, which, furni-

¹ His works are :—

- (1) विवरणप्रमेयसङ्ग्रह, (2) सूतसंहिताटीका, (3) पञ्चदशा,
- (4) अनुभूतिप्रकाश, (5) अपरोक्षानुभूति-टीका, (6) जीवनमुक्तिविवेक,
- (7) ऐतरेयोपनिषद्दीपिका, (8) तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद्दीपिका, (9) छान्दोग्योप-
- निषद्दीपिका, (10) बृहदारण्यकवात्तिकसार and (11) शङ्कर-
- दिग्विजय.

² His works are :—

- (1) सिद्धान्तविन्दु, (2) संक्षेपशारीरक-व्याख्या, (3) अद्वैतसिद्धि,
- (4) अद्वैतरत्नरत्न, (5) वेदान्तकल्पलतिका, (6) गूढार्थदीपिका and
- (7) शिवमहिम्नःस्तोत्रटीका.

³ (a) सर्वज्ञात्ममुनि—संक्षेपशारीरक A. IV, V. 62.

(b) प्रकाशात्ममुनि—P. P. V. (views quoted without directly referring to his name).

(c) आनन्दबोध—N. M.—P. 333 and P. 357.

(d) विमुक्तात्मा—I. S.—P. 255. and pp. 374—75.

(e) अमलानन्द—Kalpataru—P. 921.

(f) चिन्मुख्याचार्य—T. P.—Ps. 9, 112, 346, 348, 381 and 383.

(g) विद्यारण्य—V. P. S.—Ps. 31, 75, 114 and 205 Pañcadaśī VIII-12.

(h) अप्रययदीक्षित—S. C.—Ps. 407, 418, 473, 374 and 89 (without referring to his name).

(i) मधुसूदनसरस्वती—A. S.—Ps. 469, 483, 495, 515, 558, 696 and 885; S. B.—Ps. 220, 222, 255, 340 and 350 etc., V. K. L.—Ps. 12, 17, 25, 26, 27, 60, and 84.

(j) ब्रह्मानन्द—Laghu-candrikā-comm. on A. S., P. 483; N. R.—Ps., 221, 223, 259, 272, 273 and 343.

(k) रामाद्वय—वेदान्तकौमुदी (unpublished) and others.

shing sufficient data, provide enough scope for us to reconstruct a complete system of the philosophy in the light of his most substantial and valuable contributions to the advaita school. No doubt many of the special features of his views got almost shrouded in the subsequent over-whelming growth of the advaita literature, still his importance remains unquestionable when one takes into account the great progress effected by him in the advaita system through his marvellous interpretations and original contributions as the first exponent of the Ābhāsa theory. Although much of what may be treated as his original contributions may strike now as something not new and unfamiliar and mostly as common views of the advaitins by reason of their having been actually incorporated and frequently quoted in later works, yet it is an endeavour worth undertaking to examine critically all the works of Sureśvara and delineate the important aspects of the advaita philosophy as revealed through them by way of an exposition of the advaita system. This attempt will not only save the trouble of scholars, unavoidably entailed in wading through Suresvara's voluminous works in order to deduce his original views and contributions to the advaita system but will also secure an easy access to the secrets of the system, which have been here and there remarkably disclosed by Sureśvara in the course of his convincing and intelligent interpretation thereof.

Sureśvara occupies a very important place among those followers of Śaṅkara, who successfully tried to defend his system from the attacks of his opponents and expound the fundamental doctrines thereof in a very impressive and marvellous manner. His importance can be known by the fact that he is looked upon with great reverence by all the reputed advaitins of the Post-Śaṅkara period such as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī Citsukhācārya, Vācaspati and

others, who themselves are regarded as master minds in advaita philosophy. The very fact that these writers quote him in their important works clearly establishes both the priority of Sureśvarācārya as well as the authoritativeness of his works.

Suresvarācārya is recognised as one of the original writers of advaita philosophy. He represents a special line of thought which is known as 'Ābhāsa-Vāda' followed by him in interpreting the essential doctrines of advaitism. That Sureśvara considered it to be his chief task to interpret, amplify and vindicate the thoughts of his Divine Master, Śaṅkara, is evident from his own verses.⁴ When we call Sureśvara an original writer in the field of advaitic literature, we do not forget that he merely claims to interpret in his own way the thoughts of his predecessors in advaita philosophy. If one denies originality to Sureśvara on the score that he is a mere interpreter, he will have to deny the same even to Śaṅkara, for he too claims to formulate and represent systematically the Advaitic thoughts to be found in the Upaniṣads, the *Gītā* and the *Brahma-sūtras*. No Hindu philosopher would venture to come at the sacrilege of presenting some truths as absolutely new and original, since every one necessarily traces his thoughts to the Vedas or Upaniṣadic passages and claims only to expose the valuable instructions and doctrines contained therein by interpreting them in a manner, suitable to his desired conclusions.

Suresvara is a voluminous writer and is credited with having left behind a large number of works, some of which are not available to us such as *Laghuvārtika* and *Vārtikasāra* etc. His important works, which are available and have

⁴ B. B. V.—pp. 2072-73, vv. 23-25 ; Sambandha-Vartika-P. I., V. 2 ; N. S.—A. I., P. 8, V. 5 ; A. IV, pp. 203-5 ; vv. 76-77 and 74.

formed the basic documents of the present thesis are the following:—

- (1) *Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika*,
- (2) *Taittirīyopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika*,
- (3) *Pañcīkaraṇavārtika*,
- (4) *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra-vārtika* called *Mānasollāsa*
and
- (5) *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*.

As the *Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika* the most prominent of all his works, is exceedingly voluminous and almost unmanageable, the present writer had to devote several years to the proper study and assimilation of the work. The main consideration, constantly looming large before his eyes in writing the present thesis, has been to elucidate and amplify the Ābhāsa-vāda, which is regarded as the original contribution of Sureśvarācārya and has not been analysed and explicated as yet by any modern writer on the advaita system.

The present writer also proposes to make an apology here that in weaving together the subtle threads of Sureśvara's views, lying scattered here and there in his works, he had sometimes to develop them in such a manner as might lead one to mis-understand what is mere exposition to be pure supplementation. But it may be pledged with the fullest conviction that nothing more than what could be actually and exactly gleaned from the thorough perusal of his entire works has been put forth as Sureśvara's views and original contributions throughout the whole of the thesis. The above-noted fact has also stood in the way of the proper documentation of the thesis, for mostly citations either prove too copious to be incorporated in the foot-notes or do not exactly bring out the intended conclusion, if wrested away from the whole work and studied separately as isolated and independent extracts. To quote is to dismember and the dismembered extracts mostly

do not serve the intended purpose. This much however, can be undoubtedly assured that the thesis is the net result and logical outcome of repeated studies and thorough assimilation of all the available works of Sureśvara, studied closely and analysed synthetically in such a way as to give rise to a consistent system of philosophical thoughts.

As regards the topics of the thesis, it may be remarked that the thesis contains almost all the elaborate explanations and new ideas, that may be culled from Sureśvara's works as his original and valuable contributions to the advaita system. The *Siddhānta-Leśa-saṅgraha* points out the following as the outstanding original views of Sureśvara:—

- (1) The theory of Pratisaṅkhyā-Vidhi about Śravaṇa.
- (2) The theory of “बाधयां सामानाधिकरण्यात्” about the interpretation of Mahāvākyas.
- (3) Jīva is neither Pratibimba nor Avacchinna.
- (4) The theory that Karma is necessary for Vividiṣā.
- (5) The theory that all, belonging to the Dvija class, are entitled to Sannyāsa and Brahma-vidyā.
- (6) The Upaniṣadic texts are the Kāraṇa of Brahma-realisation.

To the above may be added the following:—

- (1) The theory of Sattaikya.
- (2) The theory of Ābhāsa (establishing that all, other than the one Absolute Reality, Brahman, are explainable in the terms of Abhāsa).
- (3) “Ātmātmavatva” is the relation of Avidyā and the universe to Brahman.
- (4) The theory that Avidyā is one and undivided, though functionally diverse.

- (5) The essential non-difference of Sākṣī, Antaryāmin and Īśvara.
- (6) The different stages of the process of Cosmogēnesis.
- (7) The cognition subsequent to Suṣupti is a continuous experience and not a memory.
- (8) The gradual stages of the path of perfection.
- (9) The inscrutable and unlimited power of the word.
- (10) Acceptance of "Jahat" Lakṣaṇā in the process of Akhaṇḍārtha-bodha about Brahman.
- (11) The process of Akhaṇḍārtha-bodha.
- (12) Avidyā-nivṛtti and Sansāra-nivṛtti are nothing but Brahman (on the general principle that an appearance is nothing but Reality unrealised and wrongly realised and the sublation thereof is nothing but Reality realised).

etc.

etc.

Lastly, the present writer craves pardon for purposely refraining from the treatment of historical problems such as Maṇḍana-Sureśvara equation etc., as they fall outside the scope of the present thesis, which is mainly concerned only with the doctrinal side of the advaita philosophy as expounded by Suresvara. This much, however, may be unhesitatingly remarked and succinctly stated for the satisfaction of readers that a perusal of the entire works of Sureśvara gives an indubious impression of Maṇḍana and Sureśvara being two distinct and prominent personalities in the field of the advaita literature, of the former being a somewhat predecessor to Śaṅkara and differing from him in views on many a topics of the advaita Vedānta and of the latter being his contemporary and disciple and a staunch follower and supporter of his views. With these preliminary remarks it is proposed now to give below some of the outstanding features of Advaitism as interpreted by Suresvara.

(To be continued)

GAUḌAPĀDA'S KĀRIKĀ.

By JNANENDRA LAL MAJUMDAR

(ALĀTAŚĀNTI)

(Continued from Vol. V. Pt. 4 p. 378)

XII. To know Dharmadhātu in its purity is to know all

कोट्य चतस्र एतास्तु ग्रहैर्यासां सदावृतः ।

भगवानाभिरस्पृष्टो येन दृष्टः स सर्वदृक् ॥८४॥

Translation—(84) These are thus the four points by attachment to which the Bhagavān (Dharmadhātu) is always obscured. He by whom the Bhagavān is seen untouched by these, sees all.

Awakening of Faith, p. 58—“As soon as you understand that when the totality of existence is spoken of, or thought of, there is neither that which speaks nor that which is spoken of, there is neither that which thinks nor that which is thought of, then you conform to Bhutatathata; and when your smṛiti (subjectivity) is thus completely obliterated, it is said to have the insight.”

Ibid. p. 126—“All so-called illusory phenomena are in truth from the beginning what they are; and their essence is nothing but the one soul (or Mind). Though ignorant minds that cling to illusory objects cannot understand that all things are in their nature the highest reality (Paramārtha), all Buddha-Tathagatas being free from clinging (or particularising) are able to have an insight into the true nature of things. And by virtue of their great wisdom they illuminate all distinctions between the defiled and the pure; through their immeasurable and inexhaustible sources of expediency (upayakausalya), which is good and excellent, they benefit

and gladden all beings according to the latters' various necessities and capabilities. Therefore, the mind that is saturated with subjectivity is annihilated, while all things are understood and omniscience (sarvakarajñana) is attained."

Ibid. p. 83—"We understand by the annihilation, not that of the Mind itself, but of its modes (only)."

Exposition:—

(84) From the above it will be amply clear how every form of discrimination is wrong from the stand-point of perfect knowledge. It is simply owing to our attachment to the false notions of discrimination about existence and non-existence that the true universal aspect of Dharmadhātu is obscured and in its place we see, or, rather, think that we see, the mirage of the world of discriminated particulars where our knowledge is necessarily limited. If ever, by strenuous spiritual effort, any one succeeds in dispelling the veil of discrimination and viewing the Dharmadhātu in its purity, then only his knowledge becomes unlimited and he knows what the entire world truly is, that it is the universal Dharmadhātu, where there is no idea of existence and non-existence, being or non-being oneness or bothness, eternity or annihilation.

प्राप्य सर्वज्ञतां कृत्स्नां ब्राह्मण्यं पदमव्ययम् ।

अनापन्नादिमध्यान्तं किमतः परमीहते ॥८५॥

Translation—(85) When he has attained universal omniscience, the non-dual state of Brahmahood, which has no beginning, middle or end, for what will he strive after this ?

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXIV—"The (Mind as) norm is the abode of self-nature which has nothing to do with a world of causation; of this norm which is perfect existence and the highest Brahma, I speak."

Exposition :—

(85) Therefore Dharmadhātu is the true jñeya (knowable). Know it and you know all, and knowing all there is no more craving for knowledge. This omniscience is Brahmahood which is eternal and devoid of all touch with duality, for it is the true existence while duality is non-existent.

विप्राणां विनयो ह्येष शमः प्राकृत उच्यते ।

शमः प्रकृतिदान्तत्वादेवं विद्वान् शमं व्रजेत् ॥८६॥

Translation—(86) This humility (i.e., absence of striving) on the part of wise men is said to be (their) natural tranquility (śama), and their discipline on account of the disciplining of (their) nature. Thus should a wise man attain tranquility.

XIII. Buddha's teaching—Jñāna, Jñeya and Vijñeya

(a) Jñāna is of three kinds, of which Jñāna itself is transcendental

सर्वस्तु सोपलम्भञ्च द्वयं लौकिकमिष्यते ।

अवस्तु सोपलम्भञ्च शुद्धं लौकिकमिष्यते ॥८७॥

अवस्त्वनुपलम्भञ्च लोकोत्तरमिति स्मृतम् ।

ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं च विज्ञेयं सदा बुद्धैः प्रकीर्तितम् ॥८८॥

Translation—(87-88) The Buddhas have always taught (literally, declared) jñāna (knowledge), jñeya (object of jñāna or knowledge) and vijñeya (object of vijñāna or particularising knowledge). (Jñāna of) the duality with object and with perception is called super-worldly. (Jñāna) self without object and without perception is called transcendental.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXVI—“There are three kinds of Jñāna—worldly, super-worldly and transcendental. Worldly knowledge belongs to the philosophers and to the ignorant and simple-minded who are attached to the dualistic

view of being and non-being. Super-worldly knowledge belongs to all the Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas who are attached to the notion of individuality and generality. Transcendental knowledge which is free from the dualism of being and non-being, belongs to the Bóddhisattvas and takes its rise when they thoroughly examine things of imagelessness, see into the state of no-birth and no-annihilation and realise egolessness at the stage of Tathagatahood."

Ibid. LXXI—"When (we know that) there is knowledge gained independent of any supporting object, whatever statements we make about it are no more than thought-constructions."

Exposition:—

(86) When you have attained perfect knowledge and known Dharmadhātu and there is nothing else for you to know, your worldly nature of strife and restlessness has been subdued and perfect quiescence or peace has become your nature. It is towards this haven of peace that all wise men who are tired of the world wistfully turn their steps "to abide in the joy of existence" as the Buddha said. (*Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, LXXXIX.)

(87-88) Speaking of omniscience, we naturally come to the consideration of knowledge in general. These types of knowledge can be spoken of in respect of the three aspects in which things appear to ignorant and wise people, namely, knowledge of things which are *Parikalpita* or purely imaginary, knowledge of things which are *Paratantra* or mutually dependent, and knowledge of things considered as *Pariniṣpanna* or *Paramārtha*, the ultimate reality. Knowledge thus differentiated in accordance with the three *svabhāvas* or natures of things can again be differentiated in accordance with worldly, super-worldly and transcendental vision when we have come to deal particularly

with transcendental knowledge. Worldly knowledge is knowledge in which the reality of the world as well as the reality of the perception of the world are both cognised as true. It is the knowledge of the ignorant masses and dualistic philosophers. Super-worldly knowledge is knowledge in which the reality of the world is not cognised but the reality of the perception of the world is cognised as true. It is the knowledge of those who are a good deal advanced in the path of spirituality. They feel that the world is unsubstantial as it appears to their sight, but they cannot give denial to their perception of it. This means that they are not as yet thoroughly reconciled with the truth of the absolute non-birth of the world. Their minds still hover about the characteristic marks of individuality and generality by which, they think, things produce effects on their perception. Although they have to a large extent quieted the mental tribulations which are inseparable from the perception of duality as absolutely true, they have not yet attained that perfect peace which nothing but a thorough realisation of non-birth can bring. So the Buddha says, "With them there is something effect-producing, and in this attainment of perfect tranquilisation, there is a trace (of dualism) of grasped and grasping. Therefore, they do not attain perfect tranquilisation in every minute of their mental lives.....They cannot attain to (the clear conviction of) an undifferentiated state of all things and the cessation of (all) multiplicities" (*Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, LXXX).

Transcendental knowledge is knowledge in which neither the reality of the world nor the reality of the perception of the world is cognised as true. It is the thorough realisation of the thorough non-birth of the world and an absolute denial to the discrimination of subject and object. Here there is attainment of perfect peace without the least shade of mental perturbation. "The Bodhisattva-

Mahasattvas,” says the Buddha, “giving up the view of self-nature as subsisting in all things, attain perfect tranquillisation in every minute of their mental lives” (L. *Sūtra* LXXX). Transcendental knowledge, which is knowledge of the *Paramārtha* svabhāva of all things, alone deserves the name of knowledge or Jñāna, worldly and super-worldly knowledge which is knowledge of the *Parikalpita* and *Paratantra* svabhāvas being truly but another name of want of knowledge.

This division of knowledge as well as the division into three svabhāvas was made by the Buddha.

In consequence of transcendental knowledge Dharmadhātu is known which alone has been called the jñeya because nothing else deserves this name. The knowables of the other two forms of knowledge have been called vijñeya or objects of vijñāna, i.e. particularising knowledge, with which the earth-bound jīva is mainly concerned. The Dharmadhātu is not a knowable in the ordinary sense of the term, and transcendental knowledge also is not knowledge in the ordinary sense, for the latter is unattainable, as will be explained in the last verse and the former is revealed when it is revealed. The jñeya also is indirectly a vijñeya, otherwise how could such a jīva be taught to have any idea of it?

Adored be the Buddha from whom we have learnt about all these, namely, jñāna, jñeya and vijñeya.

ज्ञाने च त्रिविधे ज्ञेये* क्रमेण विहिते स्वयम् ।

सर्वज्ञता हि सर्वत्र भवतीह महाधिपः ॥८९॥

* A better reading will be ज्ञाने त्रिविधे च ज्ञेये. Śāṅkara has taken त्रिविधे with ज्ञेये instead of with ज्ञाने and hence the above reading although this reading does not at all preclude त्रिविधे from being taken with ज्ञाने ।

Translation—(89) When jñāna in its three aspects and the jñeya (Dharmadhātu, the ultimate reality) itself are known in succession, universal omniscience certainly comes to the high-minded person.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXXXIII—“The five Dharmas are name; form, discrimination, right knowledge and suchness (Tathata). (When these are thoroughly comprehended) by the Yogins, they enter into the course of Tathagata's inner realisation, where they are kept away from such views as eternalism and nihilism, realism and negativism, and where they are face to face with the abode of happiness belonging to the present existence as well as to the samāpatti* (tranquilisation).”

Exposition:—

(89) When by a thorough examination and understanding of worldly and super-worldly knowledge a person has attained transcendental knowledge and thereby realised Dharmadhātu itself, then that person of high understanding has known everything. He is omniscient, as has been said before, for to him the Paratantra and the Parikalpita world has become suchness (Sagathakam 529).

(b) *Vijñeya is of four kinds, of which three are perceptible and one, jñeya, is beyond perception.*

हेयज्ञेयाप्यपाक्यानि विज्ञेयान्यग्रयानतः ।

तेषामन्यत्र हि ज्ञेया*दुपलम्भस्त्रिषु स्मृतः ॥९०॥

Translation—(90) According to the Agrayāna (the Advanced Vehicle, the Mahāyāna) the vijñeyas (objects of

† “Samāpatti” should rather be translated as equability, while tranquilisation should stand for Śamāpatti. Sana has the sense of sameness while sama that of tranquillity.

*अन्यत्र हि ज्ञेयात् is a better reading than अन्यत्र विज्ञेयात् for the ultimate reality is everywhere called jñeya, in these verses. No difference of meaning is caused by the difference of reading.

vijñāna) are the heyas (what one wants to get rid of, viz, birth, disease, death and so forth), the jñeya (the ultimate reality, Dharmadhātu), the āpyas (what one wants to acquire, that is, worldly objects of enjoyment) and the pākyas (what one wants to subdue, that is, greed, anger and folly). Of these, barring the jñeya, perception is known to obtain in the case of the other three.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXXIII—"The Blessed One said : What is meant by a worldly object of enjoyment, Mahamati ? It means that which can be touched, attracted by, wiped off handled and tasted : it is that which makes one get attached to an external world, enter into a dualism on account of a wrong view, and appear again in the Śkandhas, where, owing to the procreative force of desire, there arise all kinds of disaster such as birth, age, disease, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, despair and so forth."

Ibid, LXVIII—"Further, Mahamati, there are three attachments deep-seated in the minds of the ignorant and simple-minded. They are greed, anger and folly ; and thus there is desire which is procreative and is accompanied by joy and greed ; closely attached to this there takes place a succession of births in the (five) paths When one is cut off from this attachment, no signs will be seen indicative of attachment or non-attachment."

Exposition:—

(90) Before dealing with vijñeyas we should return to verses 45, 47 and 48 where it has been said that when vijñāna which is naturally and eternally non-dual, imageless and calm is set in motion by attachment (verse 55), (it appears as subject and object, the defiled vijñāna which) perceives the world and the world which it perceives vijñāna itself is the ultimate reality while the defiled vijñāna which is its image is the worldly ego before whom appears the

world of multiplicities. The jñeya Dharmadhātu also is, as we have seen above, indirectly an object of its perception. Hence the defiled vijñāna has within its range of perception directly the world and indirectly the jñeya which transcends the world. Being a false light, the false world is directly the object of its perception, but being at the same time a light it can have a remote idea of the true light, otherwise there would be no emancipation for it and the teachings of the Buddhas would be useless. About the defiled vijñāna, in contradistinction with pure jñāna, the Buddha said, "Vijnana is subject to birth and destruction and Jnana is not subject to birth and destruction. Further, Mahamati, vijnana falls into (the dualism of) form and no-form, being and non-being, and is characterised with multiplicity: but Jnana is marked with the transcendence of (the dualism of) form and no-form. Further, Mahamati, vijnana is characterised with accumulation and Jnana with non-accumulation.....Further, Mahamati, Jnana is devoid of attachment; vijnana attaches itself to the multitudinousness of objects. Again, vijnana is produced from the concordance of triple combination; Jnana, in its self-nature, has nothing to do with combination or concordance" (L. *Sūtra*, LXVI). Therefore Gauḍapāda says that according to the Agrayāna, the Advanced Vehicle, which is another name for the Mahāyāna, the Great Vehicle, there are four kinds of vijñānas or objects of vijñāna, comprising everything that comes within the purview of human intelligence. They are, firstly, the *beyas* or whatever a man wants to be free from, birth, disease, death, grief and so forth; secondly, the *jñeya*, the ultimate reality of perfect peace; thirdly, the *āpyas* or the objects of worldly enjoyment which he runs after to acquire; and, fourthly, the *pākyas* or the evils of greed, anger and folly which he wants to subdue because he feels that they destroy his happiness. Of these, the *beyas*, *āpyas* and *pākyas* are objects

of his direct perception. The *jñeya* is, by virtue of its very nature, beyond the scope of the defiled, *vijñāna*'s direct perception—it is the soul of the defiled *vijñāna* which can be sublimed into its essence, but can never realise it as an object existing separately from it. (For the Buddha's sayings about the *beyas*, *āpyas* and *pākyas* see quotations below the translation of this verse.)

Here ends the proof of the proposition enunciated at the beginning. In the conclusion which follows the proposition is re-stated with amplifications in accordance with the facts which have come out in the course of the Proof.

Conclusion

(c) *Jñeya G. Paramārtha Āryyajñāna Mahāśūnyatā*—Emptiness in its highest sense of ultimate reality realisable by noble wisdom (the great void of noble wisdom which is the highest reality.)

प्रकृत्याकाशवज्ज्ञेयाः सर्वे धर्मा अनादयः ।

विद्यते न हि नानात्वं तेषां क्वचन किञ्चन ॥९१॥

Translation—(91) All the Dharmas, which are beginningless (that is, unborn), are, in their nature, like unto space, (aspects of) the *jñeya*. No multiplicity exists in them anywhere in the least.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra XXVII—"Again, Mahamati, what is meant by the emptiness in its highest sense of ultimate reality realisable by noble wisdom? It is that in the attainment of an inner realisation by means of noble wisdom there is no trace of habit-energy generated by all the erroneous conceptions (of beginningless past). Thus one speaks of the highest emptiness of ultimate reality realisable by noble wisdom."

Awakening of Faith. pp. 58-59—"There is a two-fold aspect in Suchness if viewed from the point of its explicability. The first is trueness as negative (*śūnyatā*), in the

sense that it is completely set apart from the attributes of all things unreal, that it is the real reality. The second is trueness as affirmative (aśūnyatā), in the sense that it contains infinite merits, that it is self-existent."

Awakening of Faith, pp. 53-54—"The quintessence of the Mahayana as Bhutatathata (Suchness) exists in all things, remains unchanged in the pure as well as in the defiled, is always one and the same (samata), and is void of distinction."

Ibid. p. 126—"All things are in their nature the highest reality."

Ibid. p. 56—"All things, on account of our confused smṛiti (subjectivity), appear under the forms of individuation. If we could overcome our confused smṛiti, the signs of individuation would disappear, and there would be no trace of a world of (individual and isolated) objects."

Lankāvatāra Sūtra. LV—"To the Yogins there is one reality which reveals itself as multiplicity, and yet there is no multiplicity in it."

Ibid. *Sagathakam* 201—"When there is false imagination there is multitudinousness of objects, which is discriminated under the aspect of relativity."

Ibid. *Sagathakam* 100—"Mind is by nature pure, memory (smṛiti, habit-energy) has no existence in (Mind which is like) the sky."

Conclusion

Exposition:—

(91) The points which the proof has mainly established are:—(1) The birth of the world cannot be explained by either emanation or causation. Therefore, the world is unborn. (2) The apparent existence of worldly things is relative and false, for they are mutually dependent. (3) The subject or perceiver who perceives the world is himself

false for the same reason. (4) The ultimate reality is never born either as the subject or as the object. (5) The characteristic marks of subject and object are false. (6) The world of subject and object is like an inscrutable image. The ultimate reality is imageless. (7) The world as it is perceived is neither eternal nor nihil. (8) Attachment is the cause of the appearance of the world-image, that is, the Māyā-like presentation of the world. (9) The world is what is seen of the Reality itself through the veil of attachment—the term *Āvaraṇa* is to be understood in this sense. (10) This attachment also is non-existent as it depends on the world which is non-existent. (11) Thus one attains right knowledge, while the knowledge which knows the world of multiplicity is false knowledge. (12) Right knowledge consists in knowing the world as an unborn vision and knowing also the Ultimate Reality which is viewed as the world. (13) This Ultimate Reality is called *vijñāna* or *Citta* as it is the Light, and *Dharmadhātu* or *Tathatā* (*Bhūtatathatā*) as it is the existence which appears as the false existence of the world. (14) Eternal enlightenment is its character. It is knowledge itself as it is the Light. (15) No question of existence or non-existence in the worldly sense arises about it. For, it is existence itself and Light itself apart from any touch of objectivity or subjectivity. (16) Knowing it one knows all, for it is all, and thus one attains perfect peace. (17) It is known when by the realisation of the absolute non-birth of the world, the veil of attachment is removed and its self-light is revealed as transcendental knowledge.

By the establishment of these points the proposition is proved beyond all doubt that all the Dharmas—Form, Name, Discrimination, Suchness and Perfect knowledge—are in their true nature, nothing but the universal *Dharmadhātu*, the *jñeya*, and eternal and tranquil and homogeneous like unto space; so that there is absolutely no multi-

plicity in them. The Buddha says, "To the Yogins there is one reality which reveals itself as multiplicity and yet there is no multiplicity in it." (L. *Sātra*, LV).

Thus is established *Paramārtha Āryajñāna Mahāśūnyatā*—Emptiness in its highest sense of ultimate reality realisable by noble wisdom or the great void of noble wisdom which is the highest reality. It is called Mahāśūnyatā because there is a twofold aspect in it, namely, the aspect of Śūnyatā or emptiness and the aspect of self-existence.

आदिबुद्धाः प्रकृत्यैव सर्वे धर्माः सुनिश्चिताः ।

यस्यैवं भवति क्षान्तिः सोऽमृतत्वाय कल्पते ॥९२॥

Translation—(92) (As aspects of the jñeya) all the Dharmas are, in their very nature, enlightened ones from the beginning and certainties. He who attains (Jñāna) kṣānti (that is, rest or fulfilment or perfection of knowledge) in this way is destined for immortality.

Awakening of Faith pp. 61-62—"Enlightenment is the highest quality of the Mind....as it is free from all (limiting) attributes of smṛiti, it is like unto space (ākāśa), penetrating everywhere, as the unity of all (Dharmadhatu)"

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXXXIX—"These Tathagatas are abiding in the joy of existence as it is, as they reached the truth of intuitive knowledge by means of Jñanakṣanti."

Ibid, LXXVII—"No-birth and no annihilation, this I call Nirvana. By Nirvana, Mahamati, is meant the looking into the abode of reality as it really is in itself; and when along with the turning back of the entire system of mentation (cittacaitta—kalāpa), there is the attainment of self-realisation by means of noble wisdom, which belongs to the Tathagatas, I call it Nirvana."

Exposition:—

(92) Being, in their true nature, the jñeya all the Dharmas are eternally enlightened and one with the Reality. By attaining this perfection of knowledge one becomes immortal, for birth and death have no longer any meaning for such a wise man. In the *Laṅkāvatāra* the Buddha actually uses the term *keśānti* to indicate perfection of knowledge.

आदिशान्ता ह्यनुत्पन्नाः प्रकृत्यैव सुनिवृताः ।

सर्वे धर्माः समाभिन्ना अजं साम्यं विशारदम् ॥९३॥

Translation—(93) cf. 80. All the Dharmas, are in their very nature, quiescent from the beginning, unborn, blissful, the same (*sama* equable), undifferentiated. (This) unborn *sāmya* (sameness) is infinite (universal, boundless).

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, LXXXV—“When all things, external or internal, are examined with intelligence, Mahamati, knowing and known are found to be quiescent. But when it is not recognised that all things rise from the discrimination of the Mind itself, discrimination asserts itself. When this is understood, discrimination ceases.”

Ibid, XXXIII—“The highest reality is an exalted state of bliss.”

Ibid, *Sagathakam* 417—“The two-fold egolessness the Citta, Manas and Manovijnana, the five Dharmas, the (three) Svabhavas—they do not belong to my essence.”

Awakening of Faith. pp. 56-57—“Therefore all things in their fundamental nature are not namable or explicable. They cannot be expressed in any form of language. They are without the range of apperception. (They are universals). They (things in their fundamental nature) have no signs of distinction. (They are not particulars). They possess absolute samata (sameness). (They are universals.) They are subject neither to transformation nor to destruc-

tion. They are nothing but the one soul (atma), for which Bhutatatathata (Suchness) is another designation."

Lankāvatāra Sūtra LXXXIX—"There is an eternally abiding reality (which is to be understood) according to the hidden meaning because it is something that has neither antecedents nor consequents."

Exposition:—

(93) Thus all the Dharma's are, in their true nature, eternally quiescent (see verse 86), unborn, blissful, the same (sama) and undifferentiated, and this unborn or eternal sameness is universal or infinite. It is not that they were different before and have attained this sameness subsequently by any process, but they are eternally the same.

The highest reality is thus Light, Existence and Bliss.

वैशारद्यन्तु वै नास्ति भेदे विचरतां सदा ।

भेदनिम्नाः पृथग्बाला*स्तस्मात्ते कृपणाः स्मृताः ॥९४॥

अजे साम्ये तु ये केचिद्भविष्यन्ति सुनिश्चिताः ।

ते हि लोके महाज्ञानास्तच्च लोको न ग्राहते ॥९५॥

Translation—(94) Infinitude, however, does not exist for those who always move in the midst of distinction. The ignorant and simple-minded are inclined to making distinctions and are, therefore, considered poor.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra, XXIV—"The ignorant, owing to their erroneous discrimination, imagine here the multiplicity of phenomena; the wise, however, do not."

Translation—(95) They forsooth are the great men possessed of jñāna in the world who, however, are well

* "पृथग्बालाः" is most probably the correct reading here and not पृथक्वादाः, for it is the term which corresponds to the term बालपृथक्जनाः by which the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* everywhere designates the ignorant masses. Moreover भेदनिम्नाः and पृथक्वादाः would make a tautology.

established in the unborn *sāmya*. But the world does not comprehend it.

Awakening of Faith. p. 80—"The significance of the Doctrine is so extremely deep and unfathomable that it can be fully comprehended by Buddhas and no others."

XIV—*Transcendental Jñāna* of the Buddha

अजेष्वजमसंक्रान्तं धर्मेषु ज्ञानमिष्यते ।

यतो न क्रमते ज्ञानमसङ्गं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥१६॥

Translation—(96) (This) *jñāna* in the unborn Dharma is considered to be unborn and unattained. As *jñāna* is not attainable, it is declared touchless.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra LXVI—"Again, Mahamati, Jñana is characterised with unattainability; it is the inner state of self-realisation by noble wisdom, and as it neither enters nor goes out, it is like the moon in water."

Ibid, LXXXII—"With the Tathagatas it is an intuitive experience as if it were an Amalaka fruit held in the palm of the hand."

Ibid, LXVI—"Mahamati, Jñana is devoid of attachment."

Awakening of Faith. pp. 74-75—"Buddha teaches that all beings are from all eternity ever-abiding in Nirvana. In truth, enlightenment cannot be manufactured, nor can it be created; it is absolutely intangible; it is no material existence that is an object of sensation.....Wisdom itself has nothing to do with material phenomena whose characteristic feature is extension in space, and there are no attributes there by which wisdom can become tangible. This is the meaning of Buddha's brief statement just referred to."

Exposition:—

(94-96) But ignorant and simple-minded people are always given to making distinctions between the Dhar-

mas. Their knowledge being thus poor, they become subject to birth, death and all sorts of sufferings. The bliss of Nirvana belongs only to those who are firmly established in the highest knowledge, the knowledge of the unborn sameness of all the Dharmas which is so difficult to comprehend that Āśvaghōṣa has said, "It can be comprehended by Buddhas and by no others" (*Awakening of Faith*, p. 80).

Perfect knowledge

Now the question naturally arises, is the unborn sameness, which is the Dharmadhātu, something to which one's knowledge is extended, or, putting it in another way, does one attain or acquire the knowledge by which he knows the unborn sameness? The reply is, no. It is transcendental jñāna in which there is neither object nor perception, and so it neither extends to anything nor is acquired. When the non-birth of the Dharmas is understood by a thorough examination of their character, it is revealed in them as the self-light of the Dharmadhātu to which they are reduced. It is the unborn and unattained light in the unborn dharmas. It belongs to the nature of Dharmadhātu and is one with it, and so as the Dharmadhātu is unattainable and touchless it is also unattainable and touchless. There is not the least trace of the duality of perception and perceived in it. Āśvaghōṣa says, "Enlightenment is the highest quality of the Mind; it is free from all the (limiting) attributes of Smṛiti. As it is free from all the (limiting) attributes of smṛiti, it is like unto space (ākāśa) penetrating everywhere as the unity of all (Dharmadhātu). That is to say, it is the universal Dharmakaya of all Tathagatas". (*Awakening of Faith*, pp. 61-62). Thus Āśvaghōṣa calls it a quality of the Mind and identifies it with Dharmadhātu. In fact, the highest reality, when it is conceived of as the existence which is the essence of all the Dharmas, is called Dharmadhātu, and, when it is conceived of as the light

of which the false light of the worldly ego is but an image, it is called Citta (Mind) or vijñāna having jñāna as its highest characteristic. All this has been explained before.

It is Pariniṣpanna Svabhāva in which Right knowledge and Suchness are both included. "Right knowledge and Suchness," said the Buddha, "are indestructible, and thus they are known as Parinishpanna" (L. *Sūtra*, LXXXIII). And again, "Form, name and discrimination (correspond to) the two forms of svabhava, and Right knowledge and Suchness to the Parinishpanna aspect" (L. *Sūtra*, XXIII).

The root *Kram* has the sense of growth or development in the Ātmanepada and of going, reaching, extending or attacking in the Parasmaipada. Here the Ātmanepada is used and so *asamkrānta* means unattained, that is, unacquired, not the result of growth, although the sense of going or reaching is also conveyed. In translating *na kramate* into "is not attainable," both the senses are retained, for knowledge reaches a thing by development and is called acquired. The point is that like the jñeya, jñāna is infinite and tranquil like unto the sky (see verse 1.) and so the idea of growth or motion does not obtain in relation to it.

अणुमात्रेऽपि वैधर्म्ये जायमाने विपश्चितः ।

असंगता मदा नास्ति किमुतावर्णच्युतिः ॥९७॥

Translation—(97) When even the least deviation from this character takes place (in the jñāna) of an unwise person, there is always an absence of touchlessness. How then can there be the falling off of the Āvaraṇas (hindrances) which obscure the Dharmadhātu ?

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra LXXXIX—"Knowledge-hindrane, Mahamati, is purified when the egolessness of things is distinctly perceived; but passion-hindrane is destroyed when first the egolessness of persons is perceived and acted upon, for (then) the Manovijñana ceases to function,

Further, Dharma-hindrane is given up because of the disappearance of the habit-energy (accumulated) in the Alaya-vijnana, which is now thoroughly purified."

Exposition:—

(97) The least deviation from this standard of absolute touchlessness of jñāna marks a man as ignorant. And as he has not got touchless jñāna, the veil of knowledge hindrance and passion-hindrane (jñeyāvaraṇa and kleśāvaraṇa) operating, as we have seen before, in the form of the dualistic ideas of existence and non-existence, is not removed. Consequently he does not realise his identity with the absolute reality of Dharmadhātu. And the emptiness or egolessness of persons and things being thus not realised, he is unenlightened and bound to the wheel of birth and death.

अलम्बावरणाः सर्वे धर्माः प्रकृतिनिर्मलाः ।

आदौ बुद्धास्तथा मुक्ता बुद्धन्त इति नायकाः ॥९८॥

Translation—(98) The Dharmas all had never any *Āvaraṇa*, are spotless in their nature, enlightened and so emancipated from the beginning. So do the Masters understand.

Lankāvatāra Sūtra. LXVIII—"Further, Mahamati, when the existence and non-existence of the external world are understood to be due to the seeing of the Mind itself in these signs, (the Bodhisattva) can enter upon the state of imagelessness where Mind only is, and (there) see into the solitude which characterises the discrimination of all things as being and non-being and the deep-seated attachments resulting therefrom. This being so, there are in all things no signs of a deep-rooted attachment or of a detachment. Here, Mahamati, is nobody in bondage, nobody in emancipation, except those who by reason of their perverted wisdom recognise bondage and emancipation."

Exposition:—

(98) Wise men, however, in whom touchless jñāna has been revealed in all its purity and who have thus seen the emptiness of persons and things, realise that all the Dharmas being, in their nature, nothing but the Dharma-dhātu, are, by nature, pure, without having ever been really veiled by any hindrance, and eternally enlightened and liberated. The fact is that all the Dharmas being always unborn and the same, the hindrances are false. Realising this through the revelation of true inner light, one is emancipated.

क्रमते न हि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेषु तायिनः ॥

सर्वे धर्मोस्तथा ज्ञानं नैतद् बुद्धेन भाषितम् ॥९९॥

Translation—(99) Hence the fully-enlightened Buddha's jñāna in the Dharmas is not attainable. Similarly, the Dharmas all do not attain jñāna. (That is, transcendental jñāna is unborn and touchless and so does not depend on anybody or anything for its existence. It is not like the worldly or super-worldly jñāna which is relative and exists only in association with the knower and the known. It is knowledge absolute.) This has been said by the Buddha.

Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. LXXI—"When (we know that) there is knowledge gained independent of any supporting object, whatever statements we make about it are no more than thought-constructions. That (transcendental) knowledge is unobtainable is due to the recognition that there is nothing in the world but what is seen of the Mind, and that these external objects to which being and non-being are predicated are non-existent. As this (knowledge) is unobtainable, there is no evolving of knowing and known, and as thus the triple emancipation is realised, there is unattainable knowledge (which is transcendental)."

Ibid. LXVI—"The Tathagata's Prajñā is spotless (amālā) because of its being in accordance with Mind only".

Exposition:—

(99) This jñāna of a Buddha or wise man who is fully enlightened in the Dharmas is not attainable but is one with his nature. Similarly, it is one with the nature of all the Dharmas and is not such as is attained by them. It was the Buddha Gautama who taught this.

दुर्दर्शमतिगम्भीरमजं साम्यं विशारदम् ।

बुद्ध्वा पदमनानात्वं नमस्कुर्मो यथाबलम् ॥१००॥

Translation—(100) Having understood the state of non-multiplicity, the sāmīya which is hard to see, very deep, unborn (and) infinite, we make obeisance according to our capacity.

Thus is proved the proposition enunciated in the first five verses.

Exposition:—

Thus is proved the Proposition which had to be proved and Gauḍapāda finishes the treatise by paying proper obeisance to the Buddha by whose grace he has been enlightened in the principle of unborn and infinite sameness, the essential calmness of the fire-brand.

HINDU LAW, A CODE OF DUTIES

By K. R. R. SASTRY

THE Jurisprudence that has been covered in the Hindu Codes (*Smrtis*) appears complete and exhaustive and includes all branches of law suitable to "the exigencies of Hindu Society and actually prevalent therein."¹

If Sir Henry Maine found a singular dearth of rules of land tenure it is due to the fact that the peasant was the proprietor of the land under his cultivation. The sovereign got *tax*, not rent from the subject.

The Hindu system of Law was suited to the needs of the people whose social relations it had to adjust and regulate.

At the threshold one finds the term "Hindu" itself exotic in origin, having come in probably since Persia came into contact with India. The inhabitants originally styled themselves as belonging to "Jambūdhwīpa" or "*Bhārata-khaṇḍa*", two words still being repeated in the *Saṅkalpa* prior to bath in holy waters.

The Hindu law is a *code of duties*. In a community like that of the ancient Hindus saturated with religion and philosophy, it is not surprising that their ancient scriptures—*Śrutis* and later *Smrtis*—should be almost replete with one's *duties* rather than rights. This does not mean that as distinguished from *Right*, ancient Hindu Society was unfamiliar with *specific rights* as e.g. father's rights over the son's person and property, husband's rights over his wife's person and property, girl's rights to choose her husband, proprietary rights, son's rights to hold sepa-

¹ A chapter from a forthcoming work on "*Hindu Jurisprudence*,"

² G. C. Sarkar Sastry. *Hindu Law*. VIII, Ed. p. 57.

rate property, and wife's rights to her *Strīdhana*. In the west, the start from individual rights has led to clashes and conflicts of interests tending to the disintegration of family harmony and fanning a number of antagonisms in society by multiplying group conflicts, functional antipathies, and resulting disharmonies.

The purpose of law, according to a great Austinian, Dr. Holland, is the creation and protection of legal rights. The ancient Hindu started with a complete grasp of the destiny of the individual where his spiritual and temporal interests were inextricably interwoven from the moment of conception through the sixty-four *Sanskāras* beyond the death of his mortal coil.

Thus from the earliest hymns of the *R̥gveda* a Hindu's (Dharma) is spoken of under several circumstances. One of those words defying exact rendering, is derived from धृ (dhr) meaning "to uphold, to support, to nourish."

Mm. P. V. Kane³ has found this word occurring fifty-six times in the *R̥gveda*. It has passed through several vicissitudes. The term has stood for "religious rites", "fixed principles or rules of conduct" and the "whole body of religious duties."

In the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (2-23) a significant passage refers to three branches of Dharma :—

- (i) Sacrifice, study of the vedas, almsgiving—that is the first.
- (ii) Austerity indeed is the second.
- (iii) A student of sacred knowledge (*Brahmacārin*) dwelling in the house of a teacher, settling himself permanently in the house of a teacher is the third.

³ Now Vice-Chancellor of the Bombay University, in the *History of Dharmaśāstra* Vol. I, pp. 1 to 4.

All these become possessors of meritorious worlds. He who stands firm in *Brahman* "attains immortality."

In the passage extracted, advertence is to the *Āśrama* duties.

The thrilling exhortation in the *Taittirya Upaniṣad*, सत्यं वद, धर्मं चर (I,II) (speak the truth, practise (your own *dharma*) as also the reference in the *Bhagavadgītā* (Song Celestial) have the same meaning.

When one passes to the *Smṛtis*⁴ the same sense is continued. Medhātithi commenting on Manu says that the *Smṛtis* dilate on *Dharma* as five-fold e.g. *Varṇa-dharma*, *Āśrama-dharma*, *Varṇāśrama-dharma*, *naimittika-dharma* (e.g. *Prāyascitta*) and *guṇa-dharma* (the duty of a king to protect).

Dharma thus includes religious, moral, social and legal duties, and can only be defined by its contents.

An examination of the four sources of sacred law as mentioned by Manu⁵ the Veda, the *Smṛti*, customs of the virtuous, and one's own conscience,

वेदः स्मृतिः सदाचारः स्वस्य च प्रियमात्मनः ।

एतच्चतुर्विधं प्राहुः साक्षाद्दर्शस्य लक्षणम् ॥

The admixture of law, religion, and morality is complete.

Ṛita in Vedic hymns

In the Vedic texts, the word *Ṛita* (ऋत) or *Vrata* (व्रत) is used to denote physical laws⁶ or the uniformity of nature or the organized principle of the universe, comparable to the *Lex Aeterna* of the later Romans.⁷ [Dr. Berolzheimer derives '*ratum*', '*ratio*' from ऋतं.]

⁴ *Maneur.* (I. 2) ! *Yājñavalkya* (I; 1).

⁵ *Maneur.* II; 12; *Yāj.* I, 7, also.

⁶ *R̥gveda.* I, 105, 12. II, 5, 4. IX, 73, 6. I, 24, 10. II, 13, 7. IX, 73, 8. I, 25, 8. VI, 39, 4. IX, 86, 28, 29. I, 73, 6. VII, 71, 3. X, 138, 2. I, 136, 2. VIII, 86, 11.

⁷ Vide. *Modern Legal Philosophy*—II, p. 97.

One hymn from the *R̥gveda* (Book X, Hymn 196, verse (1) may here be expected—

“From fervour kindled to its height eternal law and truth were born:

Thence both the day and night and thence the billowy flood of sea arose.”⁸

Passages from the Vedas may be culled where the word *R̥ta* or *Vrata* stands for the instincts of animals.⁹

R̥ta or *Vrata* is also used to express the rules of sacrifice.¹⁰

One typical hymn runs as follows—

“Lauded by Jamadagni’s song, sit in the place of
holy law

Drink Soma, ye, who strengthen law”

(R. V. III, 62, 18)

R̥ta has been used in the sense of sacrificial altar and identified with the sacrifice also.¹¹

Dharma is figuratively described as the *path-way*:—

मानः पथः पित्र्यान्मानवादधिदूरं नैष्टपरावतः

“Lead us not from our father’s and from Manu’s path into the distance far away”

(R. V. VIII. 30, 3)¹²

Dharma is found compared to the divine bull¹³. This is later repeated in *Manusmṛiti* (VIII, 16) and *Nārada Smṛti*.

⁸ *Griffith*, Vol. IV, p. 415.

⁹ *R̥gveda*. IX, 100, 7. X, 20, 2.

¹⁰ R. V. I, 36, 19, R. V. III, 62, 18, I, 54, 7. III, 62, 13. I, 77, 2. IV, 56, 6. I, 90, 61. V, 12, 2. II, 23, 17. VII, 66, 19. VIII, 12, 15. VIII, 23, 9.

¹¹ R. V. I, 43, 9. I, 84, 4. V, 21, 4.

¹² Also R. V. X, 14, 5. X. 100, 12. X, 133, 6. Also *Sāma Veda*. Part II. B. K. VII, Ch. III, hymn 2, Vetse 3.

¹³ R. V. VI, 1, 1.

Though 'Ṛtam' has been used in a variety of senses in the Vedas, the following special references suggest "rules of human conduct generally without any reference to sacrificial rites".

"Law strengthens those who keep the Law."
Sāmaveda. Part II. Bk. II Ch. 2 Hymn 6, Verse 2.

"They true to law exceeding strong, have set them down for sovereign rule. Princes whose laws stand fast have obtained their sway."

R̥gveda VIII, 25, 8.

Vedic basis of Hindu Jurisprudence

Mm. P. V. Kane has brought together about fifty Vedic passages that shed light on marriage, the forms of marriage, the different kinds of sons, adoption of a son, partition, inheritance, *Śrāddha*, and *Strī-dhana*¹⁴. It is true that the Vedas do not contain *Vidhis* (positive precepts) on matters of *Dharma* in a connected form. It can nonetheless be substantiated that the later rules contained in the *Dharmaśāstras* had their unmistakable roots "deep down in the most ancient Vedic tradition." The authors of the *Dharmaśāstras* were quite justified "in looking up to the Vedas as a source of *Dharma*¹⁵."

Basic Postulate

It is to this day a basic postulate among the followers of Hindu tradition that "not only all law and usage but all knowledge is enshrined in the Veda¹⁶."

वेदोऽखिलो धर्ममूलं (*Manu.*, II,6)

Prof. K. V. Rangaswamy Iyengar draws three logical conclusions from this basic assumption:—

(a) That there should be internal consistency in law.

¹⁴ J. B. B. R. A. S. XXVI, 57—82.

¹⁵ P. V. Kane. *H. D. S.* Vol. I. p. 7.

¹⁶ K. V. Rangaswamy. *Raja Dharma*. 1941, p 80.

(b) The differences which appear are resolvable by enquiry; and

(c) for every rule of law a Vedic basis can be discovered.

The Veda is eternal, omniscient, and infallible, and the Vedas have no limit (अनन्ता वै वेदाः).

The Mīmāṃsā School held¹⁷ that the Vedas entirely and exclusively concern themselves with *Dharma*. *Dharma* has been defined by Jaimini in his second aphorism—

चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः (Jaimini I, i, 2)

as that “which is signified by a direction and leads to a benefit.”

When one is unable to find Vedic authority for a rule Jaimini would assume that the *Śruti* had passed out of view or is hidden and the *Śruti* text will come to view if diligently searched for.¹⁸

Medhātithi (9th century A.D.) and *Viśvarūpa*¹⁹ (beginning of 9th century A.D.) particularly have strenuously established the Vedic origin of the Smṛtis.

¹⁷ Its founder Jaimini is assigned to the 5th century B. C. by a great Mīmāṃsā Scholar Sir Ganganatha Jha. He certainly lived prior to 650-A. D.

¹⁸ *Raja Dharma*, K. V. Rangaswamy, p. 80.

¹⁹ Identified with Sureśwarācārya, a pupil of Ādyaguru Śrī Śaṅkārācārya.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

CATALOGUE OF THE ANUP SANSKRIT LIBRARY.—Prepared by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja and Shri K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M. O. L. Fasciculus V. Bikaner, pp. 401-500, 1948.

The present Fasciculus of the Catalogue contains a list of 1344 manuscripts preserved in the *Anup Sanskrit Library* of Bikaner. The manuscripts belong to Jyotiṣa, Kośa, Chandas, Vyākaraṇa, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Advaita, Dvaita and Śaiva. The catalogue, no doubt is a work of great labour and patience, but its importance can never be exaggerated. So it is expected that at least some information regarding the contents and some references in the text will be given. Mere mention of the names of the Mss and the authors leave us in great anxiety as to the real nature of the Mss. Then I find in this book under Vyākaraṇa a Ms named '*Nyāyasūtra*' on page 428. This is for the first time that I have come across such a name under Vyākaraṇa. Either it is by mere mistake that such a Ms has been included under this head, or if it is a genuine name of a book on Vyākaraṇa, then it was necessary for the editor to add a short note regarding the nature of the book and also a note on the peculiar title of a Vyākaraṇa work. It is very interesting and perhaps a great discovery to find out a book called *Nyāyasūtra* belonging to Vyākaraṇa. However, it is very encouraging to find the Curator so enthusiastic in his duty. I welcome this addition to our literature.

SAṆKALPASŪRYODAYA of Shri Venkaṭanātha with two commentaries Prabhāvilāsa and Prabhāvali. Published in the Adyar Library Series in two parts, pp. xxxii and 938, 1948 Price Rs. 15/- per volume.

That the Adyar Library is doing very great service to enhance the cause of Sanskrit learning in so many ways is well known to all. It has published several valuable works with critical notes from time to time. The present work is a well-known drama of Śrī Venkaṭanātha. Indian life is a life of Philosophy. Life is the practical aspect of philosophy in India and it is because of this that Philosophy is so very popular here. Scholars have tried to interpret philosophical truths in various ways. Writing of drama is one of the modes of presenting to people at large the highest aim of life. *Saṅkalpasūryodaya* is an allegorical drama in which the characters of the play are not real persons but abstract human qualities which are personified. It aims mainly to explain the Vedāntic thoughts. We are reminded of *Prabodhacandrodaya* and *Amṛtodaya* of the great Gokulanatha Upadhyaya of Mithila. The play is indeed a very excellent work of the author. It has almost all the beauties of a drama.

It is a fact which needs no explanation that the work has not been so popular. All people do not like to study Vedānta. All are not even qualified to do so. But that does not take away the beauty of the book. The verses are so very charming and the delineation of the characters are so attractive that one cannot but entertain high praise for the author. The work has been written strictly in accordance with the rules of dramaturgy. But one can also find that the poet has taken sometimes a great liberty to have, his own choice as well. It is written in ten acts and it is difficult to stage, but it is easily staged, they say, even in recent times but the South. But one cannot have so much control over himself to maintain his interest in the whole play when staged. The publisher is to be congratulated for encouraging sanskritic studies by publishing such works even these days when people are somewhat reluctant towards such activities.

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH BURMA, (1826—1886) by A. C. Banerji. The National Information and Publications Ltd., Tulloch Road, Apollo Bunder, Bombay. 1947. Pages 48. Price Re 1/-

This booklet on Burmese relations with the British Government in the nineteenth century has been published in the series 'Short Studies in Indian History', planned 'to meet the needs and demands of the common man' written 'in popular form and language, avoiding altogether technical details and use of references and footnotes'.

The author is a well-known scholar, who has to his credit some research on the eastern frontier of India. In the pamphlet, under reference, a general survey of the relations has been given till the annexation of Upper Burma under Lord Dufferin. The First Burmese War has been dealt with briefly while the second in greater details, with a more and undue emphasis on the internal affairs of Burma... which could have been easily left out from such a booklet. The last war however, has been narrated vaguely. One regrets to note that the object with which the series was planned by the General Editor, Mr. Jagmohan Mahajan has not been truly achieved through this booklet. The book has failed to provide an interest for the general reader. One of the reasons for such a shortcoming may be said to be the dearth of research on this aspect of modern Indian History.

We, however, commend the National Information and Publications Ltd., for undertaking a series of this kind on every aspect of Indian History, which was a long-felt want of those who are interested in India's past history.

THE MOTHER GODDESS KĀMĀKHYĀ. By Bani Kanta Kakati.
Published by Punya Prasad Duara for the Assam Publishing Corporation, Uzanbazar, Ganbati, Assam.—
Pages ix + 91. 1948. Price Rs. 3/-.

This is a stimulating volume on the fusion of Aryan and Primitive beliefs of Assam. As the author says in the Preface : “The present Publication is a mere introduction towards the study of the fusion of the Aryan and extra-Aryan religious beliefs and practices in Assam in the light of the comparative method of modern sociological studies. The beliefs and practices have been tracked as far as possible to their sources. No conclusion has been hazarded because none is possible at this stage. An attempt has only been made to enlarge the scope of discussion.” The *Kālikā Purāṇa* the *Yoginī Tantra* and the Copperplate land-grants of early Hindu Kings in Assam form the main sources of the present work. The author has given the varied materials a sort of coherence by choosing the figure of Mother Goddess Kāmākhyā as the pivot. Magic, witchcraft and sorcery constitute the popular religion of Assam and they have very aptly been made to revolve round the figure of Mother Kāmākhyā.

The book throws light on various aspects of ancient period of the history of Assam. It is very interesting and informative.

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[Part 2

ON THE CHRONOLOGICAL POSITION OF
KHĀRAVELA

By N. N. GHOSH

KING Khāravēla of Kalinga is an important and by now a familiar historical personage. A great deal of work has been done on the Hāthīgumphā inscription in the Udayagiri hills near Bhūbanēśvara in the Puri District. The inscription records from year to year Khāravēla's career. A lot of controversy has raged round his date, and the object of this paper is to discuss this problem.

Dr. Bhagwan Lal Indraji for the first time gave, in 1883,¹ a full transcription with notes and translations which marked a vast improvement on earlier attempts begun in 1825 and continued to 1880.² Indraji finds in line 16 mention of an era, *Muriya Kāla*, from which he deduces the date of Khāravēla. He finds the relevant passages in lines 16—17 and reads them as one sentence beginning with *veḍariya gabhe patithāpayati panamta-*

¹ *Proceedings of the International Congress of Orientalists*, Leyden, 1833.

² Sterling, *Asiatic Researches*, Vol. XV, 1825. Major Kittoe's facsimile read and published by Prinsep. *J.A.S.B.*, 1837, Cunningham, C. I. I. Vol. I Old series, 1977; Rajendra Lal Mitra, *Antiquities of Orissa*. 1880.

riya saṭhi-vasa-sate rāja muriya kāle vochine ca coyāṭhi aga satikutariyam cupādyati khemarāja sa vadharāja sa bhikurāja etc. in line 16, and ending with *mahāvi-jayo rāja khāravēla siri* (the last word of the last line i.e. line 17 of the inscription), who is identified by him with Bhikurāja of previous line. Both the reading and the syntax are doubtful as will be shown later. But he made his own meaning clear by his translation which runs as follows :—

“The victorious and illustrious king Khāravēla (named) the Bhikshurāja (son) of Vridhharāja (who was the son) of Kshemarāja and clever in various qualities, etc. born in the family of royal sages, does this (referring to the architectural constructions in the cave) in the one hundred sixty fifth year of the Maurya kings, after one hundred and sixty four years had passed (*choyāṭhi aga satikutariyam*).” On the basis of his reading, syntax and translations he draws up both a genealogy and a chronology of King Khāravēla. I am not concerned here with his genealogy which I consider wrong because of his taking Vṛddharāja and Bhikṣurāja in the genitive case, but with the chronology he has given. He reads the relevant passages *panāmtariya saṭhivasa-sate*, made clear by this interpretation of the word ‘vochine’ as ‘Vicchinne’ (expired or ended) which precedes the words which he reads as *coyāṭhi aga satikutariyam*. According to this reading, he finds a so-called Maurya era which he takes to begin in the eighth year of Aśoka’s reign which, again he thinks, starts about 263 B.C. On the basis of his reading of the passage quoted above and his assumptions regarding the date of Aśoka’s accession, when, according to him, the Maurya era begins, he draws up the chronology as follows : (263—8) = c. 255 B.C. being the initial year of the era, (255—165) = c. 90 B.C. is the date of his architectural constructions in the cave,

and these having been done in the 13th year of his (Khāra-vela's) reign, his accession took place in $(90 + 13) = c. 103$ B.C., his *yauvarājya* nine years before in 112 B.C. and his birth 24 years before his accession in 127 B.C. Indraji himself is in doubt as to the existence of a Maurya era which he says 'has not been found anywhere' (Ibid. 149). But he worked out his chronology on this doubtful basis. Both Fleet³ and Luders³ denied the existence of a date in line 16 of the inscription. Dr. Jayaswal who earlier (*JBORS* 1917) accepted the existence of the era '165 Maurya Kāla' in line 16 finally gave it up (*JBORS* 1927) but found other evidences to put Khāravēla in the first quarter of the second century B.C., taking him to be a contemporary of Puṣyamitra Śuṅga. He identifies Bahaspatimita or Brhaspatimitra mentioned in the Hāthīgumphā inscription whom Khāravēla defeated in the twelfth year of his reign on the ground that Brhaspati is mentioned in the *Sāṅkhāyana Grhya Sūtra* (1.12.6) as the presiding deity of the Puṣya constellation of stars (*JBORS* Vol. III, 1917). The argument is of doubtful validity and is not at all convincing.⁵ He further argues that a king of this very name figures in the Pabhosā inscription and on a coin found in Kosam. Bahaspatimita of the Pabhosā inscription was probably a local king of Kauśāmbī, whose maternal uncle Asāḍhasena excavated the cave in the reign of 'Udaka' whom Jayaswal himself restored Odraka, the fifth Śuṅga king. How can this Bahaspatimita then be the same person as the first Śuṅga king Puṣyamitra? He seeks to explain the coin name Bahaspatimita for Puṣyamitra by the fact that some other Śuṅga and later Śuṅga kings appear in different names on

³ *J.R.A.S.*, 1910.

⁴ Luders's List in *E.I.* Vol. X, (Appendix).

⁵ R. B. Chanda, *I.H.Q.* 1929, p. 595 f; Raychaudhuri, *P.H.A.I.*, 3rd Ed., p. 255.

their coins. He says that the Purāṇic names, Vasumitra, Vasujyeṣṭha, Ghoṣavasū, Vajramitra, Devabhūti appear as Bhānumitra, Jeṭhamitra, Bhādraghoṣa, Indramitra, Devamitra on the coins respectively. But the question arises: are the identifications beyond any dispute? They were probably rulers of local dynasties—new-Mitra or later Śuṅga kings ruling in Ayodhyā and Bareilly Districts, where a large number of these coins have been found, after the break up of the Śuṅga empire. Dr. V. Smith places them on the ground of scripts between the first century B.C. and the first century A.D.⁶ Moreover, unlike them, Puṣaymitra Śuṅga appears in the inscriptions in his Purāṇic name. It is unusual that he should have chosen a different name for his coin found in Kosam.

Dr. V. Smith⁷ and Prof. Dubreuil⁸ accepted the date worked out by Indrajī and Jayaswal and placed Khāravēla in the second century B.C. Prof. Rapson also did the same, though in a non-committal way. He writes: "The inscription *probably* belongs to about the second century B.C." ⁹ As we have seen, Dr. Jayaswal himself subsequently gave up Indrajī's reading of the passages in question in line 16 on which he had based his earlier theory. The passages as finally edited¹⁰ now are: *catare ca veḍuriya-gabhe tham̐bhe paṭiṭhāpayati pāṇa-tariya-sata-sahasehi (stop) mu(khi)yakala—vochimam̐ ca coya(thi)-aṅga saṁtika-(m̐) turiyam̐ upādayati (stop)*. The remaining words of line 16, *Khemarājā sa Vadharājā sa Bhikkhurājā Dhamarājā*, etc. form part of the next sentence ending with *rājā Khāravēla siri* in line 17. As you will notice this new reading and syntax are completely

⁶ *Coins of the Indian Museum*, p. 185.

⁷ *J.R.A.S.*, 1918.

⁸ *A.H.D.*, 1920.

⁹ *Camb. Hist. of India* I, p. 535.

¹⁰ Sircar, *Select Inscriptions*, p. 210.

different from Indraji's. The splitting up of the sentences and reading of *satasahasehi* for *saṭhivasasate*, *mukhiya* for *Muriya*, *Kala* for *Kāle*, *aṅga* for *aga*, *santikam-turiyam* for *satikutariyam* are the keystones of this revised reading. The phrase *pānatariya satasahasehi*, as the syntax shows, with which the first sentence in line 16 ends, refers to the cost of five lakhs of coins incurred for the decoration of the cave with ornamented pillars *veduriya gabhe tham̐bhe*. This gives a better sense. Khāravēla was particular about stating the amount of money he spent on various occasions. For instance, in line 3, he states to have spent 35 lakhs to restore the works of the city damaged by storm in the first year of his reign. He mentions to have spent in the ninth year of his reign 38 lakhs to build the great Victory Palace *mahāvijaya-pasāda* (L.10). Consequently, *pānatariya satasahasehi* appears to be the only reasonable reading. The sentence, which immediately follows it, speaks of his patronage to arts befitting peacetimes, including principal ones (*mukhiya kāla vochinam*) which Dr. Sircar rightly interprets as *gīta nṛtyādi samanvitam*. There is no reference to any date, of a *muriya kāla*, 165 years or 164 years expired, counted backward from the 13th year of Khāravēla's reign. Thus there is no data to place Khāravēla in the second century B.C. which some historians including Professor Rapson did.

II

On the other hand, certain palaeographical, monumental and internal evidences found in the epigraph point to the last quarter of the first century B.C. as the date of the author of the inscription. A Śātakarṇi appears in the Hāthīgumphā inscription whom Khāravēla defeated in the second year of his reign. A Śātakarṇi also appears in the Nānāghāt inscription of his wife Nāyanikā." Prof.

Rapson, while discussing the date of Khāravela, refers to Bühler's *Indian palaeography*, p. 39, in which the latter takes both the Nānāghāṭ inscription of Nāyanikā and the inscription of Khāravela to belong to the same chronological group and places them in the middle of the second century B.C.¹² This was in 1904 when the date of Khāravela discovered by Indrajī held the field. He refers to Indrajī's paper on Khāravela and writes: "Khāravela's inscription *must have been inscribed between B.C. 157 and 147 as the king's 13th year is said to correspond to the year 165 of the Maurya*"¹³ (Italics mine). This shows his mind was not completely free from this influence. Later scholars like Prof. Chanda, however, place the Nānāghāṭ records on the grounds of palaeography much later.¹⁴ Dr. D. C. Sircar assigns them, on the same ground to the latter half of the first century B.C.¹⁵ The well known scholars on architecture, Messrs. Fergusson and Burgess, in their great work on the *Cave Temples of India*, assigned the Nāsik *Caitya Hall* to the latter half of the first century B.C. Modern art critics agree to this date.¹⁶ Now, according to Sir John Marshall, a small *vihāra*, excavated during the time of the second Andhra king Kṛṣṇa is 'of the same age' as the Nāsik *Caitya Hall*. So if Kṛṣṇa flourished in the latter half of the first century B.C., the date of his nephew Śātakarṇī who succeeded him and the date of Śātakarṇī's wife's Nānāghāṭ inscription, cannot be placed earlier than the close of the second half of the beginning of the last quarter of the first cen-

¹² *Ind. Ant.* XIII. 1904, Appendix.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *M.A.S.I.* No. I.

¹⁵ *Select Inscriptions* I, p. 113, n.

¹⁶ *Camb. His. Ind.* I, p. 636 f.

ture B.C. So, Khāravēla does not need to be placed in the second century, B.C. for reasons of identification of Śātakarṇi I as his contemporary, as earlier scholars like Bühler and others did.

A Śrī Śātakarṇi also appears in the inscription on the Sāncī *torāṇa*, as its donor. He is to be identified with the third Andhra king Śātakarṇi I. This identification involves no chronological impossibilities. The region of Vidiśā in which Sāncī falls was in possession of the Śuṅga dynasty up to at least its ninth king Bhāgabhadra, as the Besnagar Garuḍa Pillar inscription of Heliodoras proves. Bhāgabhadra's reign, according to the Purāṇas, ended in c. 82 B.C. Eastern Malwa including Vidiśā probably fell to the Andhras about the same time as its northern portion when the Śuṅga power broke up. According to the Purāṇic chronology the Śuṅga dynasty ended about 72 B.C.¹⁷ Therefore, I agree with Dr. Raychaudhuri when he places Simuka in the Kāṇva period and makes him a contemporary with the Kāṇva king Suśarman (c. 38—28 B.C.).¹⁸ The recognition of Simuka dynasty as an imperial power by the Purāṇas, of course, begins in 27 B.C., the interval of 45 years being assigned to the Kāṇvas. The Purāṇas assign to Simuka's brother 10 years of reign. Assuming B.C. 28 or 27 as the last year of Simuka's reign, Śātakarṇi I came to the throne about 17 B.C. and this not only satisfies the Purāṇic chronological order as shown above, but also the reasons of palaeography, for it has been pointed by R.B. Chanda, as against Bühler's views, that the inscription of Nāyanikā is later than the Besnagar inscription.¹⁹ So Khāravēla who was a contemporary of Śātakarṇi I and who appears in the Nānāghāṭ

¹⁷ Taking B. C. 184 as the year of Puṣyamitra's accession and the total reign-period of the ten Śuṅga kings as 112 years, as stated in the Purāṇas.

¹⁸ *P.H.I. Ed.* 3rd., p. 277.

¹⁹ *M.S.A.I.I.* pp. 14—15.

and Sāñci inscriptions, both of the first century B.C. naturally belongs to the same period, and not to the second century B.C.

A more positive data for Khāravēla's chronology is found in line 6 of the Hāthīgumphā inscription. It states. *Pañcame ca dānīvase Nandarāja tivasa-sata oghāṭitīm tanasuliya vātā paṇāḍim nagaram pavesayati*. Khāravēla extended up to the city through Tanasulia road the aqueduct which had been opened by King Nanda three hundred years ago. *Ti nasa sata* which was earlier translated as 103 years by Indrajī and Jayaswal, is now taken to mean 300 years. Even Dr. Jayaswal accepts it, but identifies Nandarāja with Nandivardhana. But how can Nandivardhana be taken as King Nanda? The Purāṇas call him Nandivardhana and not Nandavardhana. In the latter case, there might have been some justification to identify him with the Nandarājā of the inscription. Moreover, according to the Purāṇas, he is a Śaiśunāga king and the first Nanda king is Mahāpadma Nanda. The Purāṇas do not speak very enthusiastically of the Nanda kings, because the last Śaiśunāga king Mahānandin became the founder of this dynasty through his marriage with a Śūdra woman. Mahāpadmananda is called *śūdragarbhodbhava* but yields him uncommon praise for his prowess as the destroyer of many Kṣatriya races, and being the sole monarch (*ekarāt*). Among the dynasties whose chronologies are given in the Purāṇas in the interval between the last Śaiśunāga king and the first Nanda king of Magadha are also the Kaliṅgas. It is probable that Mahāpadmananda defeated the Kaliṅgas of the South-Eastern India along with the Haihayas, Aśmakas, Vitihotras, Mithilas, Kurus, Pañcālas, Sūrasenas, Kāśis and Ikṣvākūs of Central and Northern India, to be justifiably called by the Purāṇas *ekarāt* and *sarva kṣa-trāṇaka*. So there is more reason to identify the Nanda-

rāja of the inscription with Mahāpadmananda rather than with Nandivardhana. Jayaswal probably did it in order to bring the date of Khāravēla to the 2nd century B.C., so as to maintain him as a contemporary of Puṣyamitra Śuṅga. So if Mahāpadmananda is the king who is to be calculated 300 years backward to the fifth year of Khāravēla's reign, we get a key to the date of Khāravēla as well as to his inscription.

The Purāṇas differ as to the length of the reign-period of Mahāpadma. But there is no difference as to the total reign period of his eight successors who ruled (probably jointly) for 12 years. Taking this period of 12 years into account and accepting 322 B.C. as the year of Candragupta Maurya's accession which is more or less a fixed point of chronology, we may work backward to find the last date of Mahāpadmananda which comes to (322 plus 12) 334 B.C. Therefore, the extension of the canal could not at any rate have taken place after 334 B.C. The mention of a round figure of 300 years is a conventional form of expression and may not be taken too literally. Other round figures like 10, 20 or 25 may be permitted to add to it in order to find synchronisms. And this synchronism is the identity of Khāravēla with Śātakarṇi I, the third king of the Śātavāhanakula. We may therefore take 334 B.C. as the starting point for our purpose.

If, say, 20 years are added to 300, the date of extension of the canal took place in c. (334—320) 14 B.C. and his accession 5 years before in 19 B.C. In line 2 of the epigraph we find details of his early life from which we gather that he became heir-apparent at the age of 16 and king at the age of 24. He was therefore 29 years old when he was king for 5 years at the time of the extension of the aqueduct in 14 B.C. We may thus draw up a tentative chronology of Khāravēla as follows :

Birth 29 plus 14	c. 43 B.C.
Yauvarājya 43—16	c. 27 B.C.
Accession 43—24	c. 19 B.C.

The epigraph gives details of his reign from year to year up to the 13th year. The inscription was therefore engraved in the 13th or 14th year of his reign and this brings the date of the inscription to c. (19—14) 5 B.C. This tentative chronology agrees with the Purāṇic data and satisfies other synchronisms, the most important of which is that of the date of Kḥāravēla's fight with Śāta-karṇi I, which, according to the epigraph took place in the 2nd year of Kḥāravēla's reign, i.e. 17 B.C. a data which, as has been shown above, falls with the reign of the third Andhra king.

SOME OF THE OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF THE ADVAITA PHILOSOPHY ACCORDING TO SUREŚWARA

By VEERAMANI PRASAD UPADHYĀYA

(Continued from Vol. VI. Part I.)

There are three important and prominent theories, namely, Ābhāsa-Vāda, Pratibimba-Vāda, and Avaccheda-Vāda, expounded by different interpreters of the Advaita philosophy in the Post-Śaṅkara period. Of these, the theory of Ābhāsa, enunciated and developed by Sureśvara, is the earliest. The second theory of Reflection (Pratibimba) is undoubtedly in its earliest form simultaneous with the first one (as already adumbrated by Padmapādācārya in his work, namely *Pañca-Pādikā*), but in its more developed form, as presented by Prakāśātman—the author of the well-known work *Pañcapādikā—Vivaraṇa*—it is decidedly much later than the first one. The third ‘Theory of Delimitation’ (Avaccheda), attributed to Vācaspati Miśra I, is still later, although this may be traced back to the ‘*Brahmasiddhi*’ of Maṇḍana, who enunciated almost all the basic tenets or fundamental principles of the said theory and from whom are really inherited all the distinctive features of what is known as the *Vācaspati-prasthāna* or the Avaccheda-Vāda in the Post-Śaṅkara literature.

Both Padmapādācārya and Vācaspati regard reflection (*Pratibimba*) as identical with the prototype, only having certain attributes such as ‘facing oneself,’ ‘appearing as located on the mirror’ etc., superimposed thereon in the instance of a reflected face. Looked at superficially, the doctrines of Pratibimba and Ābhāsa

would appear to have much in common, but to a critical student the basic or fundamental difference of the two concepts, which is mainly intended to be brought out in this thesis, cannot fail to assert itself even at the first glance.

Ābhāsa, as delineated by Sureśvara, is considered by him to be something inexplicable and unreal as such, while Pratibimba, as recognised by the Vivaraṇa school, is accepted to be real, being identical with its prototype. Ābhāsa is an appearance directly or indirectly of the one Reality through Avidyā and it is something altogether *de novo* and inexplicable. It is enlivened and propped up or sustained by any of the various Incidences or Appearances of the one Reality in correspondence with the diversely modifying Avidyā, constituting the material stuff of all empirical and seeming entities. The multifarious modifications of Avidyā serve as so many receptacles of the said Incidences or Appearances, elicited from the Reality or Pure Consciousness by Avidyā and these receptacles are given their being and manifestation as multiple entities of the empirical order by the said Appearances, underlying all of them as their very essence, life, power, force and what not, owing to which they are enabled to appear and figure as the real objects of the universe. Ābhāsa is an established fact and practically sufficient and empirically veritable, that is, capable of subserving all practical purposes and empirical needs and commending all pragmatic values from the stand-point of Avidyā (Tamo-Vṛtta) but it has no locus standii whatsoever absolutely, i.e. from that of Brahman or Reality proper (Vastu-Vṛtta). Brahman, the Pure Consciousness, is the only Reality and everything else—animate or inanimate—in the world is manifested on the strength and in the light of Its various Appearances or Incidences, answering to the manifold modifications of Avidyā.

The one and the same Reality, Brahman, appearing in and through Avidyā and its multiple modifications as so many various receptacles or adjuncts, gives rise to the diverse and discrete phenomena of the Universe and by virtue of Its so many underlying Appearances makes all of them appear to be existing, real and perceivable as something immediate. It is the central doctrine of the Advaita philosophy, as expounded by Sureśvara, that Brahman is the only Reality—unconditional and Apriori Immediacy—and all others appear real and immediate only as pervaded by the Appearance of Brahman in them. Thus all phenomena are incidentally due to and only outward appearances or seeming external expressions of one and the same Reality, Brahman.

The whole universe is the transformation and projection of Avidyā and illusory manifestation of the One Reality, Brahman. In other words, the universe is nothing but a vortex of diverse appearances of Brahman as appearing through the manifold modifications of Avidyā and the corresponding Appearances of Reality therein, but oneness is the essential nature of Reality Itself. When diversity is dissolved or sublated by Brahma-realisation, oneness the essential nature of Reality or Reality Itself—emerges as the sole Residue.

The primary and direct Appearance of Brahman is in Avidyā, which is one, beginningless and inadvertently present (अगदि स्वाभाविकी) in Brahman. The Consciousness, conditioned by Avidyā, apparently identifies therewith on account of Its nondiscrimination from Its own Appearance therein (अविद्योपहित-तद्गतस्व भासाऽविविक्त-चित्) and is variously called the internal ruler, the witness and the cause of the world in relation to different functions attributable to It through Avidyā. The same Consciousness,

¹ B.B.V., p. 661, VV. 1138—41; p. 1024, V, 191; p. 1104; V. 425 and V. 427.

conditioned by one of the products of Avidyā, namely, mind (Buddhi) and apparently identified therewith owing to Its non-discrimination from Its own Appearance therein is called the individual soul—the agent, the enjoyer and the cogniser in relation to different functions of the psychophysical organism through Avidyā. On account of the difference of the mind in each body, the Appearances of Consciousness in various and different and hence, although there is an undeniable distinction between the Appearance of Consciousness in the mind and the consciousness conditioned thereby, yet by reason of the said non-discrimination from Its various Appearances, the same Consciousness appearing to be conditioned by different minds, comes to be cognised as if it were different. This leads to and establishes the plurality of Jīvas, according to Sureśvara's Abhāsa-Vāda. Avidyā is undifferentiated and one and so is the Appearance of Consciousness therein; and hence the Consciousness, non-discriminated from the said Appearance and conditioned by its receptacle Avidyā, that is, Ívara, the ultimate cause, the Inner Ruler and the witness—is regarded as one, admitting of no difference at all. In the same way, all other entities sentient or insentient come out as something empirically or illusorily existent and varitable as a result of Reality, the pure consciousness, appearing through the different modifications of Avidyā variously. Thus Ívara, the Appearance of consciousness in Avidyā, in the primary sense of the word, or the Consciousness, conditioned by Avidyā as nondiscriminated from Its appearance therein, figuratively, is the cause of the outcome of the whole phenomenal world. There is no difficulty in understanding so far that the one Reality, Brahman, through the diversely modifying Avidyā appears variously as the multiple empirical entities.

But the question, that inevitably arises, is how does

Avidyā itself arise initially. According to Sureśvara, Avidyā also is an appearance, but being inadvertently unintermittingly and unmediatedly present in and about Reality or Brahman Itself, it does not require any instrumentality or receptacle for itself. It is beginningless but 'Avicārita-Samsiddha' that is, appears to be an established fact or veritable only so long as the Reality is not realised.² No question of beginning about Avidyā can be raised as Time etc.,—the universal causal factors for all producibles—are themselves the issues of Avidyā. Being "Avicārita-Samsiddha," its end also is not questionable on the ground of its beginninglessness; because no actual end is needed to be accomplished of such an appearance and what is essential for its sublation is merely the realisation of Reality. For explaining an appearance, the Appearance of Reality unrealised as such is enough and no separate reality and real destruction of any destruction about the appearance itself are needed to be admitted at all.³ When Avidyā is sublated by proper Realisation of Reality all appearances, arising through it, are also automatically sublated and once sublated thus, they cannot be resurrected any more.

Having for its abode and object, that is, characterising and supported by Brahman, the one and indivisible Reality, Avidyā also is one and indivisible. Although objectively and substantively one, Avidyā operates differently in individual cases. Not only it operates differently and individually, but it is sublated also individually.

² *B.B.V.*, p. 933, V. 279; p. 1103; *VY*, 420—21; p. 1105, V. 436; p. 1122; V. 61.

³ There are only two logical alternatives: either knowledge, which, purely speaking, is itself Reality, that is, Eternal Existence, or Ignorance, which, etymologically speaking, is non-realisation of Reality and is technically known as Avidyā. There can be no Avidyā without Reality and there can be no Avidyā also after Reality proper is realised.

Oneness of Avidyā does not militate against the possibility of its sublation with regard to a particular Jīva and its continuation as usual for others, since its cessation is conditional and consequent upon Realisation of Reality, which is obviously an individual concern. Avidyā does not depend upon accidental or adventitious accessories for unfurling various appearances out of one Reality, as even the triune circle of Vāsanā, Kāma and Karma, responsible for the varieties of mundane experiences and migratory lives of individual souls, is also only the offshoot of Avidyā and contained in its womb as its necessary corollaries. Hence the causal apparatus of the entire empirical phenomenality ultimately reduces itself to Avidyā and the Appearance of Consciousness therein, enlivening and energising it as unlimited force and inscrutable power.

Avidyā is 'Avicārita-Samsiddha' also in the sense that it is unprovable. It should not be taken as tantological, if it is remarked that Avidyā is 'Āvidyaka,' as there is no other word in any language to convey the sense of the latter. It is the supreme prerogative of Avidyā that it does not admit of any proof or epistemological process in respect of itself and if it can be admitted anywhere, it can be done so only with regard to Pure Reality, the Consciousness, which, as the witnessing self, manifests it and its modifications and, as the Supreme Lord, materialises, eventuates, consolidates and manifests them variously as diverse concrete objects of the universe by appearing in and through them numerous in response to them. All producibles of the universe are provable and are actually proved through any of the different epistemological processes, but Avidyā—the unavoidable sole instrumentality or primary causal condition behind all appearances, and itself an uncaused appearance, being natural to Reality or apparently but inadventitiously and beginninglessly

related to It as Its unaccountable force or inexplicable power (in such a way as not to prove detrimental or derogatory to Its being. Pure Unity)—is intolerant of any proof or epistemological explanation; as it is the source and necessary presupposition of all logical and psychological process and their resultant empirical experiences. Avidyā is an appearance but not opposed to Reality, as Reality is ever glimmering through it and its modifications as their very source and sustenance but not as something wholly alien to them. It is sufficient to account for itself and is the inevitable ground of all other appearances and their cognitive processes and pragmatic values. It looms large as an established entity and veritably valid, forming as the unshakable foundation of the entire edifice of series of appearances as the whole universe and all, that prevail in it subjectively, objectively and epistemologically, but only so long as the Reality, which it seems to swing round and sway, is not realised to its utter sublation once for ever. All knowables, kinds and processes of knowledge owe their origin to it through non-realisation and wrong realisations of Reality, Pure Consciousness the Brahman; so Avidyā is established and supported directly by the witnessing self and not by any source and process of knowledge, which depend on and presuppose it as the fundamental ground of their etymological explanation.

The universe is an *Āvidvaka* array or a sustained series of appearances, arising from nonrealisation and wrong realisation of Reality through Avidyā. It is as '*Avicārita-Samsiddha*,' that is, of 'non-realisational' or apparent reality (to use a newly word in order to convey the exact sense of the phrase), as its cause Avidyā is. Like the leaves of a pruned plant, old appearances pass away and new ones spring up instead. Appearances crop up unendingly as long as Avidyā continues to muffle Reality. They are to be stultified or effaced altogether only when their

root—Avidyā—is sublated by Brahma-realisation. Sureśvara does not recognise any reality of any description or nature whatsoever, attributable to any object independently of the one Reality, which alone appears to be empirical or seeming realities also in the empirical plane. All empirical entities—whether appraised and evaluated as real or illusory in the common parlance—are equally appearances with this difference that the former are primary appearances and the latter secondary ones. The empirical realities are appearances of Reality proper and are in no way better than the ordinarily admitted illusions so far as their nature and perishability are concerned, but the difference lies only with regard to the exact number of causal conditions and duration of persistence. Even as regards the necessary causal conditions, Sureśvara is of opinion that Avidyā alone is enough to explain all kinds of appearances and other auxiliary conditions, laboured at even by many colleagues of the same camp: (1) general apprehension of the Adhiṣṭhāna, that is, cognition of the underlying reality as something, divested of its distinctive features and not as a particular thing, (2) Samskāra or the residual impression of a previous experience of the superimposed and (3) defects—subjective, objective and instrumental (Pramāṭr-Prameya-Pramāṇa-doṣa) etc. are regarded flippant and superfluous by him. Thus excepting the one Reality, Brahman, all are appearances and sublatable by realisation of Reality.

It is difficult to decide whether Appearances of Consciousness are first elicited and then come out the modifications of Avidyā as their receptacles, animated and manifested thereby or the modifications of Avidyā are materialised first and then Appearances of Consciousness are elicited so as to enliven and sustain those modifications. Sureśvara says that there is no necessity of answering such objections, nothing is impossible in the realm of

Avidyā. Alternative or mutually contrary propositions, such as those of capability or incapability, possibility or impossibility and contradiction or non-contradiction arise only in the plane of proofs but not in the sphere of Avidyā, which is assumptive and explanatory logically but apparent and not real essentially. It governs the entire plane of proofs and provables so far as the discursive knowledge is concerned but instantaneously dwindles away or undergoes sublation in the light of Realisation which embraces pure consciousness directly and not its apparent form only. In keeping with the nature of Avidyā and Avidyaka, all irregularities, discrepancies, logical inconsistencies and unaccountability of any kind are ornamentations to them and tend to establish them as "Avicārita-Samsiddha." So far some of the ontological and other special features of the Advaitic philosophy, set forth by Sureśvara in his works, have been dealt with.

Sureśvara has not contributed much to the epistemology of the Advaita Vedānta, which received ample development at the hands of later Advaitins. Nevertheless, it would be worth while to bring out his original views on some topics in this connection.

Firstly, the accounts for the omniscience of Īśvara in the following manner. Avidyā is an indispensable factor in the outcome of all entities of the universe, which are necessarily appearances, and Īśvara, being the consciousness appearing in and through that Avidyā, has a direct bearing on and relation to all, belonging to any period of time—present, past or future—and thus omniscience is natural to Him and independent of any causal condition or circumstance.

Secondly, Sureśvara does not recognise the necessity for any vṛtti in the process of cognition for objects, that are illumined directly by the witnessing self (Sākṣi-Bhāṣya Padārthas). Accordingly, no vṛtti of Avidyā is

accepted to account for the experience of 'Ajñāna etc. during Susupti. It is very remarkable that the subsequent apprehension, immediately after waking up from suṣupti (i.e., Deep Sleep) is not a recollection wholly or even partially according to him, but experience lingering on or continued from before with the addition of 'Aham' as the subject to it.

Thirdly, the function of *vṛtti* in the perceptual process, according to him, can be determined to be 'Abhedā-bhivyakti' or manifestation of identity between the subjective and objective appearances of Consciousness, that is, the Jīva and the 'Viṣayāvachinna-Cidābhāsa'. As regards other problems on Epistemology, they have been already discussed above in the light of Sureśvara's 'Abhāsa-Vāda' in their proper place.⁴

It has been pointed out above while defining the nature of the individual soul that the natural outcome of non-discrimination of Consciousness from Its own Appearance is the false identity of the Jīva with its receptacle and limiting adjunct—the psycho-physical organism. This erroneous notion of identity is the root-cause of all evils, from which individual souls in general unexceptionally and incessantly suffer. As long as the individual soul thinks that it is identical with the entire psycho-physical organism, it supposes itself related to all mental and physical changes as if they are taking place in itself and feels elated, perturbed, shocked etc. in accordance with various circumstances, accompaniments or surroundings on different occasions of its empirical life. This is technically called 'Adhyāsa', which consists in the illusory identity and consequent seeming transference or transmutation of the nature and attributes of the one to the other. Philosophically analysed, all experiences and

⁴ *B.B.V.*, p. 534, VV. 599—500,

enjoyments of the Jīva are explicable only through the Appearance of the Consciousness, conditioned by the mind, in the various attributes or modifications of the mind such as pleasure, pain etc. or the psychoses respectively. The four-fold aspect of cognition—the subjective, objective, instrumental and consequential—is nothing but Appearances of Consciousness in the various receptacles or adjuncts, such as the mind etc., the direct or indirect modifications of Avidyā. To sum up in a word, the whole life of the individual soul is merely an appearance and governed by appearance.

From all that has been stated so far, it must have been clear that it is the 'Appearance' which through non-discrimination makes the Consciousness, ever free in Its own essential nature conditioned by and identified with its receptacle-mind and thus enchained unendingly (excepting through Intuition of Reality) in the empirical life.

Similarly, in order to be free from all this bondage what is needed is the sublation of Avidyā, which, though beginningless and inadvertently present in Consciousness is अविचारितसिद्ध, that is one whose presence is admissible only so long as the discriminating Intuition of the Absolute Reality, the Brahman, has not dawned on the deserving soul. As pointed out above, actually Avidyā also is an appearance but it is the direct Appearance of Consciousness, which energises, enlivens and gives it its being by imparting seeming existence, reality and manifestation to it. But for this Appearance it would have never seemed to exist and appeared as real at all. Being an appearance it must be sublatale or annulable. But this is not to be sublated by Pure Consciousness, which brooks and gives it its being. It can be sublated by the empirical but discriminating knowledge⁵—direct and intuitional—arising from the sublime 'scriptural' passages revealing the

⁵ *B.B.V.*, p. 915, V. 173; p. 1060, V. 167,

absolute identity of the Jīva with Brahman and opening the eyes as it were of the deserving soul (on the analogy of कण्टकेनैव कण्टकम्). This final and liberating Brahman-realisation is itself an appearance but the last Appearance of Consciousness in the psychosis, having its content—Brahman and not any of its apparant forms only in the aforesaid manner. It is the last Appearance in the sense that it, having sublated Avidyā so far as that particular individual is concerned, undoes all the possible consequent receptacles or adjuncts which constitute the empirical life of that Jīva in particular and finally annihilates itself also. In other words, the mind—the permanent receptacle of that Appearance of Consciousness constituting or occasioning its seeming Jīva-bhāva in particular, having been sublated, the Appearance also is exterminated and erased once for ever; since the relation between the two—Appearance and receptacle—is organic and inseparable. The residue that survives this sublation and extermination, so far as that Individual soul in its primitive stages is concerned, is Pure Consciousness, Eternal Existence and Unlimited Bliss only. Accordingly, in the primary sense of the word, Mokṣa is the sublation of Avidyā and consequent erasement of the Appearance of Consciousness in its modification, which is empirically termed as mind, but in the secondary sense, it is the emergence or revelation (which is ever an accomplished fact but appears to be non-accomplished as obscured by Avidyā permanently but not endlessly) of Self-Same, Absolute and Bare Reality, Pure and Self-luminous Consciousness and Eternal, Unlimited and Unexcellable Bliss. For the attainment of this Mokṣa, nothing else but the direct Brahman—realisation through the Mahāvākyas is needed.

Before closing this analysis, it is necessary to explicate the nature of 'Appearance, which everything other than Brahman necessarily and exceptionally is, in the

light of Sureśvara's Ābhāsavāda. It is usual now to describe the universe as 'Anirvacanīya' according to the Advaita system and render the term as 'inexplicable'. This inexplicability may be taken as signifying a confession of ignorance about the ultimate nature of the universe. So it is necessary to explain the exact significance of the term in the light of Sureśvara's Ābhāsavāda. To characterise the universe as 'Anirvacanīya' is no doubt to reject the explanation that it is either 'Sat', 'Asat', or 'Sadasat', but it must be definitely understood that the rejection is not to be explained literally for it has a deep significance and a positive implication in accordance with the Advaita theory of knowledge, advanced by Sureśvara. That the illusory rope-serpant is Anirvacanīya means that it has no existence or reality of its own but we have to turn to something else for this, which is the so-called underlying reality behind it. Similarly, in the case of the universe also, we have to look elsewhere for what may be ultimately realised as the Reality behind and beyond all appearances. This Reality, Brahman, is the one Ultimate ground of all appearances, whether empirical or illusory. Thus the universe is Anirvacanīya in the sense that it is not self-explanatory and self-established but only 'Avicārita-Samsiddha', that is, appears to be self-established and utterly veritable for all intents and practical purposes only so long as Reality is not realised. It is a glistening glamour, which endures so long as Avidyā lingers and goes away for ever the moment Reality is realised. In other words, it means that the universe is an array of appearances, which come out and continue through and till the Realisation of the underlying Reality, necessarily pointed out and presupposed by them for their explanation as empirical realities out of Avidyā in and about that Absolute Reality.

As pointed out in one of the previous sections Avidyā

is responsible for suppressing and hiding the one Reality and showing in Its place the universe of diversity or plurality. This Avidyā is obviously not only an obscurative and suppressive factor but also a Creative principle, assumed under the logical necessity of explaining the appearance of the universe. Avidyā modifies itself variously, furnishing and serving as the necessary receptacles for the Appearances of one Reality and it is thus that Avidyā expresses itself empirically both as knowledge and object. It is impossible that knowledge in the empirical plane can be real, when the object is not so, for the relation between the two is organic and constitutional and the two are alike appearance of one and the same eternal Consciousness, which is Pure knowledge or A Priori immediately of course through different media presented by Avidyā. Accordingly, every appearance has an objective reference, as Avidyā does not show it as existent in the mind of a particular percipient but at a particular spot and time, which also are respectively only degrees nearness and succession in the order of appearances. Thus the Advaita system, unlike the school of Realism, recognises any empirical entity as not selfexplanatory and independent of the mind and, unlike the school of Subjectivism, refuses to accept it as purely mental also. It is denied only as Reality proper but not as 'Epistemological' realy or something logically existent till its appearance, which is terminable and sublatable by realisation of Reality. Again, in as much as the Advaita does not reject an external world as distinct empirically from experiences, it clearly avoids sollipsism, which is the pit-fall of the idealistic schools. This is the true explanation of the nature of appearance, as elucidated by Suresvara in conformity with his theory of Abhāsa. From all that has been said in the preceeding pages it may be safely concluded that besides Reality, Brahman, all are appearances,

In one verse⁶ Sureśvara conspicuously summarises all the possible apparent moments of movement and modifications in the Absolute, which taken together represents Reality with Its Appearances in its entirety. The Creator, the witness, and the inner Ruler on one side and the whole creation or entities of the universe—the object of creation, manifestation and government—on the other are all nothing but appearance only. This it is only the Appearance of Consciousness, which is directly involved in the tissues of empirical life and order (by way of their explanation). If Consciousness appears to be involved empirically at all, it is on account of Its nondiscrimination from Its Appearances in Avidyā and its modifications; otherwise, as a matter of truth or essentially speaking, Consciousness is above any association of phenomenality. Pure Consciousness or Reality Itself is ever untouched, unaffected, uninfluenced and uncontaminated by any kind of defilement, division limitation or relation, Reality or one Eternal being is held to be apparently but directly related to all empirical becomings, according to both the schools of Pratibimba and Avaccheda; whereas It is manifested to be so indirectly and incidentally; according to Sureśvara's Abhāsavāda, it is only Appearances, diversely elicited from Reality answering to various receptacles (i.e. Avidyā and its modifications), that account for, govern and hold up the plurality of the universe. Nothing is really born out of It and of nothing It is born Itself.⁷ It is one and one and there is nothing else similar to or dissimilar from or inherent in Itself. This is the real state of affair or truth from the view-point of Reality (Vastu-vṛtta), an unshakeable and perfect realisation of which (सम्यक्तत्त्वपरिज्ञान)⁸ puts an end to all empirical

⁶ B.B.V., A. III, B. IV., p. 1228, V. 121,

⁷ B.B.V., p. 1073, V. 244.

⁸ B.B.V., p. 1076, V. 260:

existences, migrations and accompanying evils. All that impress as real upon the unenlightened mind as other than and independently of the one Reality are appearances only (अभासमान .) and these appearances are not identical with Reality but an overgrowth through Its Avidyā. So the greatest and the most important contribution, made by Sureśvara, lies in enunciating the theory of Ābhāsa in order to give a new interpretation to the entire system of the Advaita and this task he has accomplished, with a remarkable success and a commendable originality of thoughts.

PART II

WHITEHEAD AND ŚANKARA

By DR. P. NAGARAJA RAO.

GENERAL CRITICISM OF WHITEHEAD'S RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY

WHITEHEAD'S conception of God is climed by him to be strictly metaphysical. He invokes the concept of God in response to the deep metaphysical needs of his system. His God is modelled on Aristotle's conception. There are definite functions for Him in the system. God is one of the chief metaphysical categories necessary for the logical completion of the system. He is not treated in a manner unlike other metaphysical categories. He is the supreme instance of all the metaphysical categories

Whitehead is of opinion that the current conceptions of God adumbrated by the religious philosophers and theologians of tradition, do not accord with the deliverances of modern science. He criticises in detail the conception of God in terms of a supreme personality, and also the view of God as Absolute consciousness or spirit. He arrives at his conception of God through a detailed criticism of the concept of God as personality and spirit, and in sheer response to the metaphysical needs of his system. He is never tired of reiterating that only a philosophy of organism is in consonance with the conclusions of modern physical science. A philosophy of organism entails the conception of a metaphysical God.

It is sought to be maintained here, that Whitehead's criticism of the theistic conception of God, and the allied religious doctrines, are not unanswerable, nor are they invincible and conclusive. Further we discern that Whitehead's description of God, and the functions he

seeks to explain with the help of that concept, are neither easily intelligible nor very clear. We shall proceed to state Whitehead's case against traditional religious conceptions of God and then advert to their criticism.

The gravamen of Whitehead's charge against traditional theology is its adoption of the outmoded scientific ideas. He discusses the various possible views of the laws of nature and concludes that the law must be conceived as immanent. The view that a supreme personality has imposed a law on Nature has been the view of the traditional theologians. It is based on the Newtonian world view viz. that there are isolated bits of matter and definite laws governing their motions. No longer is such a world view tenable; because of the interrelated nature of objects. The Newtonian view helped the theologians to conceive of God as the imposer of laws on Nature. Whitehead is of opinion that the nineteenth century physics is the background for the view of an extracosmic suprapersonal God who imposes laws on Nature. The view is summarised by him as follows:—'there are bits of matter, enduring self-identically in space which is otherwise empty. Each bit of matter occupies a definite, limited region. Each such particle of matter has its own private qualifications such as its shape, its motion, its mass, its colour, its scent. Some of these qualifications change, others persist. The essential relationship between bits of matter is purely spatial. Space itself is eternally unchanging; always including in itself, this capacity for the relationship of the bits of matter. The materialism of the nineteenth century believed in the conception of matter as the only form of Reality, and the conception of the mechanical law as the only law. Besides they declared that evolution is automatic and predetermined. Against the background of this deterministic view of the universe the theologian erects his God and attributes the reign of law,

present in Nature as arising from the imposition of God. The theologians described God in strictly non-metaphysical terms. In the words of Whitehead, God 'stood in the same relation to the whole world as early Egyptian or Mesopotamian kings stood to their subjects populations. Also the moral characters were very analogous. In the final metaphysical sublimation, he became the one absolute, omnipotent, omniscient source of all being, for his own existence requiring no relations to anything beyond himself. He was internally complete.' God stood out as an extra-cosmic entity. He was represented as eminently real and the world as derivatively real. God was necessary for the world but the world was not necessary for God. Thus the traditional theologians on the basis of nineteenth century physics created a gulf between God and the world.

Newton himself subscribed to such a view. He stated 'that the correlated modes of behaviour of the bodies forming the solar system required God for the imposition of the principles on which all depended. He was certainly doubtful, indeed more than doubtful, as to whether the Law of gravity was the ultimate statement of principles imposed by God. But he certainly thought that the conception of the solar system exhibited in his *Principia* was sufficiently ultimate to make obvious the necessity of a God imposing law'.² Newton's doctrine helped science a great deal. It is a definite and an easy view to understand. Whitehead is not chary in his compliment for the concept of 'Law as imposed'. He held the view that 'if success be a guarantee of truth, no other system of thought has enjoyed a tithe of such success since mankind started on its job of

¹ *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 217.

² *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 144—145.

thinking. Within three hundred years it has transformed human life, in its intimate thoughts, its technologies, its social behaviour, and its ambitions.³ The motive force of scientific research has been the implicit belief in some form of the imposition of Law and its consequent exactness. But for it men would not have sought to observe the grand uniformities of Nature. It is the belief in the possibilities of Laws that egged on men to research.

But for the doctrine of the 'imposed Law' the universe would be relapsing into lawless chaos. While bestowing a good deal of praise on the concept of the imposed Law whitehead is not slow to discern the defects and the terrible consequences of such a view. He affirms that such a cosmology is very easy to understand and very hard to believe.⁴ It no doubt represents a clear and distinct system of ideas. But none the less it is based on an outmoded conception of conclusions of the physical sciences.

Whitehead rejects the theological conception of a supra-cosmic God because it is based on an outmoded scientific conception which does not give an intelligent account of the universe as a whole. It has shivered the universe into a multitude of disconnected substantial things. Further he declares that a sound metaphysics must overcome the dualism set out by the theologians. It requires a solution exhibiting the plurality of individuals as consistent with the unity of the universe, and a solution which exhibits the world as requiring its union with God, and God as requiring his union with the world. Sound doctrine also requires an understanding how the ideals in God's nature by reason of their status in his nature, are there by persuasive elements in the creative advance.⁵ The world must not derive its laws or reality

³ *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 155.

⁴ *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 168.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 215.

from the accidents of the will of God. 'Metaphysics requires that the relationships of God to the world should lie beyond the accidents of will, and that they be founded upon the necessities of the nature of God and the nature of the world.'⁶

After making out a case for the philosophy of organism Whitehead sets up his metaphysical God and gives him some functions. In the formation of an actual entity we need the ingression of the eternal objects. It is God that determines as to which eternal object should ingress into the spatiotemporal flux. God is thus, the principle of actuality. He is also described as the principle of limitation. It is the premordial nature of God that is responsible for the graded relevance of the eternal objects. Apart from God there would be no novelty at all. This principle of limitation stands outside the world of flux. Thus 'God is the ultimate limitation and His existence the ultimate irrationality. For no reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in his nature to impose. God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the nature of God because that nature is the ground of rationality.' In simple language in order that a thing may be actual there must be some limitation upon possibilities since by virtue of becoming that thing, a thing excludes all the other infinitely numerous possible things which it might have been. It is God who carves the actual world from the realm of infinite possibilities.

The consequent nature of God is responsible for the objective immortality of the world.* The objective immortality of the fluent world is secured in God. It is this aspect of God that saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. God's role is not the combat

* *Ibid.* p. 215.

of productive force with productive force, of destructive force with destructive force; it lies in the patient operation of the over-powering rationality of his conceptual harmonisation. He does not create the world. He saves it or more accurately He is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by His vision of truth, beauty and goodness. In another passage He refers to God as the greatest companion and the fellow sufferer of men.

Further, Whitehead is of opinion that the metaphysical nature of his God does not suffer from the defects of the theologians' concept of God. God, according to Whitehead, determines the actualization of one of an infinite number of worlds that might have been. He does not create the world that actually is. So Whitehead's God is exonerated from the responsibility for the existence of evil and good in the world. Whitehead thinks that he scores here heavily over the theologian's concept of the personal and extra cosmic God. He is not in sympathy with the Leibinzian view that our universe is 'the best of possible worlds'. He declares that theory 'is an audacious, fudge' produced in order to save the face of a creator constructed by contemporary, and antecedent, theologians.⁷

Whitehead further criticises the theologians God as creating a great division between the world and Himself. He laments that there is no logical way of knowing God who is on the other side of the gulf. He distrusts mysticism and the nonlogical modes of knowledge. He trenchantly remarks that, "It is only by drawing the long bow of mysticism that evidences for his (God's) existence can be collected from our temporal world."⁸

Besides setting up the gulf, Whitehead points out that an omnipotent despot like God whose power is unqualified becomes responsible for the existence of evil.

⁷ *Process and Reality*. p. 64.

⁸ *Adventures of Ideas*. p. 217.

Evil stands out as a creation of God. The theologians' God is made responsible for evil. The notion of an absolute despot cannot escape the problem of evil. This does not touch Whitehead's God. He says 'the worst of unqualified omnipotence is that it is accompanied by responsibility for every detail of every happening.' He points out that the problem of evil and God's responsibility for it preclude him from accepting the theologians' description of God as an extra-cosmic and supra-personal being.

Before offering our criticism on the religious non-availability of Whitehead's God, let us in some detail examine his other charges. His indictment is that the concept of God in traditional theologies is based on a system of the outmoded conclusions of science. It is assuming a great deal for his system. It is certainly dogmatic even for Whitehead to identify the limits of philosophy with those of his system. His system does not derive any special validity because it is in consonance with the deliverances of modern sciences. Philosophical concepts and deep religious truths cannot go on changing with the time to time revised conclusions of the physical and the biological sciences. Religious ideas and philosophical truths are not dependent factors of the shifting conclusions of science. It is the expression of an anti-metaphysical bias to set up the conclusions of science as the norm for all religious and other truths. The erection of such a standard may help us to get at a completed and intellectually satisfactory view of Reality. The human being will certainly be pleased to learn that his unaided reason could construct a system, clear and intelligible. The God of such a system is purely an intellectual conception and may even be indispensable to the adequate understanding of the universe. But such a God does not play any part in the urgent problems of life. Bacon compared certain

philosophers to the stars which give very little light because they are high. This remark is not without some relevance to Whitehead's God.

Whitehead's love of Mathematics and his faith in the ultimacy of Time and his belief in the creative power of the process of reality are responsible for making him think that the philosophy of organism is very nearly the perfect system of metaphysics. But he has been oblivious of the deep needs of man which are answered by the God of the traditional theologies. In his anxiety to construct a purely metaphysical God he has given us a God who is of very little use to religion. His philosophy of organism like some of the evolutionist-philosophers is almost infatuated with the doctrine that we can get out of the process of reality in time ever new entities. Following the tradition of William James, Whitehead believes, 'that there shall be news'. James was fond of saying with rapture quoting from the unpublished poem of an obscure friend, 'that there shall be news in heaven.' The craze for novelty as emerging from the process is also deep in the philosophy of organism. But the line of thought is not new. Santayana observes 'that if the author of the book of Ecclesiastes were now alive. and heard that there shall be news in heaven, he would doubtless say that there may possibly be news there, but that under the sun there is nothing new.'⁹ Not even the philosophy of organism.

To erect a concept of God and derive a philosophy from the evolutionary process of Reality is not a safe standard. It has no enduring foundations. Such a God does not answer to the religious needs of man. Years ago the great T. H. Huxley sounded the warning. He says 'let us understand, once for all that the ethical progress

⁹ Santayana, on: *Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy*, address delivered before the philosophical Union of the University of California, August 25, 1911.

of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, but still less in running away from it, but in combating it.¹⁰ The method of the cosmic process is 'the gladitorial theory of existence' where the strongest, the most self-assertive tend to tread down the weaker. Its demand is 'the ruthless self-assertion.' It involves the 'thrusting aside, or treading down of all competitors. From the working of the cosmic process we cannot derive a philosophy or a religion. We can strive to make the world moral in the light of our religion and conception of values. The norm has to be other than the cosmic process. The historical and the temporal cannot be the matrix from which we can derive our God. We must think transcendently and not historically. We should not adopt our Gods and build altars for them on the principle of the evolution of the universe. The God of the evolutionist is highly abstract and does not answer to the deep needs of men. We cannot simply accept the direction of evolution as good simply because it is evolution. It has to be estimated from outside and if possible directed in the light of religious values.¹¹

The central defect of the philosophies of evolution is, they believe that science can give us the knowledge of Reality in all its aspects. They are blind to the transcendent and super-natural elements in Reality. They seek to explain the world in terms of the conceptions appropriate to and derived from the natural world. As a result of this we get a finite and a growing God with the universe as his partner. The evolutionist philosophers in their craze for progress have put their gods also on motion.

¹⁰ T. H. Huxley. *Evolution and Ethics*. p. 83, 1884.

¹¹ See Waddington's *Science and Ethics*. He holds that we must accept the direction of evolution as good simply p. 18. For criticisms see the reply of others in the symposium.

The status of such a God is no better than that of a mathematical figure.

Whitehead's God rests on the ultimate truth of the nature of his metaphysics. He has created a God to suit the requirements of his system. His God is as abstract as that of Aristotle. The concept of finite struggling God needing man's cooperation for perfecting Himself was the fashion set up by William James. Many of the natural philosophers have taken to it after him. They tell us that there is no use positing a perfect God and surrendering ourselves to Him. James characterised all types of absolutistic schemes as appealing to the 'tender minded'.

He exhorts the 'tough minded' to face an improving universe accept a finite God and subscribe to a pluralistic metaphysics. Modern evolutionist philosophers discern a special merit in the adventure in a chance universe. Years before William James put the following choice before men 'Suppose the world's author put the case to you; I am going to make the world not certain to be saved, a world the perfection of which shall be conditional merely, the condition being that each several agent does its own level best. 'I offer you the chance of taking part in such a world. Its safety, you see, is unwarranted. It is a real adventure, with real danger, yet it may win through. It is a social scheme of cooperative work genuinely to be done. Will you join the procession? Will you trust yourself and trust the other agents enough to face the risk.'¹² James found that a normally constituted healthy man would accept the choice with buoyancy and join the procession to perfect himself and his creator. Thus he would add his fiat to the fiat of God.

Whitehead in general belongs to the philosophical tradition of James. As James, he also is for an improving

¹² William James: *Pragmatism*, pp. 290—297. (1907).

universe and a finite God. He believes that there is the need for the realisation of the god through the course of the process. The view that God is being perfected in the process of evolution and that he is at the end of the evolution is said to egg on men to moral activity. The God who is the *nisus* of evolution is held to escape the charge of anthropomorphism. Alexander, the great philosophical companion of Whitehead writes that the concept of God as a supra perfected person results from the inability of men to proceed rationally or to think in abstract terms. Men are in general creatures of imagination. 'It is small wonder that a creator who makes his creatures and sways their lives by His ordinances is easier and more natural to our work-day minds than such a being as has been suggested here. We shadow forth our abstract thoughts in the most accessible images and overlook their weakness, leaving them rather to provoke in our theologies whole volumes of controversy spent on the insuperable task of giving rational form to imaginative creations.'¹³ After thus indicating the traditional God of theology of anthropomorphism, Alexander observes, 'It seems to me more reasonable (and helpful) to worship a being whose love draws us to him in front, and whom we thus help into existence, rather than a being independent of our efforts. who pushes us from behind.'¹⁴

Most of the religions of the world have examined the nature and predicament of man in all aspects and then have formulated the doctrines relating to the nature and destiny of man. They have not identified man with the entire world of matter. They find that man is something more than what the industrial chemist and the materialist

¹³ *Science and Religion*. (A Symposium) p. 139 (1934).

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 138.

¹⁵ Vide. B. A. Howard—

resolve him into. Nor is man a body plus an extraordinary degree of scientific cunning.¹⁶ All the religions of the world hold the view that man is spirit at his essential core. They declare that he lives in two worlds and really belongs to the higher. He is immortal. There is a perpetual urge in him to create things in the likeness of the spirit. This feeling is instinct with him. It is overlaid with other materials and thus we are confused and deluded. The deluded and confused human being is not satisfied with the intellectual concept of a God. To the ordinary human being who lives in the midst of perplexing situation the need to believe in a supra-personal God is the very source of His existence. This need to belief is not a psychological weakness nor is it an opiate. It is not the wet nurse complex as Freud described it. It is there deep in the very nature of man. The human being finds it difficult to live by the ordinary intelligence that is vouchsafed to him. Life bears a very hard on him. On account of his weak will he consistently finds it difficult to translate his knowledge into virtue. He finds his will be unable to will his knowledge. There is a constant struggle between our knowledge and our inclinations. We find it difficult in the face of real temptation to live by ourselves; our 'puny reason' and 'wavering uncertainty' cannot help us at the cross-roads of life. We need a self which is infinitely good and other than ourselves to stand by us and sustain the moral values in the universe. Such a spirit, the theist conceives in terms of an omnipotent good father. God

The proper study of Mankind—

“ Enough water to fill a ten-gallon barrel;
 enough fat for seven bars of soap;
 carbon for 9,000 lead pencils;
 phosphorus for 2,200 match-heads;
 iron for one medium-sized nail;
 lime enough to whitewash a chicken coop; and
 small quantities of magnesium and sulphur.”

¹⁶ Byron: 'man is a two-legged reptile, crafty and venomous.

is a power who is akin to us, most sensitive to our wishes, responsive to our hopes and continually with us helping us to live aright and face the temptations with courage.¹⁷ The perfect dissolution of the struggle is attained with the fellowship of the Lord. The human heart never rests satisfied till it attains its consumation in the self and the love of the Lord. The situations in life that demand the concept of God are in the experience of all. Pascal observed, 'the human mind believes naturally and the will loves naturally; consequently for lack of real objects it attaches itself to false objects.' The need to believe can never be eradicated. If we knock down the gods from the pedestal human idols spring up in their place.¹⁸ This need to belief and man's desire for the fellowship with the Lord cannot find any substitute. 'Epicurus remarked, and not without reason that with a little bread and water, the wise man is the equal of Jupiter himself; Gilson improves the remark,' the fact is perhaps that with a little bread and water man ought to be happy but precisely is not; and if he is not, it is not necessarily because he lacks wisdom but simply because he is a man, and because all that is deepest in him perpetually gainsays the wisdom offered. The owner of a great state would still add field to field, the rich man would heap up more riches, the husband of a fair wife would have another still fairer or possibly one less fair would serve, provided only she were fair in some other way This incessant pursuit of an ever fugitive satisfaction springs from troubled deeps in human nature . . . the very insatiability of human desire has

¹⁷ Some seek a father in heavens above Some ask a human image to adore Some crave a spirit vast as life and love Within thy massions have all and more. 3 Misc Book V.

¹⁸ Disraeli remarks 'Give man nothing to worship and nothing to revere, and He will find altars and idols in his own heart and his own imagination . . . fashioning his own divinities and finding a chieftain in his passions.'

positive significance; it means we are attracted by a powerful goal.

This need for believing in a powerful personal God cannot be quelled by any substitute. The substitutes of religion can never take the place of real religion. The passion for communal improvement, or the zeal for social applause, cannot distract man from this fundamental unrest. Action however exciting, labour however absorbing, penury however exacting, love and hate however obsessing leave still a yawning gap. You may beat this exigency down, you may starve it out, or crowd it away; the need for God refuses to be eradicated. St. Augustine in the opening words of the confession declares 'Thou, O God, hast made us for thyself, and our hearts are restless until they find rest in thee.' The need for a supra personal God whose presence and strength is a treasure is made evident to us in the hour of temptation. At that moment we have neither the will nor the wisdom necessary for the act. Our will is weakened. We are passionate, and we bring to our passions an unavailing pity. Mere knowledge of the truth is not enough. Knowing too much and refusing to act as required by duty or moral law is a common weakness of men. The problem of temptation is a predicament we experience every day of our life. The subject has a terrific topicality to the distracted modern world. On the theists analysis, why theists on any spiritual analysis, 'things happen first in the soul and then the body.' The modern man is without any rule of life. He is distracted. Impulses drive him one way; fear holds him back; desire pulls, duty forbids; thus there is a tug of war. Behind the lineaments of the portrait of the Democratic man of Plato described in the eighth book of the Republic we discern the contemporary face. 'He (the Democratic man) spends as much time and pains and money on his superfluous pleasures as on the

necessary ones . . . He sets all his pleasures on a footing of equality, denying to none equal rights and maintenance, and allowing each in turn, as it presents itself, to succeed to the government of his soul until it is satisfied. When he is told that some pleasures should be pursued and valued as arising from desires of a high order, others chastised and enslaved because the desires are base, he will shut the gates of the citadel against the messengers of truth, shaking his head and declaring that one appetite is as good as another and all must have their equal rights. So he spends his days indulging the pleasures of the moment, now intoxicated with wine and music, and then taking to a spare diet and drinking nothing but water; one day in hard training, the next day doing nothing at all, the third apparently immersed in study. Every now and then he takes a part in politics, and jumps to his feet to say or do whatever comes into his head. Or he will set out to rival some one whom he admires, a soldier perhaps, or, if the fancy takes him, a man of business.¹⁹

The democratic man is the typical unregenerate intelligent man of to day. He submits himself to no order or restraint, and he has 'no wish to change the existence which he calls pleasant and free and happy.' Indian philosophical systems and theistic creeds have found that it is difficult and impossible to attain perfection by the mere extension of the pleasures of life.

On close reflective analysis, we find that our ego and

¹⁹ Plato, *Republic*. 561.

Vide Dryden's description of zimiri in *Absalom and Achitophel*

Part I Lines (541—551).

'A man so various that he seemed to be
Not one, but all mankind's epitome;
Stiff in opinion, always in the wrong,
Was every thing by starts and nothing long;
But in the course of one revolving moon
Was chemist, fiddler, statesman, and buffoon;
Then all for women, painting, rhyming, drinking.'

unregenerate life overlay themselves with thick layers of unreality and prevent the inflow of the grace. The need for the grace of the Lord becomes evident to us when we are face to face with our 'infinite wretchedness.' Life bears sometimes very hard on us. There are moments of discouragement in us, when we are sick of the self and tired of vainly striving. Our own life breaks down, and we fall into the attitude of the prodigal son. We mistrust the chances of life; we want a universe where we can just give up and fall on our father's neck and say, 'It is finished father, into thy hands I commend this spirit'. It is by this surrender of the ego, or the offering of the self that there is the inflow of the grace. But man finds it very hard to shed the ego in its various forms. It is only when everything fails him and bewildered by the accidents of finite experience, man finds that his grip on surface supports will not be of any avail. It is at this moment that man experiences the everlasting arms underneath sustaining him. It is this surrender that recharges man with the new spirit. The spirit of man mutates during this experience. In christian language the crucifixion must go before resurrection. But the self-surrender in a complete fashion is not possible for the unregenerate human being. Eckhart, the German mystic, observes, 'the opening of the door, your escaping out of the suffocating person of the ego, and God's entering, the king and the kingdom coming unto you are one and the same act, an instantaneous transaction and reciprocation.' Śrī Ramakṛṣṇa, the great eastern mystic, said, 'bliss begins that moment the ego dies. 'Nothing burns in Hell but the ego.' The human soul is so near the Lord, but still finds itself hard to surrender to Him. Anselm expresses the idea neatly. He says, 'how far am I from thee who are so high to me. It is only one step but an immeasurable step from Time to eternity.'

The need for this surrender and the strength of the presence of the Lord is most evident to us when we face troubles, temptations and trials in life. We are perplexed at the problem of life. There is a Sanskr̥ta saying which expresses in a pointed manner the helplessness of man. 'Man knows what is Dharma and does not practise it, and he knows what is adharmā and does not desist from it.'²⁰ St. Paul's confession echoes the sentiment 'the good that I would, do not, the evil that I would not, that I do.'²¹ St. Augustine declares in dejection, 'I know not how it is, that an object of desire becomes more seductive when it is forbidden.' There seems a condemnation on man that he should profess ideas of universal harmony and make perpetual war with the neighbour. In the words of the gospel,²² 'this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil'. John Bunyan depicted Lord Hate-good as the presiding judge over the tribunal at the vanity fair. The character and name ring true to life. In the east the representative man in the *Gītā* asked Kṛṣṇa 'what impels a man to commit sin in spite of himself and driven as it were by force?' Lord Kṛṣṇa puts his finger on the main cause and source i.e. unregenerate human desires. Human egotism sets itself against the infinite and works as if nothing but its strength counts. Evil arises, according to Reinhold Niebuhr, not an account of man's finiteness, but out of his refusal to admit his creatureliness. It arises out of man's rebellian against God. He hankers after infinity. The scientific materialist of our day giddy with the success attained over material things declares himself to be God.

²⁰ Jānami dharmān na ca me pravṛttili,

²⁰ Jānāmyadharmān na ca me nivṛttili.

²¹ St. Paul *Rom.* VII 19.

²² St. John III 19.

He declares in the words of the *Gītā*, 'the world is false, without a moral basis, and without God, what is there that does not spring from mutual union, lust is the cause of all.'²³ He recounts his exploits with a swagger. He says 'this enemy I have slain, and other too I will slay. I am the Lord of all and I enjoy myself. I am prosperous, mighty and happy. I am rich and of high birth, who is there like unto me? I will perform sacrifices, I will give alms, I will rejoice.'²⁴ In the hour of trial and temptation there is no good attempting to live by our 'puny reason' and wavering uncertainty. In the logical language it is sin not to admit the creatureliness of man. Faith in conceptual reason, and self conscious intellect with its clean analysis and limited aims are in the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan 'the logical counter part of human egoism.'²⁵ Pascal in a celebrated passage points out, by ourself in effects, it is no use trying to do good, you are too sinful; by yourself, it is no use trying to be wise; your folly is too crass' After this we have the assurance in the words of Pascal 'But fortunately here is no need to try to be by yourselves since there is one who will lead you, one who will give you the strength to do good and wisdom to go aright.'

It is in the pragmatic demand of man in his effort to live aright that the God of religion helps him. He finds that he only hankers after infinity and is not really so. He realises his infinite wretchedness and helplessness, and at the same time needs the infinite goodness of god to help him. The great theists of the world have all employed their gifts of logic and powers of argumentation to lay bare this need of man in the hour of his temptation.

²³ *Gītā*: XVI, v 8.

²⁴ *Gītā*: XVI, v 14-15.

²⁵ The fool hath said in his heart there is no God.

It is the God of religion and not a metaphysical entity that gives us security in the dire hour of our need. The Lord of the *Gītā* says, 'those who meditate on me and worship me and no other and who are ever devoted to me to them I ensure all that is necessary.'²⁶ Jesus observed 'let not your heart be troubled. Ye believe in God.'²⁷ The God of religion is the comfort and the companion of man. It gives significance and security to moral life. A God who is a neat intellectual construct rounding off a metaphysical system, with no purposes, with no grace does not answer to the needs of man. Such a god does not create the world nor could he have made it otherwise than as it is. The things of the world follow from his fixed nature. Judged by this test Whitehead's God is not available for religion.

Further we have the fundamental difficulty in knowing Whitehead's God, because he is never perfect and independent of the evolving process. God realises his fulness through the process of reality. God finds his completion in terms of the world process. He has a past which is irrevocable and unrealised in future. At no time do we have a completely perfect God. There is a finite aspect which is constitutive feature of God. Thus the God of Whitehead does not completely exist. So we cannot know him. He is not the creator of the world and at best he is one factor in it. So we cannot have unquestionable faith in the rationality and the order of the universe. The great evolutionist philosophers are distrustful of mysticism and ask us, 'what guarantee have we that, that light (mystic vision) may not be a wandering fire?' 'It needs confirmation from the accordance of its deliverances with the whole of our experiences.'²⁸ But the intellectual

²⁶ *Gītā*: IX, V, 22.

²⁷ *St. John*: XIV, 1.

²⁸ *Science and Religion*. p. 137.

perception of the evolutionists' God can never be complete for he does not exist at any time. He is yet to be. The metaphysical tendency of the scientific philosophers has been to envisage objects under the form of time 'to write' in the words of A. E. Taylor, the object's life history. 'The entire' hierarchised nature of the universe is explained as due to the configurations, in a kinematical system, with the result that we get a God who is abstract. This is due to the excessive trust that Whitehead has in mathematics. He supposes that his favourite subject must provide the solution of every problem in the universe. It is all due to Whitehead's presupposition that symbolic logic and mathematics are the key to the problems of aesthetics, ethics and theology that is responsible for such an abstract concept of God. This is an illustration of the fact as to how great minds can be obsessed by single ideas.²⁹

The scientific bias of some of the contemporary philosophers is more than the theologian's. Centuries ago Pascal condemned the attempt to subject the laws of science to theological dictations. He declared 'the jesuits have procured a decree from Rome that the earth does not resolve, but, if it really resolves, no decree can alter that fact.'³⁰ A. E. Taylor comments with a sense of terrific topicality, 'in our own day we more commonly, perhaps, see the process reversed. We see the invoking of something like "decree" from the Royal society in condemnation of the doctrines of theology'.³¹ If we believe Pascal in religious experiences the witness we have of God in ourselves and the light of nature we experience need not be set down as fancies embodied under some mood of excitement, having no basis in the solid facts and the

²⁹ Vide. W. T. Stages review of P. A. Schilpp's *philosophy of* A. N. Whitehead-Mind Vol. II. No. 205, Jan (1943),

³⁰ *Letters ecrites aun provincial*, XVIII.

³¹ A. E. Taylor. *The Faith of a Moralist. Series II* p. 395 (1931).

general nature of things. They are real facts and no decree can make them unreal.

The charge of anthropomorphism is levelled at the God of all types of theism. It is described as arising from the conceit of the human being. Man has chosen to make God in his own image and attribute human qualities in extraordinary proportion to him. This charge is true to a degree. But that is a limitation natural to the human mind and finite intelligence. It has to think always with the help of some analogy or other. Thomas Aquinas points out that there is no way left for man to think of God except in the method of analogy.

The picture of God is some times that of a holy father or a divine mother. We have the glassy seas and many mansions also. They are only symbols and the symbol depends upon the culture and tradition of the age and the people that invent them. We must not take them as literal truths. Anthropomorphism is the method through which man expresses his self. He expresses his love for the divine through symbolism and art. The anthropomorphic ideas are valuable as long as they strengthen our faith don't strangle it. As long as they help the human spirit they need not be superseded ³²

The charge of anthropomorphism against the god of the theist has no doubt some force and significance. But here is a case of the pot calling the kettle black. The charge turns out to be a boomerang. It recoils on the evolutionists. Dr. Joad points out, 'the conceit involved in the traditional view is as nothing compared with the aggrandisement of the human spirit implied by the philosophy of emergence. For the emergent God is not only imaginatively conceived by man's spirit, he is actively made by man's efforts. Not only are his attributes the products of our conception, not only are His virtues and

³² Dr. C. E. M. Joad; *God and Evil* p. 153,

values the projection of our aspirations, but is reality is our gift.³³ Thus we see that the evolutionist philosophers are not away from anthropomorphism. They make man the measure of everything. The universe for them in the words of Bergson 'is a machine for producing Gods'. Such a view leaves out a lot and makes man the creator and the bestower of reality to his God. It is this exaltation of man and the non-admission of his finitude that is responsible for the doctrines of eternal progress and the pursuit of the Faustian infinity. These doctrines mistake perfection as a process of progress. The eternal travel or ascent is regarded as the path to perfection.

Goethe contradicted Eckermann's description of human thought and action as repeating themselves by going round in a circle. He asserted that human thought 'is not a circle; it is a spiral.' Mr. Hume, the author of *Speculations* has a powerful rejoinder to Goethe in his saying 'this is to disguise the wheel by making it run up an inclined plane?'

If the God of the evolutionist is finite, his fate would be no better than that of the universe along with which he evolves. His doom is not different from that of the universe. The immanent evolving Gods share the same fate as the universe. The fate if the second law of thermodynamics is to be trusted, is to achieve a condition of eventless stagnation. Dr. Joad has a very eloquent description of that state, which awaits the universe and a finite God. 'The last inhabitants of the earth will be as destitute, as feeble and as dull witted as the first. They would have forgotten all the arts and all the sciences. They would huddle wretchedly in caves in the sides of the glaciers that will roll their transparent masses over the half obliterated ruins of the cities, where men now think and love, suffer and hope. The last desperate survivor

³³ Dr. C. E. M. Joad: *God and Evil* p. 153,

of mankind will know nothing of our genius, nothing of our civilisation. One day the last man callous alike to hate and love, will exhale to the unfriendly sky the last human breath and the globe will go rolling on bearing with it, through the silent fields of space, the ashes of humanity, the picture of Michelangelo and the remnants of the Greek marbles frozen to its icy surface.³² Such a prospect for God or the universe is not calculated to evoke religious sentiments nor will it satisfy the religious soul.

Whitehead claims that the traditional concept of God is open to the difficulty of the problem of evil. He adds that his conception of God is free from such defects. God is not the creator of the world and as such is not responsible for the evil therein. He does not explain away evil, but admits its existence. He describes evil as a 'destructive agent among things greater than itself'³⁴ The moral order of the world for him consists in 'the fact of the instability of evil.' But he again and again points out that evil is essentially unstable. 'Evil promotes its own elimination by destruction, or degradation, or by elevation . . . But in its own nature it is unstable.'³⁵ There is evil when things are not in order and when they are at cross purposes. Whitehead perceives, 'the ultimate evil in the temporal world is deeper than any specific evil. It lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a 'perpetual perishing.'³⁶ He is of opinion that evil is responsible for the character of things that are mutually obstructive. We have to build harmony by transforming these obstructive elements. This can be done only by struggle. 'The struggle with evil is a process of building up a mode of utilisation by provision of intermediate elements in-

³² Dr. Joad. *Guide to Modern thought*, p. 42, (1943)

³⁵ *Religion in the Making*. p. 83.

³⁶ *Religion in the Making*. p. 83.

roducing a complex structure of harmony.'³⁷ It is because of this that Whitehead regards that 'evil is the way house between perfection and triviality'.³⁸

The theist's God is said to be tainted by the evil. Though it is generally held that many a student of philosophy is precluded from accepting God because of the problem of evil and the difficulties it presents, it is not so. According to a few it is the very problem of evil that makes men accept God. The late W.R. Sorley holds the view that the problem of evil constitute a chief consideration, which disables us from denying God. He argues that 'evil would cease to be a problem but for the presupposition that God exists'.³⁹ Why should the problem of evil offend us, unless we assume the existence of an all-powerful and 'all-good being? We should have no right to object to it any more, it would never have occurred to us to object to it except on the basis of the presumption that God exists and is good. Sorley holds the view that the problem far from discrediting theism, entails it. So we find that the problem does not necessitate atheism, nor does it impair the theist's God as Whitehead imagines.

Thus we find that neither the God of Aristotle nor that of Whitehead performs the functions for which God was invoked in the past. The concept of God must be capable of answering certain definite requirements of religious consciousness. Aristotle for whom Whitehead has such admiration has given us God who is perfect and as such he does not soil his hands by creating imperfect things. His one activity is self-contemplation. He moves the world through its appetite. Such a God is 'not the loving father of mankind nor 'the lord of all the

³⁷ *Process and Reality*, p. 482.

³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 482.

³⁹ *Adventures of deus* p. 355.

worlds and the friend of all.⁴⁰ Religion requires a personality, and not a completed philosophy of organism.

William Temple in his Gifford lectures *Nature, Man and God* points out that Whitehead's God described under two aspects the primordial and the consequent, does not clearly explain the functions for which they are evoked. For example, Whitehead observes that the primordial nature of God is the desideratum for his metaphysics. It is by virtue of this entity 'that the multiplicity of external objects obtains its graded relevance to each stage of concrescence. Apart from God there would be no relevant novelty.' William Temple argues 'the mere fact of positing an entity because of logical requirements does not tell us as to how 'novelty' results from a metaphysical entity. The nature of the metaphysical entity must be described and must be conceived in terms of a personality.' Unless we do so we will not be able to explain satisfactorily how the primordial nature of God accounts for novelty. Once we posit the personality of God we will be in a position to explain novelty, concreteness and other factor in the light of the purposes and desires of the supreme spirit. For this we have to go beyond the concept of organism to the concept of personality. Then only can we explain as to how the primordial and the consequent nature of God work. Without such a concept they would merely remain as formal factors without significance. The first principles of Whitehead's metaphysics do not admit the personality of God. This is due to the initial prejudice that we cannot refer the universe or its process to any class higher or wider than itself. It has no similar and no other, all classes and concepts must be found within it, not outside it. Our seeking to understand the process must be from within and not without. We are ourselves a part of the universe, or factor of it and an outside view of it is im-

⁴⁰ *Gītā*: V 29.

possible. The question is not how God is, but how he participates and informs the universe.

Further Whitehead's grand descriptions of God and the several images he employs to express the ideas are incompatible with the concept of organism. The attributes such as 'love, tenderness' and 'great companion' and 'fellow sufferer' have no meaning with reference to an organism. They have no cosmic character. They fit in with the concept of a supra-personal God and not a philosophy or organism. William Temple feels that the philosophy of organism should not stop short of personality. If Whitehead could take one step on to the idea of personality from organism there would be no difference between him and the Christian philosophy.

Whitehead's arguments for the existence of God are no improvement on the traditional proofs. The cosmological, the ontological and the teleological proofs for the existence of God do not demonstrate the God of religion. They at best raise presumption in favour of the existence of God. They do not prove a loving father of mankind. The best proof for the existence of God is religious experience of the mystics. Religious experience and the deep human need for God, constitute the conclusive evidence for the existence of God. Whitehead's argument that God is a metaphysical requirement of his system may round off his system but does not demonstrate the existence of God. The author of the Vedānta sūtra points out that mere reasoning cannot give us a conclusive metaphysical system nor an abiding religious faith.⁴¹ Saṅkara commenting on the sūtra points out, 'as the thoughts of a man are altogether unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments, which some clever men had expogitated with great pains, are shown, by people still more

⁴¹ *Vedānta sūtra* II, 1, 11.

ingenious, to be fallacious and how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn, by other men; so that on account of the diversity of men's opinions it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation.' Thus we see that reason can be refuted by better reason but spiritual experience is ultimate and final. The function of God in religion is to give satisfaction and strength to the individual in the art of living. Satisfaction of the metaphysical instinct is not enough. Barren speculation, dry intellectual feats, sheer logical rigour, architectonic thinking and the sense of a rounded metaphysical system cannot give us a god of religion.

The doctrine that has the longest intellectual ancestry is the idea of God. It has sustained us in all our efforts and has given meaning to all our endeavours. Cicero said, 'What gods are is a matter of dispute, but that they are is denied by none.' Epictetus held the view that we are all fragments of God. St. Augustine in the opening words of the Confession said 'thou, O God, hast made us for thyself and our hearts are restless until they find rest in thee.' The author of the Imitation towards the conclusion of his work exhorts men to have simple faith in God and not trust 'curious and unprofitable reasoning.' 'God is able to work more than man can understand.' So all reason and natural search ought to follow faith, not to go before it, not to break in upon it. John Milton observes, 'the end of all learning is to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love him, to imitate Him, to be like Him as we may the nearest, by possessing our souls of true virtue.'

Berkeley with infinite compassion for mankind observes. 'It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking her'd that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we need

only open our eyes to see the sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and clean view than we do any of our fellow creatures'.⁴²

After a few pages, Berkley concludes 'it is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one that is capable of the least reflection, than the existence of God, or spirit who is intimately present to our minds-producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short, 'in whom we live, and move, and have our being.' That the discovery of this great truth, which lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained by the reason of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and in-attention of men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, at it were, blinded with excess of light.'⁴³

Thus we find that the God of religion answers to our deepest needs. He is the truest truth (satyasya satyam). Berdyaev puts it: 'where there is no God, there is no man, man without God is no longer man.'

⁴² Berkeley *A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge*. 1, 148.

⁴³ Berkeley *A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge*. 1; 149.

VIEWS OF SCHOLARS REGARDING THE VEDAS—III

By GIRISH CHANDRA AWASTHI.

I HAVE furnished evidence of the contemporaneousness of the Vedas in my first article and have exposed the hollowness of the arguments of European scholar in my second article.

In this article I propose to discuss before the public the truth of the assertion of scholars that the *Rgveda* does not contain any description of the Sea. This assertion is being blatantly made by teachers in their lectures to University students. This assertion has now percolated to Hindi books and is thus misleading even small children. If some Nāgarī knowing person comes across the word "Samudra" at many places in the *Rgveda* his suspicions are allayed by asserting that the word refers to the river Indus (Sindhu) or a lake of that name in the Punjab.

Even a Devanāgarī knowing child can find that the word "Samudra" has occurred a number of times in the *Rgveda*. At a few places it means the sky but elsewhere it always counts the ocean as is known to every-body.

In the Sanskrit language the word Sindhu in the masculine gender means the ocean or particular river. In the feminine gender it means either rivers in general or only the river Indus alone. But the word Samudra never means the Sindhu river in Sanskrit language.

I will now place before you some quotations from the *Rgveda* containing descriptions of the Ocean.

'Rcā 1/19/7 contains a prayer to Vāyu (air) in which there is a description of the moving of the clouds and the creation of the waves in the ocean by Vāyu. In

Ṛcā 1/11/1 there is a prayer to Indra in which Indra is described as all pervading like the ocean. Do the Sindhu river or the lake in Punjab named Samudra pervade the world? In Ṛcā 1/25/7 there is a prayer to Varuṇa in which it is said that Varuṇa know the movements of the ships sailing in the water of the ocean i.e. he is aware of the positions and conditions of the ships. In Ṛcā 1/44/12 there is a prayer to Mitra in which it is said that he is as glorious as the resounding waves of the Sindhu i.e. Samudra (Ocean). In Ṛcā 1/32/2 it is said that when Indra splits the clouds with his Vajra, the rain falling from the split clouds goes to the ocean. Just as cows go to their calves—the mantra of the *Rgveda* describes the natural flowing of the rain water to the Ocean. Rain water ultimately flows into some ocean or the other and not into the Sindhu river or any Punjābī pond. In Ṛcā 1/56/2 there is a prayer to Indra in which it is said that performers of Yajñas pray to Indra though prayers in the same way as merchants proceed though the ocean in ships to make money. In Ṛcā 1/48/3 Uṣā Devī or the goddess of the dawn urges the chariots to proceed in the morning in the same way as those who desire wealth loads ships and send them to sail in the ocean. In Ṛcā 6/62/6 there is mention of the saving of Bhujya. In Ṛcā 1/116/3-4-5 in the course of prayer to the Aświnī Kumāras it is said that Rājā Tugra sent his son, Bhujya by Sea to conquer the enemies. In the course of the description it is stated that when the ships of Bhujya were destroyed in the ocean, he prayed to the Aświnī Kumāras and they saved Bhujya and his army and took them to dry land in three days in a hundred ships which could proceed on land, in the air and in water and which had hundreds of rowers, had six horses harnessed and wings fixed. (Ṛcā 1/182/5). Here the ocean is called Udmegh. You can realise how for the

Aśvinī Kumāras could take Bhujya in three (3) days in such ships. The word “anāram bhāve” has been used here in the description of the ocean which means “devoid of land”. Can dry land be so distant in the Sindhu river that even ordinary ships could take so much time in reaching it? In R̥cā 1/95/3 the mantra mentions the three birth places of Agni. One is in the sky in the form of lightning fire. The second is in the form of the Sun. The third is in the form of fire spout (barwanal) in the ocean. Can there be a barwānal in the Sindhu river or in the Panjābī hole. In R̥cā 2/35/3 there is a description of Urwa and Urwa is a barwānal which is found in the ocean and is always developed by the water of the ocean. It is not possible for the barwānal to exist in the Sindhu river or the Panjābī ditch.

In R̥cā 3/45/3 there is a description of the badwānala in the ocean. In R̥cā 3/22/2 in a prayer to Agni it is said that it is his glow that is found in the fire named Aurwa in the ocean. In R̥cā 3/3/19 in a prayer to Indra the fire of the ocean is counted by the words Urwa and it is said that on aspirations are growing like the barwanal of the ocean. In R̥cā 8/102/4 there is a description of the fire develling in the ocean. In R̥cā 4/58/11 there is a description of the barwānal in the Sea. In R̥cā 6/5/13 the word Samudraih has been used. There is a prayer to the oceans for protection. As the Sindhu river and the Panjābī hollow are single they cannot be referred to in the plural number which can be used only for three or more objects. This then refers to the four oceans. In R̥cā 9/80/1 occurs the word Samudrasah which means pervading the earth like the ocean. In R̥cā 4/16/7 there is a prayer to Indra in which there is a description of Indra dropping from the sky the water of the oceans. It is the water of the oceans which causes the Monsoon rains. This is clearly a description of the

ocean. Can the water of the Sindhu river or the Panjābī ditch cause rainfall in the world? In R̥cā 10/47/2 in prayers to Indra there is mention of the four oceans being permeated with the glory of Indra. In R̥cā 9/34/6 occur the words Caturāḥ Samudrān. These four oceans refer to the oceans surrounding the earth on the four sides. Can the word Samudra imply the Sindhu river or the Panjābī ditch? In R̥cā 10/89/1 it is said that the glory of Indra is greater than that of the ocean. Here the plural word "Sindhubhyaḥ" has been used. Can the plural word mean the Sindhu river, it being only singular? The Sindhu river is not such a great thing that a comparison with it would become the glory of the worshipped god. In R̥cā 10/98/5 the mantra prays to the Gods that beautiful water may fall from the upper ocean in the form of sky and flow into the ocean on the earth. In R̥cā 10/104/8 the mantra prays to Indra to fill the Sindhu Samudra (Ocean) with the seven beautiful rivers. In R̥cā 10/136/5 there is a description of the eastern ocean and the Western Ocean. Can either of these be the Sindhu river or the Panjābī ditch? R̥cā 10/137/2 contain a description of two winds which reach the Eastern ocean and the Western ocean. In R̥cā 8/3/10 there is a prayer to Indra in which it is said that Indra produced with his limitless strength water to fill the oceans to the brim. In R̥cā 8/12/5 there is a description of a tide in the ocean. The tide occurs in the ocean owing to the rising of the moon and Sāyaṇa has taken this to mean that the ocean rises on seeing the moon. R̥cā 2/20/24 contains both the words "Sindhau" and "Samudreṣu". This makes a distinction between "Sindhu" and "Samudra". R̥cā 7/96/7 describes the falling of the Saraswatī river into the ocean and Zimmer in "*Altindisches Leben*" 22 et. seg. has at one place taken "Samudra" to mean the ocean and at other places has

taken it to mean the Sindh river which is made up by the joining of the streams of five rivers.

On the other hand Max Muller in "*Sacred Books of the East*" 32, 61 *et. seq.* has differed from Zimmer and has alway taken "Samudra" to mean the ocean in the *Rgveda*. Lassen in "*Indische Alter Thums Kunde*" 12,883 has also taken "Samudra" to mean the ocean in the *Rgveda*.

HEALTH PROBLEMS OF MITHILA

By LAKSHMIKANT

I

Introduction

As Kashmīr is the garden of India, Mithilā is the garden of Bihar. It is a place of beauty and has its own history and culture. It is a place of abundance but a place of poverty too— a paradox.

In this small article an attempt has been made to ventilate the present problems of health which have been prevailing in the rural areas of Mithilā. Suggestions for improvement have also been made.

Physiography.—Mithilā proper is situated in Tirhut and Bhagalpur Divisions of the Province of Bihar in India. It comprises of the districts of Darbhanga, some portions of the district of Muzaffarpur, North Bhagalpur, Motihari, Monghyr and Purnea. Its general slope is from North to South but the gradient is small. It is traversed by the rivers— Kamalā, Kośī, Bagvatī, Balāna, Gaṇḍaka, Tiljugā (Triyugā), Dhemurā, Tilabi etc. Most of these rivers which have their origin in the Himalayas are fed by numerous hilly streams flowing through the Nepal territory. The land of Mithilā has a high reputation of being the most fertile; the reason being that the above-mentioned rivers bring silt with flood water. But the river Kośī is a great devastating river which has covered a large track of alluvial soil with jungles and has converted it into sandy land. It has a great influence on the health and economical conditions of Mithilā.

Mithilā proper has got an area of 19,000 square miles with a population of 92 lacs.

Mithilā is bounded by the river Gangā on the south, by the Gaṇḍaka on the west, Nepal on the north and the old bed of the Kośī on the east.

Topography.—Mithilā shows distinct variations in its different parts. It can be divided into four regions—according to its physical features as shown in the map :

1. *Tarai area.*—It is situated on the border of Tarai of Nepal. The people are backward and usually away from Railway stations. Communication is bad. Area is moderately malarious. Frequent infection of cholera is brought from Nepal side.

2. *Gangetic Plain area.*—This area is drier and is situated on the bank of the river Gangā. It is visited by the flood of the Gangā which brings silt. The nature of the flood is temporary and not devastating. The climate is not moist but drier. The land is very fertile and famous for many crops such as chilly, tobacco, wheat etc. The people are healthy and hardy.

3. *General Plain area.*—The general plain area covers the largest portion of Mithilā. It is flat and is not visited by floods mostly. The climate is moist as described elsewhere.

4. *Flooded area.*—It is mainly flooded due to the rivers Kośī and Kamalā. It can be divided into :

(1) Direct-Kośī area and

(2) Post-Kośī area.

(1) *Direct-Kośī area.*—It is about 1900 sq. miles in area and its population is about 12,28,991.

An extract from an article written by Shri Laliteshwar Mullick in this connection is quoted below :

“The sting of the attack of the river is not felt all at once. The spile flood-water of the river visits a village for a few years varying from five to twenty years. It is a period of plenty and happiness though not unmixed with sorrow. The jack-fruit and



Weeds in Kosi affected area.



Weeds in Kosi area. (Another view.)



Weeds in Kosi area. (Another view)

some mango and lichi trees dry up. Some stray bushes of Jhowa, Kāśā, and Pater make their appearance here and there. A few pregnant women and a few of the more playful of the children pay the debt of nature. A few shallow beds are dug up. But the good done far out-weighs the losses. Those fields which did not even produce Maruā before the coming of the Kosi, yield bumper crops of paddy, Khesārī, moong and maize. The agricultural output of the village increases immensely. People enjoy an easy go-lucky life."¹

During a high flood almost all the villages of the worst affected zone of the Kosi area remain submerged under water. Water enters into the houses. People live on bamboo platforms constructed inside their houses. They improvise their own methods of cooking their food. While they sleep at night on those platforms, knee-deep and sometimes waist-high water passes beneath them. Fishes, snakes and other reptiles keep moving on the surface of water. A great alarm is raised when some stray crocodiles have been bagged by the villagers in their houses. The condition of the people under these circumstances can better be imagined than described. They suffer from all conceivable and inconceivable difficulties. They can move only on boats and wade through water. They cannot make any good arrangement for the storage of their food-grains. Much of the little they possess is wasted for lack of good arrangement of storage. I leave to the imagination of the readers to form their own idea of the plight of these people under some special circumstances, such as the arrival of some guest or illness of some members of the family, or a case of delivery in the family and thousand and one such events of every-day occurrence.

The following lines give a graphic description of the condition of the above zone :

"With the end of monsoon in September, flood water begins receding and the process is complete and the villages become free from floods by the end of December. Contrary to expectations, how-

¹ *Searchlight*, March 31, 1946

ever, this receding is not at all welcomed; the sorrow-tales of disease and death are too horrible to contemplate. In June, with the first on-rush of flood water and the attendant troubles to which the inhabitants are put, there is at least one great re-deeming feature: all the dirt and filth and marshes are washed clean and the health of the area is surprisingly good in June and July. During these months fresh flowing water is always available for all purposes. But with the receding of flood, the villager has to fall back upon his half-choaked well or pond holding stagnant water. This in itself is sufficient to bring havoc on his health. But added to this is the fact that in all the innumerable water-logged ditches and marshes and fens and ponds which the receding flood leaves behind, in and round the villages, serve as excellent mosquito-breeding centres. The result is that malaria stalks the land and, almost invariably, grips the villagers in its clutches. Instances are not rare when a whole family or a whole village is laid up with some ailment or the other . . . and there is none to look after the dying persons or to take the dead to cremation ground. And this ghastly tragedy is repeated year after year and thousands are wiped out of existence."

"One very special feature of the area, at least of the worst affected parts, is the almost complete absence of children. It is a matter of common experience that ordinarily the women does not conceive and even when she does—the delivery is not normal and the issue comes early and dies soon after. For all these, to apportion responsibility between the reduced vitality of the people and the "Kosi air and water," is more than we can do; it may be a fit subject for research work by medical men and others and yield fruitful results. Recently, the present writer has had occasion to visit one of the worst affected villages, named Darah, (P. S. Madhepur) of this area when a few children, mostly male, had been born to the villagers after a gap of 7 to 8 years."

"The Health Officer (Darbhanga district) explained that this had been made possible only because of certain special experimental measures he had taken in the village to check the diseases and to keep the inhabitants otherwise fit.

"In the areas that are permanently water-logged, buffaloes are the only means of subsistence. And yet, it is a cruel irony of fate that the water which is helpful in the breeding of disease-germs for human-beings is helpful for cattle epidemics too."²

(2) *Post-Kośi area*.—It is 1585 sq. miles in area and its total population is about 8,68,172.

"There is a striking similarity between the effects produced on the fields and their yields by the going away of the river bed and its approach. With the silting up of the main bed and its westward swinging, only spilt-water visits the area and its slack current. These deposit layers of fine fertilising silt. Naturally, the fields

² *The Kosi Problem* by Hari Nath Misra.



Housing in Koši affected area.



House in Koši Area. (Another view)



People of Koši.



People of Kosi.



A family in Kosi are



Children of Kosi affected area.

that have not yet been covered with jungles, give bumper crops. But the phase lasts only a few years and gradually, with the going away of the river with the spilt-water and silt, the yield of a field falls rapidly. The soil-nitrogen is also exhausted. The result is more or less barrenness of the erstwhile fertile lands."

The place is dry but moderately malarious. This area is thinly populated as large number of people either died or fled away when this area was under the direct influence of the Kośī river. In case an irrigation scheme is started, the land can be brought under cultivation. Really the services of 'grow-more-food-campaign' can very well be utilised here.

Climate.—The climate of Mithilā varies as per topography. It tallies with that of Bengal to a great extent in the Kośī and post-Kośī areas which are damp, moist and highly malarious. In this area the humidity is high and the temperature is low—as such it is quite a suitable climate for the development and breeding of mosquitoes.

The climate of the Gangetic area is drier and not damp but here also the humidity is higher. This area is the healthiest area in Mithilā. The Tarai area is also damp and moist and reputed for malaria.

The General plain area has got a moderate climate and is mildly malarious. So on the whole the climate of Mithilā is hot and moist except in cold season (November to February) when the average temperature is 78°8'F. and the average humidity is 81.

Summer season lasts from March to June. The temperature then shoots up to 100°9'F and the humidity varies from 45 to 72.

The rainy season begins from the middle of June and lasts till October. The temperature then varies from 89°F to 92°F but the humidity shoots high to 81.

The average total rainfall is 2'77 inches ranging between .06 to 7'77 inches.

There is also rainfall in the winter season generally between February and March on account of the North East Trade wind.

The Sub-soil water is quite high. It ranges from 10 feet to 25 feet. This is another reason for easy Sub-soil pollution.

Communication —The communication is very defective. There are mostly village-roads. The soil being alluvial and sandy the kutcha roads become a great nuisance of dust. There are only a few pucca roads. The maintenance of roads becomes difficult on account of large number of rivers which flood during the monsoons. Due to this the Bus-services are only confined to certain areas. So the communication becomes very difficult and a large number of villages are cut off during monsoon when elephants alone are used for the purpose. In the flood affected areas the boats are the only means of communications specially in the Kośī and the Kamalā affected areas. The villages then appear like dots in the vast sheet of water and it becomes a difficult task to go from one house to another without a boat. Even the call of nature is attended on boats. People usually live on 'machāns'.


Irrigation.—There is no system of irrigation in the area partly due to high moisture retaining power of the soil and partly due to the idleness of the people. People depend on monsoon rains and spilt water from the rivers during flood for cultivation. Since the violent earthquake of 1934 which affected a considerable part of Mithilā to a great extent and disturbed the level of the soil considerably, some parts are seldom free from floods which have converted a portion of land into jungles, marshy lands, small channels and streams. During draught the people use water from these channels for irrigating paddy crops by means of 'Karīn' (a log of wood about 12' to 15' long having a groove throughout its length).



A scene of River Koši.



Entrance of Koši.



A part of River Koši.



A tour in Koši area.

Housing and Planning.—Most of the villages in Mithilā have different tolas for different communities. Generally, the tolas inhabited by Maithila Brāhmaṇas and other high class people are cleaner and have got better houses. People indiscriminately excavate earth for building houses and leave them as such. They are converted into insanitary ditches which become the potential breeding grounds for mosquitoes. These houses are generally surrounded by vegetation which is a great shelter for sand flies and mosquitoes which are the vectors of Kala-Azar and malaria respectively.

Only a few houses specially belonging to well-to-do persons have a compound and a kitchen-garden (called *bāḍī*) attached to them. Most of the houses are built on slightly raised lands for fear of flood and dampness. They are haphazardly built without any proper planning but these are not back to back houses as found mostly in South Bihar and specially in Northern India. On inspection and survey carried on in certain parts of Mithilā about 50% of the houses were found detached, 30% houses semi-detached and the rest compact and back to back. Houses are mostly made of mud and thatched with straw. Tiled roofs or pucca built houses are not commonly found. A typical Mithilā house is generally rectangular in shape consisting of 3 to 4 rooms grouped together on four sides having a courtyard in the centre. Each room is separated from the other room by some space which is fenced on the outer side.

New houses should be built according to new house planning in which provision for smoke, flues, and good drains should be made. The earth for building houses should be excavated from a common place which will be converted into a sanitary tank.

Ventilation and light.—Very few houses are properly ventilated. The villagers do not provide windows partly

due to the fact that they do not realise their significance and partly due to the fear of thieves. On the whole, the rooms of the houses are dark, damp and ill-ventilated.

Drainage.—Most of the houses have kutcha open drains which end either in a Doba or in a Cess Pool. A few of them have blind drains as a result of which the houses remain generally damp.

Kitchens.—They are not generally situated separately. They are also used for sleeping and storing grains. They have no special outlet for smoke and as such the cooks (generally the housewives) suffer to a great extent.

Animal Shed.—Generally, there is special arrangement for Animal-shed separately in villages, though not in towns.

Water-Supply.—The main source of drinking water-supply are shallow dug wells. In some areas tank water is also used for drinking purposes. The water of the tanks and rivers is mostly used for bathing and domestic purposes.

The wells have no platforms or drains. They are usually kept in insanitary condition. The wells of the flood areas, specially those of the Kośī and Kamalā affected areas, are filled with flood water and silt during the monsoon. The level of the subsoil water is usually 15-30 ft. high. The soil being sandy and alluvial, the water of the shallow well is polluted easily by percolation of excreta. The tanks and dobhas are mostly insanitary and are usually situated close to the houses. Most of the house drains and cowshed drains directly fall into the tanks and dobhas. People generally defecate on the banks of the tanks which pollutes the tank during rainy season. There are several tanks in each village. These dobhas and tanks are usually filled with aquatic vegetations such as water hyacinth, lamina, Pistia and other aquatic weeds. They are the suitable breeding grounds for

the mosquitoes. On the whole, the water supply in Mithilā is very defective and unhygienic. This is one of the most important causes of intestinal diseases specially cholera which takes a heavy toll of lives every now and then.

In order to safeguard the people from bowel diseases specially cholera, typhoid, and dysentery, deep tube wells must be provided in every village. Occasional bacteriological examination of which is also desired.

Disposal of cattle dung and refuses.—Large number of houses have cattle. The cow dung and the house refuses are kept in heaps just near the houses. Cattle dung is generally transformed into cakes and is used for fuel. The habit of making cow-dung-cakes makes the person filthy and devoids the field of manure. The cow-dung-cakes burn in the houses but laughs when thrown in fields. The cattle dung refuse when kept in heaps becomes dry and is blown by the wind and poisons the water we drink, the food we eat and the air we breathe. Thus it ruins the health, sight and physique of ourselves and of our children but when kept in pits, it becomes a good manure and brings bumper crops.

Disposal of human excreta.—Only some rich persons have latrines which are not usually kept in sanitary condition. Rest of the people use the land specially the bank of rivers, tanks, bushes, gardens and roadside etc. for this purpose. This is the most important cause of soil and water pollutions. The Hook-worm eggs have a great chance of developing into larvae due to favourable humidity and temperature of the bushes, gardens etc., the soil of which is a suitable culture for them. The bare-footed persons specially the ladies who frequently visit these places become the victim of Hookworm disease. During the rainy season the excreta is partly washed and drained into adjacent tanks or rivers and partly percolates and pollutes the sub-soil water.

Bore-hole latrines specially in the poor areas will be of great use. Meantime the villagers may also be instructed to dig holes of about 6" to 8" deep and then pass stools and cover it. The ideal thing will be to provide with septic tanks or Wardha type of latrines.

Habits and Customs.—People of Mithilā are generally clean, hospitable, and gluttonous in habits. They are intelligent but lethargic. It is quite common to see even a poor and ill-clad man going to have a dip in the tank even on the chilly days. Majority of the people are non-vegetarian excepting the widows. Caste system is rigid, although it is being relaxed among highly educated and the nationalists. Usually no member of a caste may intermarry or eat or drink with persons of lower castes. The members of a lower caste (specially the untouchables) are not allowed to enter the houses of their higher class brethren. It is most rigidly followed in the Darbhanga district. The people of Mithilā think it a religious obligation to get their girls married off before the age of puberty (usually below 13 years). The Muhammadans follow their example and precepts. In the western countries, specially in America and Europe, marriage is a voluntary act usually contracted only when the parties concerned are healthy and able to support a family, but here it is generally performed by every one regardless of the fitness of the parties. This results in early motherhood, widowhood, etc. The father selects the bride or the bridegroom without consulting the party concerned. Endogamy (marriage within caste) and Exogamy (prohibiting marriage within one's own sect or gotra) are common. Maithila Brāhmaṇas are much more careful about the caste and the gotra etc. of the bride and the bridegroom, than about their wealth and education. Selection of bridegroom becomes very easy and unexpensive due to the prevalence of 'Sabhā' system where a large number of bridegrooms or their

guardians assemble at a particular place during the particular auspicious days of the year. One of the most famous places of such 'Sabhiā' is Saurāṭha just near Madhubani in the Darbhanga district. Really it is worth seeing the bridegrooms of different ages with red dhotis and Pāgas (national head-dress). Thousands of marriage negotiations are settled within a short period of 3 to 4 days. The custom of marriage processions is very simple. People of the lower social status have to pay by way of social compensation to the bride and the bridegroom of higher status. There is no widow marriage and divorce among the higher caste but widow marriages and divorces are quite common among low caste Hindu and the Muhammadans. Polygamy is in fashion though it is decreasing day by day. The Maithila Brāhmanas spend lavishly on the Upanayana and the Śrāddha ceremonies. They do not hesitate even in taking loan for performing these ceremonies.

The people are generally addicted to take Bhānga and chewing of nut and betel specially in the higher communities. The lower class of people mostly chew tobacco. It would not be out of place to mention here that nut is consumed in the largest quantity in Mithilā. Chewing nuts has become a habit. One can seldom find even a boy of 10 years free from the habit.

Smoking of Hukkah is seldom seen. Toddy drinking is not much prevalent here.

On the whole the people of Mithilā are fond of eating and feeding. They take usually good food. Feast is usually common in villages. Sometimes the feast which is generally held on the occasion of a Śrāddha ceremony (after death) in the cholera affected villages becomes a source of infection. At times an epidemic has broken out in several villages simultaneously due to such feasts.

Sending of "Bhāras" (presents, such as sweetmeats and curd etc.) is very frequent. It is usually sent exposed

to dust and flies etc. This is also responsible for the spread of communicable diseases, such as cholera, typhoid and dysentery.

Melas are held very frequently even on ordinary occasions. Most of the melas have religious backgrounds. It is the hobby of the village folk to attend a mela even at the risk of their lives. It has been found that people have died in large numbers due to cholera in such fairs.

Socio-economic condition.—Most of the people are cultivators but per capita of the land is about one acre. A large number of people are unemployed. Family budget is not known but from enquiries it is learnt that most of the people live from hand to mouth. Their economic condition is very poor and is going from bad to worse due to floods and loss of man-power due to diseases specially malaria, Kala-Azar and Hookworm particularly in the Kośī, post-Kośī and Kamalā affected areas. There is an ample scope of work but due to ill health they are unable to do anything. It is sure that they cannot afford to purchase health.

The age-old superstitions, laws and customs of society not changing for centuries have a tightening grip on the people of Mithilā. Early marriage and early motherhood are common. The pressure of population on land which is practically the source of existence is increasing.

Mithilā is famous for Khadi and Handloom works but there is no other Cottage Industry on regular lines.

For improvement (i) Education should be popularised, (ii) Improvement in agriculture should be made, (iii) facilities for co-operative, marketing and development of Cottage Industries should be provided.

Physique.—Majority of the adult males achieve a weight ranging from 100 to 120 lbs. and a height from 55" to 65", whereas adult females have 70 to 110 lbs. and

50" to 60" respectively. The physique of Maithilas, on the whole, is poor on account of the following reasons :

1. *Race factor*.—Heredity plays a role though other factors very greatly modify its influence on physique both favourably and adversely according to circumstances. As there is no standard of weight and height for Maithila population, so it is difficult to judge exactly as to how far they compare, but there is no doubt that they fall short of normal.

2. *Nutrition Factor*.—This has already been discussed elsewhere. On the whole the masses suffer from mal-nutrition.

3. *Disease*.—Hook-worm and malaria serve to aggravate the influence of poor heritance and mal-nutrition.

4. *Economic Factor*.—There is no doubt that economic condition is low. So the purchasing power is low, nutrition is poor and there is ignorance and chance of falling easy prey to disease and thus a poor physique. In fact there is a vicious circle of the above facts.

Occupation.—Agriculture is the main occupation of the people. Land is fertile and has a high moisture retaining power. It has attracted a large number of foreigners who have settled in Mithilā and have engaged themselves in extensive as well as intensive farming. A great number of people of Mithilā have no employment due to their ill-health as they cannot stand physical labour. It is a seat of Khadi spinning and weaving in Bihar.

Education.—Modern Education is below the level of Bihar and India. Mithilā has very high reputation for her learning and culture in her earlier days. The first College in Mithilā was started in Darbhanga in the year 1936. But education on orthodox lines in traditional learning is very popular and its percentage is far above the average in Mithilā when compared with other parts of the country.

II

Diet and Nutrition

The chief food of Mithilā consists of mainly boiled rice, pulse, vegetables, fish and curd etc. People are very fond of taking cūḍā (flatten rice) and dahī (curd). Poor people use Keshārī, Maḍuā and sweet potatoes chiefly.

Rice.—Rice is a chief diet in a country like Japan and Burma where it has not any bad effect on the health of people, but it has affected the health of the people of Mithilā due to its misuse on account of ignorance.

The high class people specially the widows, usually take Āraba rice (Ātapa-rice) on religious grounds. It has infiltrated to the lower class of people also. It has been proved scientifically that Āraba rice (Ātapa-rice) is less nutritive than parboiled rice. The reason is that before husking, the paddy is parboiled and then dried and husked. During the process of boiling the vitamins and minerals which are mostly found in the peri-crap (outer coating) diffuse inside. They are retained even after husking.

Milling of rice.—Mithilā has large number of rice mills. People in town consume milled rice in a large quantity. Milling of rice devoids it mostly of the vitamins and minerals which are found in the peri-crap (outer coating) of the rice. In villages they do not take milled rice.

Method of cooking.—Before cooking rice, it is washed very thoroughly. A portion of vitamins is washed out during this process. After the rice is ready, the rice-water (Māṇḍa) is taken out and thrown. Thus we take cooked rice which contains chiefly starch (carbo-hydrate) and lose the important substances such as minerals and vitamins.

Cūḍā (flatten rice).—This is quite staple food. It retains the nutritive value of the rice. It has been found that people who take cūḍā keep fitter.

Milk is produced in large quantity here; but in villages situated near towns, it is mostly exported to other places outside the area in the form of cream and ghee. It is not possible to stop this practice on account of the economic reasons.

Fish.—It is found in abundance in Kośī and Kamalā affected areas. There are large number of tanks but they are mostly filled with aquatic vegetations and this makes the Pisciculture difficult. It will be a great boon to the people if systematic Pisciculture is started in the villages. This can serve in double ways—antilarvae which can control the mosquitoes and can provide enough of fish which can improve the economic condition also.

• *Vegetables*.—Leafy vegetables are consumed in fair amount specially among female folk and this provides sufficient minerals and vitamins. But it should be used more liberally.

Oil.—Mostly mustard oil is used. It is devoid of vitamins. Rich persons use ghee also.

Only some high class people of Mithilā take balanced diet. In a diet survey done in Mithilā the following defects were revealed :

1. Diet falls short in about 25% with respect to caloric requirements as based on the League of Nations Standard for Phillipine Island the conditions of which are more or less identical with Mithilā.
2. Proteins.—Mostly of animal origin are deficient to an extent of 30%.
3. Fats are deficient in about 75% of cases. Whatever fat is consumed is taken largely as mustard oil. This also accounts for the gross deficiency of Vitamin A. As said before milk is exported in the form of cream and ghee.

Considering the defects and the degrees prevalent in population it is easy to account for the mal-nutrition which is responsible for anaemia and several other defects.

III

Vital Statistics

Reports of vital statistics are done by the Chowkidars of the villages on parade dāys when they attend their respective Thanas. This system although it prevails in every part of India remains defective. The diagnosis is also done by these illiterate fellows. The reporting becomes very defective in the Flood affected areas. Registrations and compilations are done by the Thana Officer who sends a copy to the Sub-Division Officer and the Civil Surgeon and thus there is enough delay. Verification of the vital statistics is done by the Health Staff.

TABLE I

*Comparative Vital Statistics for the year 1937,
(India—Bihar (Mithilā) and Selected Countries)*

Name of Countries :—	Death-rate per 1,000 Population :—	Birth-rate per 1,000 Population :—	Infant Mortality per, 1,000 Birth :—	Average Life
India ...	22·4	34·5	16·2	
Bihar (Mithilā).	2·2	33	120	
Australia ...	9·4	17·4	38	
U. S. A. ...	11·2	17·0	54	
England -				
Wales,	12·4	14·9	58	
Ceylon ...	21·7	37·8	158	
Java ...	18·8	28·3		
Japan ...	17·0	30·6	106	
New-Zealand.	9·1		31	

(From the Health of India by John B. Grant.)

From the above table it is clear that India compares unfavourably with other countries regarding crude death-rate, Infant mortality rate and average life. The Birth-rate is no-doubt very high. But the Infant mortality rate

is the highest. Bihar, specially Mithilā, cannot be free from these.

TABLE II

*Death Rates for Small-pox and Cholera in Asiatic Countries,
(Mortality rate per 100,000 Population)*

	British India.	Burma.	Japan.	Philippines.	French Indo-China.	Netherlands East-Indies.	Thailand (Siam).
<i>Small-pox.</i>							
1928	28.5	19.3	0.1	*	1.6	10.0	0.2
1929	21.6	12.6	0.02	*	7.3	69.0	0.5
1930	21.5	4.4	0.006	*	7.8	85.0	0.1
1931	11.0	3.3	0.001	0.007	2.4	8.0	0.04
1932	13.3	16.9	0.06	0.0	6.7	2.0	0.03
1933	30.7	10.3	0.08	0.0	4.4	0.0	0.1
1934	24.8	10.9	0.05	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.2
1935	26.5	8.6	0.02	0.0	2.2	0.0	0.03
1936	30.6	9.2	0.04	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0
1937	19.2	9.3	0.008	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.08
<i>Cholera.</i>							
1928	100	49	0.001	0.1	21.3	0.002	9.5
1929	84	54	0.2	0.0	17.0	0.0	14.4
1930	107	41	0.0	*	*	0.0	0.6
1931	65.4	3.6	0.0	5.8	6.8	0.0	0.1
1932	19.9	7.4	0.001	3.3	1.6	0.0	0.1
1933	20.2	0.2	0.0	13.4	0.8	0.0	0.2
1934	59.1	5.6	0.0	4.7	0.4	0.0	0.04
1935	62.2	46.6	0.0	0.02	0.4	*	6.3
1936	47.1	6.7	0.0	0.01	0.3	*	21.6
1937	29.3	23.7	0.01	0.01	38.3	*	41.1

* Figures not available.

(From the Health of India by John B. Grand).

* From the above table it is evident that diseases like Small-pox and Cholera are mostly prevalent in India. Countries like Philippines and Netherlands having the

same socio-economic conditions have done away with them in these days.

TABLE III

Death from Cholera in Bihar by months in 1944.

Months	No. of deaths	Remarks
January ..	1811	In spite of the fact that the reporting is not satisfactory, the death-rate due to Cholera alone is very high. Badly affected Cholera areas were North Bihar specially-Mithilā.
February ...	1198	
March ...	1116	
April ...	1703	
May ...	8,352	
June ..	18,225	
July ...	16,773	
August ...	12,170	
September	10,513	
October ...	7,124	
November ...	6,478	
December ...	485	
Total ...	85,951	

(From Indian Health Gazette by Lt. Col. C. A. Bozam I.M.S., 1945).

TABLE IV

Average Deaths due to Fever, Cholera, Small-pox and Plague for the years 1938 to 1942.

Names of Provinces	Fever	Cholera	Small-pox	Plague
N. W. F. P. ...	42,152	427	600	*
Punjab ...	4,94,482	1,422	3,217	*
U. P. ...	8,49,873	36,931	9,624	11,962
Bihar ...	5,55,936	25,623	10,427	1,009
Orissa ...	1,03,203	6,915	4,541	*
Assam ...	97,796	7,654	1,177	*
Bengal ...	7,48,102	53,274	7,991	!
C. P. ...	3,07,619	17,461	1,947	533
Bombay ...	1,79,451	6,823	5,635	2,648
Sind ...	29,298	745	578	*
Madras ...	2,96,248	15,935	3,174	1,038

(From Indian Health Gazette by Lt. Col. C. A. Bozam, I.M.S., 1944).

The above table shows that Small-pox is highest in Bihar. Bihar stands third in Fever and Cholera. The worst Malaria and Cholera affected areas of Bihar lie specially in Mithilā.

The vital statistics given above reflect that the preventable diseases, such as Cholera, Small-pox and Malaria, are widely spread. There are no available records about Hook-worms and Dysentery, but they are more common. On the whole the level of Health in Bihar specially in Mithilā is low.

The causes of low health of Mithilā are described below:—

1. Climatic Factor.
2. Bad Socio-economic condition—wealth is distributed among a few persons only. On account of the poverty of the masses the standard of living is low. There is no social or economical machinery to level it up.
3. Lack of general and health education:—Education is limited to the upper classes mostly. It is poor in quality also. People are ignorant of the fundamental principles of Health and Hygiene. Teaching of Hygiene is compulsory up to the middle standard but this is mostly to pass the examinations. Instructions should be given on practical lines in mother tongue.
4. Lack of well organised medical and Public Health services for prevention, early diagnosis and early treatment of diseases.

Besides the above there are mal-nutrition, bad-housing, lack of proper water-supply and conservancy, lack of co-operation among the people and the Public Health staffs, bad communications etc.

IV

Prevalence of Diseases

These days Mithilā has become the abode of epidemics. The general health of people has deteriorated to a great extent due to mal-nutrition, bad climatic effects and bad sanitation. Due to these factors they become an easy prey to the diseases like malaria, Hookworm etc. which are prevalent in some parts of Mithilā in epidemic form. The most prevalent diseases are Cholera, Malaria, Kala-Azar, Typhoid, Dysentery, Small-pox and skin diseases, specially Scabies. In some parts Plague also visits now and then.

1. *Malaria*.—Malaria is caused by the bite of a particular infected mosquito, the anopheles. The reservoir of infective organisms is the man who has suffered from the disease but has not been cured fully. If an anopheles mosquito bite such a man, it becomes infected itself and then after a period of 8-10 days if it bites a healthy man, he is infected with the germs of malaria.

For the death rate due to fever see the graphs given before.

History.—It is difficult to say whether this disease was prevalent in Mithilā before the 19th century or not, but it is a fact that in the books of indigenous system on medicines Śitajwara has been frequently mentioned. From the writings of travellers, such as Huen-Thiasang, 4th century A.D., Burmier. (1666) and Rennel (1760), it is quite evident that the disease did not exist at that time in such a form. But from other records it appears that malaria did appear in epidemic form in the middle of the last century and since then it has become endemic which breaks out frequently in epidemic form.

Mithilā has got the reputation of being malarious. In the malaria-māp of India prepared by the Malaria Institute of India, 1929, Bihar is shown as an area having

malaria with moderate to high endemicity of more or less static character, the intensity depending on local surroundings, seasonal variations, moderate fulminant-epidemics as such there is no wonder if Mithilā which forms a part of Bihar should share such characteristics regarding malaria endemicity.

Present condition.—It is admitted by all the entomologists that a considerable percentage of death registered under the head "fever", at least 40 to 50% if not more, is due to malaria and such a death rate due to fever is an index to the amount of malaria prevailing in the area. Sickness of malaria is not being recorded either by the police or any other organisation but the increase in the disease is judged by the increase in treatment i.e., opening centres for treatments. A large number of patients escapes treatment. It is difficult to estimate but one may say roughly that 6 to 8 millions of cases of malaria are treated every year.

Malaria and economic loss.—Malaria has deteriorated the physique of the people. In the Kośī affected area where malaria is highly endemic, it has made the people punny, less virile and impotent. The sickness rate due to malaria alone has become quite high and as such the tillers of the soil cannot cultivate their lands. During their illness they have to spend money in their treatment and diet and thus they become poor. They cannot afford to take nutritious diet and thus they get frequent relapses of malaria and become easy prey to other diseases. Thus a vicious circle of illness and bad economic condition goes on. It is because of this that persons from other parts of Bihar have taken advantages of the poverty and idleness of the people in purchasing lands and settling themselves in Mithilā.

There is another special feature in the worst Kośī affected area and that is the complete absence of children

in several villages. The ladies conceive but abort frequently. Children are seldom born, and if they are born, they die within a few months. This is mostly due to malaria and mal-nutrition. Its other causes require further investigation. It has also been found that by improving the nutrition of these people and the treatment of malaria, children have been born in some of the villages during the last three or four years and that they are alive mostly.

Causes of malaria.—The causes may be divided into (i) man made and (ii) natural causes.

(i) Man made :—

(a) *Excavation of a large number of tanks and dobas* which are frequently kept in insanitary condition and are filled with aquatic vegetations,—some of the villages of the Darbhanga district have more than twenty tanks. These are the remnants of Mithilā when it was a place of abundance and luxury. People thought that the excavation of a new tank for the purpose of irrigation and bathing etc. was a part of their religious duty, so there are so many tanks in a village in Mithilā. Unfortunately, the economic condition and general physique have deteriorated and so these tanks are kept unclean and thus they have become source of mosquito breeding and intestinal diseases.

(b). *Construction of roads and railways with its alignment and borrow-pits.*—It is quite evident from the records that the construction of railways is also responsible for bringing Malaria in Mithilā. When we pass by rail, we notice a large number of borrow-pits along the side of the Railway lines. They are again the sources of breeding of mosquitoes. The borrow-pits on both the side of roads are also places of mosquito breeding.

(c) *Embankments.*—Marginal or cross embankments are usually put in order to protect the villages from the

floods. But this is dangerous and harmful. Flood brings silt laden water and washes out the dirt. The bunds are also put for irrigation and catching of fishes. They help in the stagnation of water. All these help breeding of mosquitoes.

(d) *Indiscriminate killing of fishes.*—Fishes eat up the mosquito larvæ and keep down the mosquito. It is very essential to popularise systematic pisciculture. In Mithilā this can be done easily but the land-lords do not care and the poor tenants are ignorant.

(e) *Paddy, wild grass (Kharha) and jute cultivation.*—Mithilā is famous for paddy crops. Jute is also grown in sufficient quantity. These are local crops and have water which is a source of the breeding of mosquitoes.

(f) *Lack of proper knowledge regarding the causes of Malaria among the mass and also the educated persons:*—The masses are ignorant and they do not appreciate the harm they are doing themselves by digging dohas and killing indiscriminately the fishes etc. Suitable legislation and its application will be of great help but self help cannot be ignored

(ii) Natural causes :—

(a) *Waterhyacinth.*—It has spread in the whole of Mithilā. It has covered the tanks, Khals and Kośī flooded areas and has damaged crops, destroyed bridges and have turned them into breeding grounds of mosquitoes.

(b) *Changing of the route of rivers.*—The river Kośī is reputed for rapidly changing its courses so very often. It has got several channels which have become shallower and serve for the breeding of mosquitoes. It has also converted a considerable proportion of land into jungles and thick vegetations which are helpful for the shelter and development of mosquitoes.

(c) *Economic condition.*—The incidence of malaria is closely connected with the economic condition of the

country. In a way, Mithilā is a poor province. Its people cannot afford at present to spend much for their protection against the attack of this disease and also for the cleaning of the surroundings which help the spread of the disease. We know that during the recent war, people suffered a good deal from famine and mal-nutrition which resulted in epidemic of Malaria and killed a large number of persons. The severe epidemic of malaria during the year 1944 in Mithilā is still fresh in our memory. It has swept away thousands of persons.

(d) *Climatic conditions*.—Rainfall, humidity and temperature are also favourable for the development and prolongation of the life of mosquitoes.

The control of malaria is done in two ways :—(a) Temporary measure and (b) Permanent measure. (a) Temporary measure consists of epidemic measures, propaganda and Health education, while (b) the Permanent measure consists of stopping creation of the breeding grounds of mosquitoes and the repairing of the damage done before during the last earthquake. But this requires money and suitable men.

2. *Cholera*.—It is a highly infectious disease prevalent in India but chiefly in Bengal, Madras and Bihar (more common in Mithilā). It is caused by bacilli carried by water, food, flies, and fingers etc. A man is infected when he takes infected food or water. This disease has been controlled fully in the western countries, but it kills thousands of people here in Mithilā every year.

History.—The Gangetic plain is the home of cholera and so it is called Asiatic cholera. There is no clear cut historical record regarding this disease before 1438. Epidemic of cholera started in Bihar and Bengal in 1817 and spread in many countries, such as China, Ceylon, East Africa, Iran, Australia, Russia and America etc. Cholera has been described as the best friend of the Public Depart-

ment in England as well in India. The cause is that it creates panic among the layman and takes a heavy toll of lives without delay. In this connection it will not be out of place to mention the great epidemic of cholera in Mithilā in the year 1930. It spread from North Bihar (Mithilā) to other parts of India. This became a subject for the League of Nations Health Organizations to take up and drew the attention of the Indian representatives at a meeting of the office, Internationale d' Hygiene Publique in 1930. Cholera again broke out in virulent form in North Bihar specially in Mithilā in the year 1944 in which more than half a lac of people died in Mithilā alone. It drew the attention of the world and created a great panic but it has helped the Public Health Department to a great extent.

From the vital statistics given it is proved that cholera has become endemic in Mithilā. Endemically it varies with localities. In some parts of Mithilā specially in Darbhanga district cholera breaks out twice a year. Large number of cases occurs from March to October and then from December to February. Cholera has got a regular periodicity of about six years. More cases of cholera occur among the poor people. Mortality is high only in the cases left without any treatment.

So far investigated the chief causes of cholera in Mithilā may be classified into (i) General and (ii) Local.

(i) *General causes* :—

- (a) Lack of knowledge of the fundamental principles of hygiene. This is wanting even among the educated people. Teaching of Hygiene, no doubt, is compulsory in lower classes but only theoretically.

- (b) Lack of co-operation of the masses.

(c) Bad Socio-economic condition.

(d) Bad communication.

(ii) *Special causes* :—

(a) Lack of proper and safe drinking water supply. The main source of water supply in Mithilā, as said before is the shallow, insanitary dug wells. But in some villages there are no wells and in several villages well dry up during summer.

(b) Lack of proper isolation.

(c) Lack of resistance among the mass due to malnutrition.

(d) Infection is generally brought from or carried to the fairs which are held very frequently in various parts of the province.

(e) At places people throw dead bodies of those who have died of cholera and other infectious diseases in the rivers which form the source of water supply. Washing of the contaminated clothes with vomits and excreta of the patients in the tanks or on the wells is quite frequent. Thus the source of water supply is easily infected.

(f) The feasts and the exposed Bhāras in the cholera affected villages also play a great part in the spread of the disease.

(g) Due to insanitary conditions of villages the fly population has increased. They are also mechanical carrier of the disease from one place to another.

(h) When cholera breaks out in a village in epidemic form, people run away to other villages. They carry the infection.

Cholera can be wiped out by provision of safe drinking water-supply, previous inoculation and education of the masses.

3. *Hook-worm*.—Hook-worm is one of the most commonly prevalent diseases of Mithilā. It has affected the health and vitality of lacs of people living in Mithilā. It has made the people idle, anaemic and has crippled agriculture, handicapped the progress of the nation and thus it has created a great economic disadvantage.

When a Hook-worm survey was done in the district of Darbhanga, it was discovered that about 80% of people suffered from the infection. In spite of such a high incidence of Hook-worm the symptoms of Hook-worm are not manifested in large number of cases. The high incidence of Hook-worm infection along with Malaria and mal-nutrition accounts for the large number of people suffering from anaemia.

Persons harbouring Hook-worms pass a large number of their eggs in stools. These eggs develop into infective larvae under the favourable conditions of humidity, rainfall and low temperature. The soil of such places which is commonly used for defecation by the carriers of Hook-worm remains grossly infested with the larvae. They infect the persons who happen to pass there barefooted. They pierce the skin and then pass along until finally they reach the intestine. There they bite and suck out the blood and thus they make people anaemic.

The causes of high incidence of Hook-worm in Mithilā are as follows:—

- (a) People usually defecate in the open fields specially in the bushes, on the banks of the rivers and tanks. These places under the favourable meteorological conditions which are quite suitable for the development of Hook-worm eggs into larvae become a great

source of infection. When persons usually bare-footed go there for any work, they become victims to this disease.

(b) The soil is usually sandy, alluvial and porous. This type of soil is very helpful for its development.

(c) 85% of the people of Mithilā are agriculturists and so they have to work in the fields. Due to economic and other conditions most of them do not wear shoes. These conditions also help in the infection of the disease.

The prevention and cure of Hook-worm is comparatively simple. Prevention consists in simple sanitary arrangement, such as proper disposal of human excreta which will prevent the soil and water pollution. The construction of bore-hole latrines which is quite cheap and easy may serve the purpose to a great extent but before doing this we have to fight ignorance, apathy, poverty and general cleanliness. The suppression of the disease which is so widely spread and enormous requires social and economic uplift of the nation, the education of millions of people, changing of their daily habits and a close co-operation among the health authorities, the mass, the medical personnel and philanthropic agencies.

4. *Dysentery*.—A very common form of dysentery caused by the anéeba has been very common throughout Mithilā. The other type of dysentery known as Bacilliary dysentery is not less common. These diseases are carried by germs which contaminate food and drinks. These germs are found in the stools of persons having the disease either in dominant or latent forms. Rain waters carry the faecal matter into the wells, tanks or streams. Thus the water is polluted and becomes a source of infection. Persons who use such water get the infection. This also plays an important part in the spread of this disease. The im-

provement of primitive environmental sanitation, such as water-supply, conservancy and general sanitation etc. will drive out the disease.

5. *Typhoid*.—It is an acute fever of long duration lasting for three weeks or more. This disease also spreads in epidemic form in Mithilā. It affects both rich and poor, strong and weak alike. The epidemic occurs in warm weather. Morbidity and mortality are not notified. The incidence increases in early age. The prevention lies in the improvement of the sanitary condition.

Carrier.—The carrier is a person who harbours the disease germs but does not manifest symptoms, that is, the carrier himself or herself does not suffer from the disease but becomes a reservoir of infection. Carriers of typhoid, dysentery and hook-worm are found in abundance in Mithilā. The carriers when employed as cooks or servants spread the disease. In this connection it will not be out of place to mention that a large number of cooks and servants go to other parts of Bihar and Bengal and are employed in handling food and drinks and they carry these germs.

6. *Small-pox*.—It is an air-borne disease caused by virus. It affects all ages, both sexes, poor and rich alike. It visits in an epidemic form at an interval of 5 years and causes large number of deaths and disfigurements. This disease is mostly prevalent in the eastern countries, especially China and India. It has practically disappeared in the western countries which is quite evident from the vital statistics given above. A country like Java having the same socio-economic conditions as Mithilā has done away with the disease by regular vaccination and re-vaccination of the masses.

7. *Plague*.—It is an acute febrile disease usually attended by swelling of the lymphatic glands of the groin caused by the bite of the infected rat-flea. This is really

a disease of rat. "No rat, no plague" is a fact. Later on, this disease spreads among men.

History.—Plague is a disease of great antiquity although the disease is very old for Asia, but no records are available. In India plague is mostly prevalent in Bihar. Mithilā is not free from it. The epidemic of plague is now practically confined to Northern Monghyr, Bhagalpur and a part of Darbhanga.

Temperature and humidity play a great part in the spread of plague. High humidity and low temperature favour the life process of fleas, which are quite fitting to Mithilā. Plague generally breaks out in winter season.

The other conditions which are suitable for the spread of Plague in Mithilā are as follows:—

- (1) Type of housing, made of mud and thatched with straw and surrounded by fields, give shelter to rats.
- (2) Food and drinks are kept haphazardly and exposed. The rats get food and multiply rapidly.
- (3) People do not generally kill rats on religious grounds.
- (4) Suitable meteorological conditions as described above.
- (5) Predominance of *X. Cheopis* over *X. Astia* (types of rat flea).
- (6) Customs and habits of the people such as holding of "Hāṭas" (fairs) where grains are usually sold. Grains of infected areas may carry infected rat fleas.
- (7) Mass ignorance.

Plague does not usually break out in the Kośī and the Kamalā affected areas which are highly flooded. Once

plague occurs in a particular area it becomes a difficult task to eradicate it..

8. *Kala-azar*.—It is a fever of long duration and is caused by the organisms which are transmitted from an infected man to a healthy one by the 'bite' of an insect known as sand-fly. This disease is mostly found in Mithilā in Bihar. The cause of high incidence of this disease is due to the vegetations surrounding the houses which give shelter to the sand-fly.

9. *Lathyrism*.—This is a disease which affects the nerves (spinal cord) and causes lameness. This is due to the consumption of "Khesārī" grain as the chief diet in the form of bread, "sātu", pulse etc. In some parts of Mithilā specially where "Khesārī" grows in large quantity, lathyrism breaks out in epidemic form. In the year 1947, the writer happened to examine 140 cases of this disease in a day in Bahera P. S. of the district of Darbhanga, where it had broken out in epidemic form. The treatment is difficult and not very effective. Prevention lies in stopping the production and consumption of 'Khesārī'.

V

Maternity and Child-Welfare :—

The activities of the maternity and child-welfare work are confined to the district head-quarters. The following facts have been published in the report on Maternity and Child-Welfare work by a special committee of experts in India, about Bihar during 1938 :

"It was only in 1923, ten years after the creation of the Province that the first move was made. In that year on the advice of the I.G.C.H. the provincial Government started a maternity scheme in Patna, the staff consisting of a maternity supervisor and six midwives. Each midwife was given a definite area in which she had to work and she attended all normal labour cases."

In 1925 Lady Wheeler initiated, "The Bihar-Orissa Child Welfare Fund" which began work by maintaining two child welfare centres at Gulzarbagh and Patna by

holding baby weeks. In 1928, the Bihar and Orissa Maternity and Child-Welfare Society was established which started centres in the important towns of the Province and functioned under the guidance and provision of the Provincial Society.

There is no provision for the work of the Maternity and Child welfare works in the rural areas of Mithilā. For this reason it is difficult to estimate correctly the maternal and infant mortality in villages owing to incorrect registration of the Vital Statistics.

There are various reasons for the negligence of the service. The delivery is done generally by the low class women such as the "camains". The reason is that among the Hindus the confinement is regarded as a physical pollution. This has got a great bearing on the solution of the maternity problem in India. Thus the professional midwives of the country are from time immemorial from amongst the lowest castes because confinements are considered unclean and the confined women as sources of pollution to others coming with them. The confinement is generally done in an insanitary labour room. This is the cause of large number of deaths of children due to, 'Tetanus' and other diseases, during the first week of life.

In England and Australia etc. the maternity and child-welfare scheme is run on the co-operation basis. the villages contribute for the nurses' salary. But it is not possible for the villages of Mithilā to do so owing to poverty and lack of modern outlook. But the work of maternity and child-welfare is a national responsibility which should be shared by the State, Local bodies and people.

There is no doubt that ladies belonging to the higher castes will not like to take up this job. But the problem cannot be left aside. The best thing is to train the indigenous "camains".

VI

Infant Mortality

The most important causes of Infant mortality are :

- (1) Tetanus.
- (2) Prematurity.
- (3) Respiratory diseases like Pneumonia etc.
- (4) Infective diseases—Small-pox etc.
- (5) Wrong feeding and other bowel disorders.
- (6) Malnutrition and starvation.

50% of the deaths occur under one month of life and 60% of these in the first week which is largely influenced by pre-natal causes.

The infant mortality rate can be reduced by the education of the mothers, producing trained "camains" and improving the socio-economic conditions of the man.

VII

Medical and Public Health Facilities

Medical.—There are about 100 dispensaries in the rural areas set up by the District Boards. The medical officer-in-charge of the dispensaries attend cases in the morning and evening hours. In most of the dispensaries there is no arrangement for indoor beds. The medical officers are under the control of the Chairman of the District Board and the Civil Surgeon of the district. The Health Officer has no control over them but they are supposed to attend the epidemic-affected villages during the absence of the Public Health Staff, for inoculation and disinfection works, within a radius of 5 miles. Besides the District Board dispensaries, there are Government hospitals in the district and sub-divisional head-quarters where there are arrangements for indoor patients. There is one Medical College at Darbhanga having several specialists.

Public Health.—The attention of the Government has been drawn much towards the Public Health for the last three years. The Public Health facilities have been tremendously increased during this period although they are not in keeping with the progress of Science. *The Bihar Public Health Bill* of 1947, on the lines of *Madras Consolidated Public Health Act 1939*, is under the consideration of the Government.

The present Public Health organisation is decentralised partly by the Government and mainly by the District Boards. The District Health Officer is a Government servant of Provincial Public Health Cadre but his subordinates, such as Assistant Health Officers, Health Inspectors etc., are servants of the Board. Usually Public Health Staff in a district consists of:—

1. District Health Officer with his office staff
2. Assistant Health Officer for each sub-division.
3. Health Inspector for a population of about a lac.
4. Disinfectors with each Health Inspector.
5. Licensed vaccinator with assistant for about 25,000 people.

Besides these Epidemic Doctors, Health Assistants and temporary Health Inspectors are deputed by the Director of Public Health, Bihar and also are appointed by the Board for assisting the permanent staff in combating epidemics whenever required. Medicines such as Quinine, Quinine substitutes, Kala Azar drugs, Anti-cholera, Typhoid and Plague vaccines, vaccine lymph etc., Sulphaguanidine, Cholera powder, Thiazamide etc are supplied in sufficient quantity by the D.P.H., Bihar, for free distribution in the rural areas.

Special anti-plague, anti-Kala Azar and malaria schemes have been functioning in the areas where their

services are needed. In anti-plague scheme, cyno-gasing, disinfecting the evacuated houses, distribution of Bariuar carbonate pills, treatment of cases with Thiazamide etc., mass anti-plague inoculation, health education etc. are usually done free of cost. Each gang of workers is given about 6 villages.

The anti-malaria and Kala Azar centres treat cases of Kala Azar, Hook-worm, Dysentery-scabbies, Cholera etc. Each centre is under a qualified medical officer with his assistants. The medical officer attends 2 sub-centres besides the main centre twice a week. The anti-mosquito work is also done in many of the centres.

In the Kośī and the Post-Kośī-affected areas temporary hospitals have been started under an Assistant Surgeon. More detailed schemes for efficient medicine and Public Health facilities within the areas are under the consideration of the Government of Bihar.

Village Health committees have been organised in large number of villages. In the district of Darbhanga alone about 200 such committees are functioning. Each village Health Committee has got medicines for Malaria, Cholera etc., with written instructions for the distribution of medicines.

The brighter village scheme has also been working in several villages. Construction of Bore-hole latrines, importance of sanitation and health education are being done as per this scheme.

There is no doubt that Public Health has been improved much after 1944, the year of the greatest epidemic of Cholera in North Bihar. The public have been stimulated and awakened on matters of Public Health and have realised its significance. But even then the present organisation serves the purpose but does not meet the demand of the public.

The combination of Medical and Public Health and the creation of a post for a whole-time teacher of Hygiene in the Medical College are desired. Teaching of hygiene should be graded; practical and compulsory, up to the matriculation standard.

School Health.—There should be a compulsory Medical inspection of school children. Some suitable provision for the correction of defects should be made. Health education and its practice in the school is very essential.

VIII

Conclusion

To solve the problem of the areas of Mithilā the chain of the vicious circle—ill-health, unemployment, bad-nutrition and anxiety—must be broken. But this problem cannot be solved only by the Public Health measures alone. The physical, social, and educational sides are also to be very much improved.

Secondly, the economic condition must be raised by improving the method of cultivation, development of indigenous Cottage Industries etc. A close co-ordination of all these departments is desired for achieving the end.

To gain the public opinion and have their co-operation voluntary organisation could be started. It should be supervised technically. For gaining health self-help, is much better, cheaper and long lasting than the purchase of health. People are to be led and not to be driven away.

For a province like Mithilā, a suitable legislation and its enforcement is absolutely essential. For this a consolidated Public Health Act like the Madras Act of 1939 is desirable. The Bihar Public Health Bill of 1947 is under the consideration of the Government of Bihar

where all these problems regarding Mithilā should have much better consideration.

If efforts on the above lines are made, Mithilā once a place of health and wealth can distinguish itself not only in Bihar but in the whole of India.

OBITUARY

THE RT. HON'BLE DR. SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU.

IN the passing away of Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru the country has lost its leading statesman, jurist, and lawyer. He was a great scholar of English, Persian, and Urdu. His contribution to India's constitution will long be remembered. He was held in the highest esteem even by those who differed from him, for his stainless character and his selfless devotion to the best interests of the country. In spite of an exceedingly busy professional life, he retained a lively interest in literature, history, and politics. The *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* has special reason to lament his death. He was its founder-President and rendered it signal service. Whilst he was in good health, he regularly presided over its meetings and his advice was always available, even during the months spent on the sick-bed. Tributes to him have been paid by many persons; some have spoken of his greatness as an advocate; some have referred to his vast learning; others have enumerated the many occasions when his sage counsel has been sought by different groups of politicians; all have mourned the end of a man who had hardly an enemy.

He was the most eminent lawyer of this generation. He was honoured by the Universities of Oxford, Allahabad, Patna, Banaras, and Hyderabad. He was honoured by the King and by Mahatma Gandhi. He was a successful peacemaker. He was the President of the *Hindustani Academy*; Chief Scout Commissioner of India; President of the *Allahabad Anjuman Roohe Adab*. He was a scholar and a friend of scholars. He was a humanist and had a broad and generous outlook on life.

We pay our tribute to his memory. We cannot say what his association with this Institute meant to it and how sorely we shall miss him.



THE RT. HON'BLE DR. SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU.
PRESIDENT (1943—'49)

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

STUDIES IN THE RĀMĀYAṆA, by, Dewan Bahadur K. S. Ramaswami Sastrigal. Retired District Session Judge. Published as The *Kirti Mandir Lecture series* No. IX. by the Department of Education. Part I. *The Genius of Vālmīki* pp. 188. Part II. *Riddles of the Rāmāyaṇa*, pp. iv and 276 and vi 1949. Price Rs. 7-8-0.

We should feel grateful to the Baroda Government for the publication of this volume. The author has devoted fifty years to the study of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and has brought to bear his mature judgment in the discussion of the various problems arising from his studies.

The *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki is undoubtedly the most popular work of Sanskrit literature and no other work has exercised a greater influence from the days of its composition down to the present day.

The work is known in four recensions: (1) the Southern (including the Bombay recensions), (2) Bengali, (3) the North-western recension and (4) the Nepali. Of these, three recensions have been published. As the *Rāmāyaṇa* is a book of daily pārayaṇa (recitation) and as such held in supreme reverence, it is not likely that any critical edition attempting to ferret out the original nucleus would command the respect now given to the several recensions.

The author of the studies has established that all the seven kāṇḍas (barring a few interpolated sargas and ślokas) are the composition of Vālmīki and that the *Rāmāyaṇa* depicted a historical account of the civilisation of Rāma's times and of the Vānaras of the Deccan

as also of the Rākṣasas. Thus he begins the study with the message of the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

The book consists of two parts: Part I. deals with the message of Vālmiki. Several chapters are devoted to his ideals of education, individual life, social life, family life, economic and political ideals and spiritual ideals. Thus Vālmiki's portraiture of the Indian civilisation and vision of life are dealt with in all their aspects. Long chapters are devoted to the description of the several characters of the book and to the treatment of the *Rāmāyaṇa* as a master piece of literature and art.

Part II deals with nearly 100 riddles of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. *The Riddle of the Rāmāyaṇa* was originally propounded by C. V. Vaidya in his book under that name. The present book claims to have solved all the riddles to the satisfaction of the modern critical student. Rāma's killing Bāli, making Sītā undergo Agnipraveśa, and exiling Sītā have all been defended with good reasons. Some of the modern scholars and politicians do not appreciate the real greatness of Rāma in these respects and the book under review would give a quietus even to such doubts and critics.

—A. S. NATARAJA AYYAR.

BRAHMA VIDYA—Journal of the Advaita Sabha, Kumbakonam Madras Presidency. Vol. I. No. 1. pp. 4, 16, 10, 16. Quarterly, Annual subscription, Rs. 5.

This quarterly journal has been started mainly for the publication of the unprinted treasures of Sanskrit now lying in the archives of the libraries and awaiting a descriptive catalogue. The book has started with two minor works of Śaṅkara: (1) *Maniṣā Pañcakam* edited with two commentaries; and (2) The commentary

of Śaṅkara in a small work of 25 ślokas entitled *Jñānāṅkuśam* found in the *Saraswati Bhavan* of Banaras.

(1) The *Maniṣā Pañcakam* has now been duly admitted by all scholars as a genuine work of Śaṅkara and the only difficulty is to make out the meaning of its appeal to the householders and the Sannyāsins. The commentaries rightly attempt the difficult task. When Lord Viśveśvara argued in the guise of a Cāṇḍāla one might have expected that any ordinary person would answer him from the point of view of an ordinary man of affairs with the answer of the Dharma Śāstras. But Śaṅkara answered Viśveśvara as a practical Sannyāsi who preached and lived the life of a Jīvanmukta as the ideal life of a Sannyāsi Advaitin.

(2) The other work is a commentary by Śaṅkara dealing in a small compass with the main tenet of Advaita. That Śaṅkara wrote many Prakaraṇas and Stotras is undoubted and that many more are attributed to him is also true. But the only test for distinguishing the real works from the ascriptions is mainly subjective viz. the test of style which sometimes appeals to one and eludes another. The publication of the works is welcome.

—A. S. NATARAJA AYYAR.

- (A) REPORT ON THE INSCRIPTIONS OF THE DEVASTHANAM COLLECTION WITH ILLUSTRATIONS by Sadhu Subramania Sastry, Devasthanam, Archaeologist with 61
 • photos, maps and charts, pp. 1-366 with an introduction by Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri 1930.

(B) INSCRIPTIONS OF TIRUPATI TEMPLE :

Vol. I. EARLY INSCRIPTIONS—Translated and edited with introductions by Sadhu Subramania Sastri, pp. 1-273 with 14 full page facsimiles 1931.

- Vol. II. INSCRIPTIONS OF SAHEWA NARASIMHA'S TIME. translated and edited by do. pp. xl. and 380 1933.
- Vol. III. INSCRIPTIONS OF KRISHNA RAYA'S TIME (1509-1531 A.D.) 1935, pp. xxxii and 419 translated and edited by Vijayaraghavacharya Devasthanam Archaeologist 1935.
- Vol. IV. INSCRIPTIONS OF ACHYUTARAYA'S TIME (1530-1542 A.D.) pp. lx and 403 translated and edited by Vijayaraghavacharya 1936.
- Vol. V. INSCRIPTIONS OF SADASIVARAYA'S TIME (1541-1574 A.D.) pp. xlix and 510 translated and edited by Vijayaraghavacharya 1937.
- Vol. VI. Part 1. INSCRIPTIONS OF VENKATAPATIRAYA'S TIME pp. xxxvi and 276 translated and edited by Vijayaraghavacharya 1937.
- Vol. VI. Part 2. EPIGRAPHICAL GLOSSARY pp. 19, 316 and 98 compiled and edited by Vijayaraghavacharya 1938.

These are the seven volumes published by the *Tirupati Devasthānam*. The first narrates the main contents of the inscriptions contained in the six succeeding volumes.

Tirupati perhaps is the richest temple in India and is one of the three famous Vaiṣṇavite shrines in Southern India, the other two being Śrirangam and Conjeevaram. The idol of Śrīnivāsa situated on the "seven hills" baffles analysis and description and has been claimed by the Vaiṣṇavite, Śaivite and Śākta as their own titular diety. Tirupati has its Māhātmya narrated in 14 Purāṇas and the same with a Hīndī translation has been edited by Mm. Anantakrishna Sastry in two volumes. A history of Tirupati from the earliest times has been written in two volumes by the late Dr. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar. Both these have been published by the Devasthanam. These two works together with the above set of volumes on ins-

criptions give the student of history and religion what all he wants to know about Tirupati.

Great credit reflects on the two Devasthānam Epigraphists who have edited the inscriptions and furnished translation in English: Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastry writes a foreword in praise of them and states "that at least since the days of the Vijayanagaram rulers the temple has been enjoying a magnificent income. Of all the sacred spots (श्रीपति) (forming in Tamil as Tirupati) of Southern India, the hill of Vengadam came very early to be recognised as Tirupati par excellence." The early Ālvārs have sung about the hill and the God thereon. The later Ācāryas from Rāmānuja have made this shrine as one of the main centres for the propagation of their faith. The inscriptions in three languages Sanskrit, Telugu and Tamil making a total of over 1,000, furnish a continuous authentic record of the temple and its neighbourhood for the last seven or eight centuries and an account of the buildings endowments and numerous visits to the temple by the Vizayanagaram rulers and especially of the illustrious Krishna Deva Raya. The Devasthānam has earned the gratitude of the public by the production of these sumptuous volumes comparing in all respects with the Government Archaeological Department.

—A. S. NATARAJA AYYAR.

AN ADVANCED HISTORY OF INDIA: By R. C. Majumdar, H. C. Raychaudhuri and Kalikinkar Datta. Macmillan and Co. Ltd, London, 1946, pages xii and 1081, with 10 maps Price Rs. 16.

The need of writing a comprehensive history of India has been a problem for the last several years. The progress made by either the *Bharatiya Itihasa Samiti* or the *Indian History Congress* or other similar bodies, which

had planned for preparing history of India in twelve to fifteen volumes, is very discouraging. We were glad to learn in December last at the Delhi Session of the *Indian History Congress* that the various schemes, advanced so far, would now be merged into one. Perhaps, that is the only way to get what we want. The cooperation of all scholars of all the three periods of Indian History would be of much more value and significance, if diverted into a single channel. We hope the cause of Historiography in India would be better served if the scholars could but remember the recent speech at the Annual Meeting of the *History Association* of Great Britain by Sir G. M. Trevelyan on 'Bias in History.' Indian history needs that treatment from unprejudiced pens of scholars, and we would like to recommend strongly to all scholars to sift and collate materials in that way, while writing history. The field of Indian History presents a varied interest of study, conflicting arguments and complicated trends of thought, and their study and interpretation, if done haphazardly and with an unclear conscience, are sure to lead conclusions which in the long run would need such a revision which one could never expect. This is more true in books where a general survey is taken of the events from the earliest times to the present age.

Drs. Majumdar, Raychaudhuri and Datta in their new book *Advanced History of India*, we are glad to note, have taken greater pains to see that the book does not involve such unforeseen influences.

The *Advanced History of India* contains three parts. Part one deals with Ancient India from the pre-historic period till the passing of the old Hindu Kingdoms in the 11th century A.D. It also includes chapters on Gupta Civilization, India's colonial and cultural link, and a surviving from those distant times. Parts 2 and 3 are graphic account of monuments of Ancient India still

divided into two sections each. Part two is devoted to the expansion and disintegration of Turkish Sultans of Delhi and the Great Moghuls, one after another. In a few more chapters, a study of social and economic life, education, literature and art under the two great dynasties is marvellously explained. The third part from the advent of European right up to 1937 gives special emphasis on political relations, developments in internal administration, constitutional changes and economic conditions, religious cultural and social problems, and the dawn of the New India.

There are illustrations, maps, plans of battle fields which are of great help. Genealogical Tables, Bibliography, Chronology of Indian History are given at proper places.

It is creditable that the authors have presented a novel way of writing history books, which may prove to be interesting to a large section. The story of India is told in this book in a way which at once appeals to scholars, to teachers, to students and to the general reader alike. The trends of various forces and movements of our ancient, medieval as well as modern times have been marvellously discussed. One finds great pleasure to go through the book from cover to cover.

BENGALI LITERATURE : by J. C. Ghosh : Oxford University Press, Calcutta : pp 198; 15 sh.

Of the two regular histories of Bengali Literature that are available to us, the earlier one by Dr. Binesh Sen is known for its early description of original material while the latter one (in Bengali) by Dr. S. Sen is remarkable because of its searching analysis of that material. Not that he had not tried to assess the literary worth of his authors but then Mr. Ghosh's present book, though

short, is a more concentrated attempt at a critical examination of the numerous Bengali works that constitute our literary heritage. Of course, Mr. Ghosh's approach is from the Western standpoint with the consequence that some of his assessments of some of our poets and dramatists often appear a bit too rigid and hard. Nevertheless, an inquiry into the literary worth of our books was more than overdue and while doing this the learned author has done well not to have involved himself in the problems of the texts and their authorships focussing our entire attention firstly, on the sociological background against which the Bengali Literature grew and then, almost simultaneously, on the development of the various forms of literature which have now come to stay with us.

Of the first mentioned tendency, the division of the last thousand years of our literary history into (i) the Gour Period, (ii) the Nadia Period and (iii) the Calcutta Period is in itself suggestive, since Mr. Ghosh has been able to show in the introduction that with the change of our seat of culture from Gaur to Nadiya and thence to Calcutta Bengali literature had also undergone a process of transformation characterised by many a significant feature. That our literature had developed in the wake of the country's economic prosperity becomes abundantly clear—and, to continue Mr. Ghosh's tenor of argument, if Bengali literature to day is not breaking new ground, one may guess, it is because of our sense of economic insecurity.

Against such a background, our change of emphasis from the religious literature of the 15th. century to the secular literature of to-day becomes significant indeed as we know the stress that had compelled us to do it. If "Maladhara's *Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-Vijaya* is inspired throughout by ardent religious feeling" (p. 37), Mukundarama had already started to be more democratic (p. 73) and Bharatachandra had found that life was more worth living

by itself than for anything else. What Mr. Ghosh constantly reminds us however, and it is well that he does it, is that it is not always fair to judge the literature of a period by the standards of another : a misunderstanding that had induced many a critic to hold false views about the literary worth of Bharatachandra or Iswara Gupta, for example. Centurywise the jungle of stories introduced in the Bengali version of the *Mahābhārata* or "the essential unreality of a romantic-spiritual arcadia in the Pads" (p. 57) or even the grotesqueness of some of the Caṇḍī fables (p. 68) : all these are typical of the periods to which they belong and reveal, leaving aside the authors' weaknesses, the age. It is from this angle that (as Mr. Ghosh wants us to believe) the Vidyāpati poems may not be "pseudoromantic, meretricious and pretty-pretty" and Mukundarām's Caṇḍīmangal not merely "mystical supernatural stuff."

Besides these Mr. Ghosh's estimate of the literary competence of most of our pad-kartas and poets is very refreshing : more so when he comes nearer our times and can rely safely on Western aesthetics. But unfortunately to the interpretation of the 19th. century he has brought no new approach ever emphasizing the rather too well known truth that the Bengali literature then was the product of the growing middle-class. But beyond this Mr. Ghosh seems to be inaccurate when he says that it was inspired merely by the reading of the 'railway book-stall literature' particularly when there is evidence to show that the Bengali authors had read the best of English poets, novelists and philosophers. It is a different matter altogether if the Bengalis had not been able to engraft western methods in their own literature; in fact one would like that the Bengalis Bengali-ised whatever they read. Such a point Mr. Ghosh can ill-afford to forget when for example, he writes so trenchantly about Bankim or about

Tagore. It is true that many a novel of Bankim's is loaded with the "dead mass of mystical, didactic verbiage" but then to condemn his art of the novel on the score that he was merely a mediocre thinker and to charge him with anti-Muslim prejudice are, I think, going too far. It is equally unfair to say that Madhusudan was not a great poet but merely the maker of a great tradition which incidentally Mr. Ghosh has failed to note when he has come to scrutinise the voluminous works of Tagore.

If he had done so he would not have been lured to tread so unwittingly in the footsteps of Dr. Thompson in his estimate of the Poet's worth. The tradition of Bengal is not merely the tradition of English literature and the basis of judgement is not merely western. Tagore himself had emphasised this so frequently that a conscientious critic cannot afford to be ignorant of it—leading ultimately to such rash statements: "Tagore's other verse-plays are very carelessly written, often to the point of lacking rudimentary dramatic sense or even common sense." (p. 176) In fact, this betrays Mr. Ghosh's total ignorance of the Sanskrit dramatic tradition and a good knowledge of the bibliographical material now available in the Rachanavali which shows how painstaking an artist Tagore was. Furthermore, Mr. Ghosh is ill-informed when he says that Tagore wrote only about a dozen plays while in fact, there are at least a dozen *more* of nature-plays and dance dramas which reveal that Tagore's work was not always a hybrid of foreign and native elements. His last poems too—I mean the poems written after his Russian visit—display this attitude where the imaginative effusion of a lyric poet has been more than restrained by the thought of the west. Tagore's emphasis however, was on the Eastern hierarchy of values and it is a pity that Mr. Ghosh has not mentioned the last poems and the

bunch of short stories which display how typical an Indian Tagore finally was.

Another important point now remains to be mentioned. I have found line after line in Mr. Ghosh's book which seems to have been translated from Dr. S. Sen's *Bangla Sahityer Katha* without even the necessary acknowledgement. For instance, there are very clear verbal similarities between pages 35, 43, 63, 77 and 85 of Mr. Ghosh's book and pages 90, 16, 48, 81, 131 respectively of the second edition of Dr. Sen's volume. Furthermore, Mr. Ghosh has quoted Yeats's statement that Tagore was the product of a supreme culture (p. 174) without acknowledging his source.

In spite of these shortcomings and a slightly misleading title, *Bengali Literature* is a very well written book containing passages of penetrating critical insight. To the non Bengali especially, the volume will surely be a very delightful reading

—A. MUKERJI.

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[Part 3

LIFE AND WORK OF SHRI BAL GANGADHAR SHASTRI.*

By SHRI M. S. ANEY

I thank the members of the *Research Institute* for the honour they have done in asking me to address the distinguished audience assembled at its annual meeting. You had in the past a number of distinguished scholars as speakers on such occasions. But this year your choice has fallen on one who cannot claim a seat in the galaxy of learned men. The past speakers had used this platform to read learned theses on some important problem of oriental research or to give you some luminous instructions to facilitate your progress in the field of research. I cannot do anything of the kind. It seems to me that you have been fed to satiety by the learned men with rich intellectual food. And you now feel the need of a change and desire some *chutni*, sour and pungent, to revive your appetite. I can surely describe your choice this time in the following felicitous words of Kālidāsa :—

‘पिण्डवज्जुहो उद्वेजिदस्स तित्थिलीए अमिलास’ इव

* Speech delivered by H. E. Shri M. S. Aney, Governor of Bihar, at the Annual Meeting of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Allahabad on April 9, 1949.

I am sure that you will be magnanimous in dealing with me. I very much stand in need of it.

Ladies and gentlemen, from times immemorial the sacred city of Allahabad has been always known to us as the sacred Tirtha of the Trivenī, the confluence of Gaṅgā Yamunā and Saraswatī. Its sanctity has been attracting millions of pilgrims every year. Like the sacred stream, the stream of pilgrims also has been flowing in an unbroken and uninterrupted line from the oldest times known to history.

Similarly, for the pilgrims who have been working for the emancipation of our country during the last fifty years it has also been a sacred place of worship, sanctified by the presence of three front-rank patriots of India, Pandit Motilal Nehru, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. This trinity of Allahabad, or ancient *Prayāga*, has made a contribution to the political emancipation and cultural revival of the people of Bhāratavarṣa which it is possible only for the future historians to assess at its proper value. All the three have laid their countrymen under an eternal debt of obligations by their selfless services and sacrifices.

This Institute has lost in Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru not merely its founder and first President, but its friend, philosopher and guide. I pay my humble tribute to the memory of that Great Patriot who lived in a grandeur of isolation of his own, apart like a star shining in its own glory, but always illuminating the path with its rays of wisdom and sagacity. Indian public men of all shades of opinion looked up to him in the same way as the navigators do to the loadstar. His death relieved him from prolonged physical agonies. But it has created a big void which there is little hope of being filled up in the near future.

You know much more than I do how the present Insti-

tute owes its birth and wonderful progress it has made during the past few years to Sir Tej Bahadur's profound love and regard for India's ancient culture, her richest heritage. The report just read out and the published volumes of the Jha Institute Journal give a clear idea of the achievements of the Institute in research and other fields of allied activities.

After the foundation of the Royal Asiatic Society in England the research work was done by European scholars only. India will remain ever grateful to those great European learned men who studied the Asiatic classical languages and literatures and laboured hard to glean therefrom the grains to build the history of the Asiatic cultures and present them to the world in a form intelligible to them. They collected all sorts of materials, manuscripts, coins, inscriptions, folk-lore, relics of cultures buried underground, astronomical data and geological strata. They literally travelled from earth to heaven, dived deep into the seas to their very bottom and entered into the bowels of the earth to examine her secret recesses and processes of formation. Specimens of bones, stones, coins, pottery, cutlery, jewellery, idols, clay, wood, metals, houses, drains, baths, graves—all have been collected, catalogued, studied and requisitioned into service as far as possible.

Ancient Aryans and Dravids were praised by the scholars for their literary, cultural and artistic achievements in the past from the times of the Holy Vedas to the period of the growth of vernacular classics. But they have been all along complaining of a strangely unaccountable paucity of works on history. In spite of this handicap these scholars have pieced together the facts gleaned from scattered materials and have now succeeded in giving us a correct and continuous account of the rise and fall of Indian culture from the period of

the Mauryas of Pāṭaliputra to the times of Bābar. Even in this period there are many gaps that require to be filled up.

Without minimising the importance of the work done by European scholars, I venture to say that a real and inspiring history of Bhāratavarṣa and its culture cannot be written by scholars other than Indian. It was therefore necessary that Indian scholars should take interest in this important branch of learning and the school of Indian research scholarship should grow.

I think that no Indian scholar had any chance of doing any research work in Indian history prior to the establishment of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in the year 1784. The credit for it also goes to Sir William Jones, a judge of the Supreme Court of Calcutta, who is rightly described as the founder of the modern Indian scholarship. A considerable number of scholars in Bengal has distinguished themselves in the research work. Iśwar Chandra Vidyāsāgar, Dr. Rājendra Lal Mitra, R. C. Dutt and Haraprasad Śāstri are the names of orientlists with whose works the oriental scholars all over the world are familiar. The Bombay Royal Asiatic Society came into existence some time in the year 1805. Its membership was at first confined only to Europeans. Oriental scholars are well aware of the names of scholars like Dr. Bhāu Daji, Dr. R. G. Bhandārkar, R. S. Maṇḍalik and J. Telang for the literary work done by them, mainly in the field of elucidating inscriptions. They are generally regarded as the first Indians to enter the field of research study in Western India. But the volumes of the Royal Asiatic Society of India's Bombay Branch show that the first Indian to make contributions to that journal, particularly on inscriptions, was one Bāl Gaṅgādhara Śāstri Jambhekar, a man of great learning, who rose very rapidly to an eminent

position in the Educational Service of the Government of Bombay and the public life of the city of Bombay. He unluckily died in the prime of his youth at the age of 35. In the literary circles of Bombay and Maharashtra the name of Bāl Gaṅgādhar Śāstri Jambhekar has been known as one of the earliest writers of books in Marāthī and so to say, one of the founders of the modern Marāthī prose literature. But very little about the life and work of this first and great oriental scholar of Bombay was known.

The following quotation from the speeches made by late J. Chandavarkar can show you in what high esteem the late Bāl Gaṅgādhar Śāstri was held. While speaking on a resolution expressing sorrow on the death of the late J. Ranade at a meeting of the students of the Elphinstone College in 1901 J. Chandavarkar said :

“ . . . Mr. Ranade was undoubtedly the premier of graduates—the best Elphinstonian—and there is no one among our educated men, either of the past or of the present, with whom we can compare him unless we go back to the forties of the past century and think of Professor Bal Shastri Jambhekar, the first native professor appointed to a chair in this institution. Those who knew Professor Jambhekar—men like Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji and the late Mr. Sorabjee Shapoorjee Bengalee who were his pupils spoke of him as a man of brilliant parts, and many-sided activities, simple and kind; but he died too early—at the age of 35—to enable any one to form a correct measure of what he might have been had he lived longer.”

Again, speaking at a centenary celebration of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society on the 18th of January, 1905, he made the following complimentary reference to the memory of Bal Gangadhar Shastri Jambhekar :—

“ I propose to speak of those Hindoo scholars only who are no more, because as for the living, they are there yet working, and we all know their work and worth. The first antiquarian scholar

among Hindoos who enriched the literature of this Society was Professor Bal Shastree Jambhekar. He was something of a genius—as skilled a mathematician and literary scholar as he was an erudite Shastri. His papers on several inscriptions are among the earliest records of our Society, and are even now worth perusal. He died at the early age of 35, but even then he had acquired a great reputation as a scholar and antiquarian."

Throughout the period of one hundred years that has elapsed since the death of Bal Shastri we find eminent writers referring to his work. But all these references are extremely meagre, perfunctory and vague. One Mr. B. N. Deo, a writer of some distinction in Marathi, had published a small biography of this distinguished scholar about 1893. But it failed to attract proper attention even of those literary men of Mahārāṣṭra who were interested in the historical growth and development of Marathi language and literature.

A few persons of Bombay held public meetings to celebrate the centenary of death of this great scholar on 17th and 23rd of May, 1946. Even these meetings were meagrely attended. It is really very distressing to note that the enlightened public of Bombay should have at the end of a century no sense of gratefulness left in them for the man who had worked hard to serve the people in various ways and was in a way a Guru of many notable persons, some of whom later on distinguished themselves as men of lead and light in the public life, not only of Bombay, but of the whole nation.

It is, however, gratifying to see that nearly a century after his death this great man of Bombay was fortunate to get a scholar to write his biography. Mr. G. G. Jambhekar, a scholar and a renowned Marathi writer and journalist, took upon himself to collect the materials and write his life. This unique biography is now printed and awaiting its publication. I am grateful to Mr. Jambhekar for permitting me to use his as yet unpublished

ed work for the purpose of this lecture. He has by his indefatigable labour collected very valuable and authentic materials and made them available to the readers of the book. Thus he has admirably succeeded in presenting to the Marathi readers a good many details about the life of Bal Shastri, throwing light on his manifold public activities with which his short life was crowded.

Gangadhar Shastri Jambhekar, the father of Balshastri, was a Sanskrit Pandit residing at the village Pambhurla in Deogarh tahsil in Konkan, that small, narrow strip of land, bounded by the Sahyadri on the east and the Arabian Sea on the west, which has given to Maharashtra many of her bold statesmen, brave generals and brilliant scholars during the period of Maratha supremacy and in the British regime also. Peshwas and many of their generals and statesmen came from this land known as Parashuram Kshetra. Most of the big men who have attained eminence as leaders of public opinion in the Bombay Presidency also belonged to the class of Chitpavana Brahmans who migrated to Poona and Bombay from this part. To name only a few. J. Ranade, Dr. Bhandarkar, Lokamanya Tilak, Professor Gopalrao Gokhale. They were either residents of Konkon or born of parents who were in Konkon. Gangadhar Shastri had two sons, of whom Balshastri was the younger. He was born about the year 1812. He died on the 17th of May, 1846. His existence in this mortal world was only for a brief period of 35 years.

Balshastri's father taught him Marathi and Sanskrit till he was 12 or 13 years old. In 1826 he joined the English school run by the Native Education Society at Bombay. The young boy was extraordinarily bright. In four years he mastered Sanskrit grammar, rhetoric and literature, English grammar and composition and Marathi grammar and composition. He acquired know-

ledge of Gujrati and Bengali and made a beginning of the study of Persian. Besides languages he studied geography and mathematics, including logarithms and mensuration of planes and solids. His intelligence and quick grasp seemed to have impressed the teachers and the school authorities within two years of his joining the school. He was raised to the situation of a tutor of mathematics some time in 1827.

He was appointed Deputy Native Secretary of the Society in 1830 when he was only 17 years old. In 1832 he was promoted to the position of the Native Secretary on a salary of Rs. 100 per month. In the same year he was appointed a special tutor to the young Prince of Akalkot State. In 1834 the Elphinstone College was started and Balshastri was selected by the Government of Bombay for the post of Assistant Professor in that college. He mainly taught mathematics to the students. Professor Orlebar and Professor Harkness were sent from England to serve as professors of mathematics and physics respectively in the college. Balshastri seems to have prosecuted his studies of these subjects under these two renowned professors and completely mastered them. He acquired proficiency to such an extent that in the absence of Professor Orlebar on leave for 2 years from 1842 to 1844 he had the unique honour of being appointed acting Professor of Mathematics and Natural Science. He was perhaps the first Indian to be appointed a Professor in a college in India. In 1840 Balshastri was appointed Superintendent of the Board of Education. He had to do this work in addition to his duties as Professor in the Elphinstone Institution. As a Superintendent of Education in charge of one of the Divisions of the Bombay Presidency he worked enthusiastically and helped the Department of Education a good deal in laying the foundations of the system of primary education in those

early days. His reports are very lucid, informative and suggestive.

It will be interesting to know the names of some of his students. Dadabhai Naoroji, 'grand old man of India,' was one of them. Dr. Bhau Daji the distinguished orientalist, Nana Moroji the well-known Presidency Magistrate of Bombay and later the Prime Minister of Indore, Professor Kero Nama Chattrra the first Indian Professor of Mathematics in the Deccan College of Poona, are also among his students. All of them felt to the end of their lives proud of having learnt at the feet of Balshastri, for whom they had tremendous respect. Dadabhai, in a letter written in 1909, has paid a remarkable tribute to his teacher and professor, Balshastri: "I know him only as a teacher and indeed as a very able, tactful, amiable and wise teacher. He was kind and interested in his pupils. We looked up to him with great respect and admiration as much for his learning as for his whole character."

Balshastri was not merely a teacher and an educationist in the ordinary sense. He wrote books in Marathi for the use of the students in schools on various subjects, and they were in use as text books, in the schools of the Bombay Presidency for more than twenty-five years after his death. I give below the list of the Marathi books of which he is the author:—(1) *Nītikathā*, (2) *Sāra-Saṅgraha*, (3) *Bālaryākarnā*, (4) *Bhūgola Vidyā* (Geography), (5) *Bhūgola Sastra*, (6) *England Deshacī Bakhr* (Chronicles of England), Vol. 1 and 2, (7) *Hindustan-cha Itihas*, and (8) *History of British Rule in India*. He wrote a work in Marathi on Integral and Differential calculus, and for some time before his death was engaged in writing a work on Psychology in Marathi.

It is really extraordinary that he could spare time, notwithstanding his duties as Professor and Superin-

tendent, for writing so many books. In the discharge of his duties as superintendent he had to travel considerably in bullockcarts. Balshastri was a man of versatile genius, and he had no difficulty in mastering any subject or language.

He was the first Hindu in western India to take up copper-plate reading. It appears that he deciphered and interpreted 7 or 8 copper-plates. His article on Kharapatan copper-plate was published in the R.A.S.I. Journal of the Bombay Branch in April 1843. His notes thereon are critical. His suggestions to reconcile certain discrepancies between the genealogies of Yādava kings in this plate and in other plates published by some European scholars are very ingenious. On reading these notes one cannot but feel that oriental scholarship in western India received a terrific blow by his sudden and premature death at the age of 35. The editor of the *B.P.R.A.S. Journal*, in Vol. II (July 1844 to July 1847) referring to the death of Bal Gangadhar Shastri, says "In the death of the late Bal Gangadhar Shastri, remarkable among the native community for his great talent and acquirements, the Society has lost a valuable and most useful contributor to Indian inscriptions—the branch to which Professor Lasser has particularly called the attention of our members as being the only means of obtaining a clear and authentic knowledge of the early history of this country."

Similarly, in a review of the lights and shades of the East and a study of the late Baboo Haris Chandar in the year 1863, the editor of *Rast Goftar*, one of the oldest journals of Bombay, pays a tribute to Balshastri as follows:—

"The late lamented Mr. Bal Gangadhar Shastree, Professor of the Elphinstone College, was the author of many valuable contributions to the Journal of the Bombay

Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society on ancient inscriptions and antiquities of India. He has compiled several excellent tracts and books, which are still used in the Government Educational Department. He was also the English editor of the Bombay Durpun, the first Anglo-Vernacular newspaper published in Western India, and of the Dig Durshun, the first Murathee Magazine of science and literature. As a scholar and mathematician he has not been surpassed by any other Native. His death was regarded as a national calamity in this part of the country. Sir Erskine Perry, a friend and a well-wisher of our countrymen, mourned his loss, and paid a just tribute to his memory from the bench of late Supreme Court. He was not inferior, but in many respects superior, to the late Baboo Harischandar."

I shall now make a brief reference to other important activities of Balshastri. He started a newspaper called *Bombay Darpan*. It was bilingual. The Marathi portion was only a translation of the articles and notes in English. He conducted it with great ability from 1832 to 1840. He seemed to have earned the good opinion of Europeans and educated Indians alike by this publication. Sir J. Carnack, who was then the Governor of Bombay, in 1840 appointed him as justice of the peace, an honour which was till then mostly conferred on millionaires of Bombay only. This 'Darpan' is the first journal in Marathi started by a Hindu. He also edited a monthly magazine in Marathi called DigDarshana, which was also the first of its kind. But both these journals were discontinued in his life-time.

I think that I should not conclude this brief sketch of Balshastri without making a reference to his efforts as a social reformer. In starting periodicals one of his objects was to counteract the effects of the anti-Hinduism propaganda that was carried on by the Christian missionaries from the platform and through the press. A young boy called Shripad, who was converted to Chris-

tianity, was readmitted by him into Hinduism. He worked hard and suffered much to win over the orthodox Shastris of Bombay and Poona to his view. But he courageously suffered the harassment and ultimately succeeded in his object.

For the sake of getting this young boy back to the custody of his Hindu father he had to file an application to the Supreme Court for habeas corpus against one Rev. Nisbet, who was probably the head of the missionary organisation. The Supreme Court passed an order in favour of the father.

He also upheld the cause of the remarriage of child widows and wrote a good deal on the subject. He had to incur the displeasure of his brother Shastris who were against this reform.

He was the founder of the Self-Improvement Society, at which men like Dadabhai Naoroji and others took their first lessons in patriotism. This Society was the nucleus of the Bombay Literary and Scientific Society, whose activities were well known to the literary public.

His death was deeply deplored all over the Bombay presidency. A reference to his death in appreciative terms was made by the Hon'ble Sir T. E. Perry, Puisne judge of the Supreme Court :

“And in reference to this point I cannot but advert with the deepest regret to the great loss which your body and the whole community has sustained since our last session in the death of the late Bal Gangadhar Shastree. To the wide range of information and the enlightened morality resulting from an excellent European education, to the most solid and rare attainment in science and literature, both European and Asiatic;—and to the influence which was the just and natural result of a character and mind thus distinguished and adorned, he added an anxiety and zeal for Native improvement which I have never seen equalled; and which have

forcibly impressed upon my mind the conviction that the loss of no individual in Bombay, European or Native, of whatever rank, could prove so great a calamity to Western India as that of our lamented friend, the late Bal Shastree."

The Board of Education also referred to the loss sustained by the death of Balshastri in its report for the year 1846 :—

" Bal Shastree united in an eminent degree the highest quantities which a paternal Government would look for on the part of one who devotes himself to the business of the instruction of youth. His attainments in science, his conversance with European literature, in English composition enabled him to take a high place among the best scholars of the day, but in addition to this acquired knowledge, his simple unostentatious deportment, and unwearied efforts on behalf of his countrymen ensured him the respect and regard of all the Europeans to whom he was intimately known : while on the other hand, the zeal and industry with which he devoted the far greater part of each 24 hours to the best interests of his countrymen, with no other regard to self than is involved in the love of praise from those whose praise is worth acquiring, secured for him an influence as extensive in range as it was beneficial in character."

Such was the man who worked for his countrymen more than 100 years ago.

It is our duty in Free India to recall to our mind the good work done by the Pioneers in the early days to awaken our countrymen, and express our gratitude to them for showing them some light in the darkness that was engulfing the nation. Bal Gangadhar Shastri is undoubtedly one of those Pioneers. He had done much to earn the gratitude of his countrymen and he certainly deserves a place of honour in the gallery of the national heroes

that brightened the western horizon of India in the early days of the British rule by intellectual work and patriotic services.

I conclude this sketch after bowing my head in reverence to his hallowed memory.

NOTES ON THE USE OF FIRE APPLIANCES IN ANCIENT INDIA, GREECE AND ROME

By P. K. GODE

IN his *Technical Sciences and Arts of the Ancients*, Dr. Alburt Neuburger records some valuable information about ancient *Fire-Appliances*², the following points from which are note-worthy:

- (1) The real development in the technique of lighting and heating began when man acquired certain skill in making up fires by the use of fire-appliances.
- (2) The place and date of the origin of fire-appliances is lost in the obscurity of pre-historic ages.
- (3) Appliances which produced ignition by the friction of wood against wood are found among all the people of antiquity and even in pre-historic periods.
- (4) In the Homeric *Hymn to Herms* (108-114; See Sikes and Allen's Notes) we have a description³ of the fire-drill in a simple form.
- (5) Wood of the *laurel* was employed by the Greeks and Romans for a very long time for the purpose of ignition.

¹ Trans. by H. I. Brose, London (Methuen & Co.), 1930.

² Ibid. pp. 233—234.

³ This description reads as follows:—

“And he brought together much *wood* and sought after the art of fire. A fair bough of *laurel* he took and smoothed it to a point (?) with iron *and therewith drilled*, for well it fitted his hand, till a hot breath arose. Yea, Hermes first of all produced *fire sticks* and fire. And much *dry wood* he took; in a trench in the earth, in bundles (?) did he lay it in great abundance; and the flame gleamed, shooting forth after a jet of fire that is mickle of might.”

- (6) Pliny (XVI, 208) describes the method of making fire as follows:—

“Wood is rubbed on wood and this friction causes fire which is attracted to the dry tinder. There is nothing more suitable for this purpose than *ivy* and *laurel* the former to be rubbed and the latter to produce the rubbing. But *clematis* and other creepers have also answered the same purpose well.”

- (7) Other fire-appliances were also known to the ancients as follows:—

- (i) In Greece and Rome *steel* and *tinder* were used in combination with not only ordinary *flint* but also *pyrites* and other kinds of suitable stone. (*Pliny*, XXXVI, 138).
- (ii) Fire was made with the help of *concave mirrors* (composed of bronze and covered with silver foil) already known in 640 B. C.
- (iii) *Lenses* were made of *rock-crystal* or *glass* as has been proved by Layard's discovery in the palace of *Assur-nazir-pal* at Nineveh.
- (iv) *Aristophanes* (450—385 B. C.) says in his comedy THE CLOUDS (767) that a *burning lens*, such as strepsiadēs uses in order to rid himself of a debt of fine talents by melting a wax-tablet, is also used for lighting fire.
- (v) If the sacred flame went out in Rome it was ignited again, according to Plutarch, by means of *bronze or silver concave mirrors* or *burning lenses*.

- (vi) The burning lenses were sometimes made of *rock-crystal* (*Pliny* XXXVII. 28 and *Isidore*, XVI. 13).
- (vii) The story about Archimedes setting the Roman fleet on fire by means of concave mirrors at the siege of Syracuse is a myth as such an act was technically impossible.

In the above remarks on the fire-appliances of the ancients there is no reference to the ancient Indian fire-appliances, about which we get many references in Vedic and post-vedic literature.⁴

⁴ See Griffith's Trans. of *Rigveda* (Benares) 1896. Vol. I—Production of fire by attrition, pp. 14, 195, 342, 380—Vol. II. 1897—pp. 1, 201, 386, 389, 495, 559. In foot-note on p. 186 Griffith records *Sāyana's* reference to *Ātarcyā Brāhmaṇa* I. 16 which describes how the fire produced by friction from the two *araṇis* (fire-sticks) is thrown into the *Āharaniṇi* fire, in the *Atithyeṣṭi* ceremony—See also the note on p. 426 where reference is made to the *araṇis* of *Samī* and *Aśvattha* trees, which when rubbed together produce fire.

In the Index to the *Sacred Books of the East* (Oxford, 1910) there are many references to *Fire* (pp. 205 ff). I note a few of them as follows :—

- (1) *Fire produced by the two araṇis*—Vol. XV. 236 sq. (Upanisads).
- (2) *Churning the Fire*—Vol. XIX (Fo-sho-hing-tsan-King) pp. 161, 174, 302; Vol. XXVI (*Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*) pp. 90-92; Vol. XLII (*Ātharvaveda*) pp. 460 sq.; Vol. XLIV (*Śatapatha Br.*) p. 188; XLVI (*Vedic Hymns*) pp. 302—306;
- (3) *Means of producing Fire*—Vol. XX (*Vinaya Texts*) pp. 292, and 292n.; Vol. XXVII (*Texts of Confucianism*), p. 449 sq.; Vol. XXXV (*Mūlinda*) pp. 85, 85n.
- (4) *Producing the Sacred Fire*—Vol. VII (*Śatapatha Br.*) pp. 275, 292—95; 293 n., 294 sq. n., 311 sq., 389, 389 n.
- (5) *Two kindling sticks handed over to the sacrificer*—Vol. XXIX (*Gṛhya Sūtras*) pp. 265—8.
- (6) *Purāravas becomes a Gandharva by sacrificing with fire produced by two araṇis of the Aśvattha tree*—Vol. XLIV, 73 sq. (*Śatapatha Br.*).
- (7) *Rubbing of fire by two fire-sticks represented as an act of generation*—Vol. XLVI (*Vedic Hymns*), 302, 304 sq.

Agni *Vaiśrānara* is the fire of digestion in the bodies of living beings (*Bhagavadgītā* XV, 14). Accordingly in the *Caraka Saṁhitā* (*Sūtrasthāna* Chap. 27, अन्नपानविधि verse 342), we are told that this *agni* or fire is the very basis of life, health and strength provided it is kept constantly burning by food and drink, otherwise it dies out:—

(“बलमारोग्यमायुश्च प्राणाश्चान्नौ प्रतिष्ठिताः ।

अन्नपानेन्धनेश्चाग्निर्ज्वलति व्येति चान्यथा ॥३४२॥”)

Right kind of fuel in the form of food and drink should be supplied to this internal fire in proper proportions and at proper times and a person doing so for his own internal fire may be aptly called *āhitāgni*:—

(“हिताभिर्जुहुयान्नित्यमन्तरग्निं समाहितः ।

अन्नपानसमिद्भिर्ना मात्राकालौ विचारयन् ॥३४३॥

आहिताग्निः सदा पथ्यान्यन्तरग्नी जुहोति यः ।”)

What is true of human digestion and its basis the *antaragni* or internal fire is equally true of animal digestion. Accordingly in the celebrated treatise on the care and treatment of elephants called the *Hastyaūyurveda* of *Pālakāpya* (Pub. by the Ānandashram, Poona, 1894) we are informed that the internal fire or gastric fire in the case of elephants is situated at the navel of the elephant and from this basis it functions:—

Page 379:—

“अत ऊर्ध्वं प्रवक्ष्यामि वह्निर्यत्रावतिष्ठति ।

जाठरः, पृथिवीपाल, नाभावग्निः प्रतिष्ठितः ॥८३॥

सम्यक्पचति तत्रस्थमाहारं तु चतुर्विधम् ।

यथाग्निर्विपचेद्बाह्यो जलं स्थालीमदूषयन् ॥८४॥

दीप्तः सम्यक्परिक्लिन्नांस्तण्डुलानेवमेव तु ।

आमाशयविभागार्थं नाभ्यामग्निः प्रतिष्ठितः ॥८५॥”

(8) *Samidhs* (Kindling Sticks)—XII (*Śatapatha Br.*) 400 p. XLIV (*Śatapatha Br.*) 567.

(9) *Dhīṣṇas* or hearths—XXVI (*Śatapatha Br.*) 147—155, 148 n. etc.,

(10) Fire-pan (*ukhā*) XLI (*Śatapatha Br.*) 229—46 and XLIV, 579.

The close analogy between the internal fire or gastric fire (*antaragni* or *Jatharāgni*) and the external fire (*agni*) is brought home to our mind by the author of the *Hastya-gurveda* in the following extract :—

Page 316 :—

“अग्नेर्विवर्धमानस्य पानं भोजनमिष्यते ।

यथा हि⁵ मथनादग्निः स्वल्पोऽरणि⁶ समुत्थितः ॥

पूर्वं गोमयचूर्णेन ततस्तुणेन वै नृप ।

क्रमशस्तनुमिः काष्ठैः स्थूलैश्च तदनन्तरम् ॥

विवृद्धः स दहेद्दीप्तः काष्ठभारशतान्यपि ।

एवं गजानां विधिवच्छृणैरग्निरुदीरितः ॥

मुक्तं सर्वमशेषेण दहत्यग्निरिवेन्धनम् ।”

An elephant should be given drink and food as his appetite or *gastric fire* increases. We see in actual life how *fire*, churned out of the *fire-sticks* or *aragis* small as it is, increases, being fed first by cow-dung powder then by *grass*, then gradually by *small* and *great sticks*. In this increased form this fire blazes forth and being fed by hundreds of wooden sticks consumes completely every kind of fuel put into it. In a like manner functions the appetite or the gastric fire of the elephant, provided it is stimulated or kindled gradually.

The above passage is important for the history of Indian fire-appliances as it describes in a graphic manner the materials used for kindling the fire-spark produced

⁵ The passage “यथाहि इन्धनम्” is also found recorded in an earlier context on p. 314 of the *Hastya-gurveda* (A. S. S., 1894, Poona).

⁶ The *Sabdakalpadruma* (*Khandu* I, Calcutta, 1886, p. 93) records the following quotations about अरणि—

(i) “विपक्षवक्षोऽरणिमन्यनोत्थः

प्रतापवह्निरिव धूमलेखा”—इति धनञ्जयव्यायोगे ॥

(ii) “विधिना मन्त्रयुक्तेन रुक्षाऽपि मथिताऽपि च ।

प्रयच्छति फलं भूमिररणीव हुताशनम्”—इति पञ्चतन्त्रे

from the rubbing of the *arāṇīs* or fire-sticks, which are mentioned in early vedic texts. These materials are (1) dry cow-dung powder (2) grass (3) smaller wood sticks and (4) greater wood-sticks.

The vedic simile of the rubbing of fire-sticks as representing an act of generation is also repeated in the *garbhārakrānti* section of the *Hastyaūyurveda* (p. 412) as follows :-

“यथा ह्यरण्या ज्वलनं सूक्ष्मो यत्नेन दृश्यते ॥८६॥

एवं मैथुनयत्नेन जन्तोः शुक्रं हि दृश्यते ।”

In the *Aṣṭāṅgasāṅgraha* of Vāgbhata I (*Sūtra-sthāna* ed., by V. R. Kinjawadikar, Poona, 1940, p. 22) we find the analogy between *agni* and *jatharāgni* in the following instructions about ऋतुचर्या in the हेमन्त ऋतुः—

“देहोष्माणो विशन्तोन्तः शीते शीतानिलाहताः ।

जटरे पीडितोष्माणं प्रबलं कुर्वतेऽनलम् ॥११॥

In the *Cikitsāsthāna* (Ch. 12) of the *Aṣṭāṅgasāṅgraha* the importance of जाटराग्नि as the basis of life and strength is emphasized in the following line:—

“अग्निमूलं बलं पुंसां बलमूलं हि जीवितम्” ।

Human strength is based on appetite or *agni* and human life depends on strength.

In the *Aṣṭāṅgahrdaya* of Vāgbhata II (ed. by Harishastri Paradkar, Bombay, 1939) the importance of appetite or जाटराग्नि is mentioned in the following verses of the शारीरस्थान (p. 401):

“अन्नस्य पक्ता सर्वेषां पक्नुष्णामधिको मतः ।

तन्मूलास्ते हि तद् द्विचक्षुष्वृद्धिचक्षुष्यात्मकाः ॥७१॥

तस्मात्तं विधिवद्युक्तैरन्नपानेनैर्नैर्हितैः ।

पालयेत्प्रयतस्तस्य स्थितौ ह्यायुर्बलस्थितिः ॥७२॥

Of all fires, the fire that consumes food is superior (the commentator explains:—

“सर्वेषां पक्वः मध्ये योऽन्नस्य पक्ता पाचकः जाटराग्निः सोऽधिको मतः बलीयानभिप्रेतः” ।

The Vedic literature is full of references to the production of fire by the use of *araṇis* (fire-sticks). It appears, however, from the following extract in the *Pañcarātra* text called the *Jayākhya Samhitā* (c. A.D. 455 A.D.)⁷ that the ancient Indians knew three methods of producing fire viz. (1) Fire from *araṇis*, (2) Fire from a *Sūrya-Kānta* and (3) Fire from the friction of iron and stone:—

Page 137 (जयाम्ब्यसंहिता, ed., Embar Krishnamacharya G. O. Series, Baroda, 1931)—Chapter or Pāṭala 15 called अग्निकार्यविधान—(बह्वैः उत्पादनकमः)

“आदौ च भगवच्छ्रुतेर्वह्नेस्त्पादनाय च ॥५८॥

आदायारणिजं चाग्निं सूर्यकान्तोद्भवं तु वा ।

लोहपापाणजं वाऽथ अदुष्टं लौकिकं तु वा ॥५९॥

तैजसे ताम्रपात्रेऽमृण्मयेऽभिनवे तथा ।”

I have already recorded in this paper numerous references to the अरणिज fire but the references to the सूर्यकान्तोद्भव fire and the लोहपापाणज fire need to be collected and recorded. I am of opinion that the लोहपापाणज fire is that produced by the friction of लोह (iron) and पापाण (stone). This method of fire production (बह्वैः-उत्पादन) is still current in India in villages. In the Mahārāṣṭra the apparatus for this method is called चक्रमक which consists of (1) a piece of *flint*, (2) a piece of *steel* and (3) some dry *tinder*. This reference to the लोहपापाणजवह्नि of c. A. D. 450 is very important as it proves the antiquity of this method of fire-production in India corresponding to the use of *steel*, *tinder* and *flint*

⁷ Vide p. 34 of Dr. Bhattacharyya's foreword to the *Jayākhya-Samhitā*. Dr. Bhattacharyya observes :—

“ We shall not be far from the truth if we place the date of composition of the above work only on palaeographical grounds in about 450 A.D.”

for fire-production mentioned by Pliny (A.D. 79) in his *Natural History* (XXXVI, 138).

Some old references to the *सूर्यकान्तोद्भव* fire in sanskrit sources are as follows:—

(1) In the remarks on the *Vaiśrāṇara* fire in Yāska's *Nirukta*⁸ (VII, 23) the production of the terrestrial fire from the sun is described as follows:—

“Now (the following is the process of its production) from the sun. The sun having first revolved towards the northern hemisphere, a person holds a polished (piece of) white copper, or *crystal focussing the sun's rays* in place where there is some dry cow-dung, without touching it: it blazes forth, and this very (terrestrial) fire is produced.”⁹

(2) In Kālidāsa's *Sākuntala* (Act II, stanza 41) there is a reference to the production of fire from the *Sūryakānta* (Sun-crystal) as follows:—

“शमप्रधानेषु तपोधनेषु
गूढं हि दाहात्मकमस्ति तेजः ।
स्पर्शानुकूला इव सूर्यकान्ता-
स्तदन्यतेजोऽभिभवाद्वमन्ति ॥४१॥”

This passage refers to the consuming energy (fire) lying concealed in the *Sun crystals* but coming out when

⁸ Vide p. 125 of English Trans. of *Nirukta* by Dr. L. Sarup, Oxford University Press, 1921.

⁹ Dr. Sarup remarks:—“This shows that Yāska was familiar with the scientific law of the refraction of heat and light.” The text of *Nirukta* pertaining to the production of fire from the Sun reads as follows:—

“अथादित्यात् । उदीचिप्रथम-समावृत्ते आदित्ये कंसं वा मणिं वा परिमृत्त्य
प्रतिस्वरे यत्र शुष्कगोमयमस्पर्शयन् धारयति तत्प्रदीप्यते । सोऽयमेव सम्पद्यते”
(p. 144 of Text ed. by Sarup).

acted upon by the influence of other forces viz., the rays of the sun.

Monier Williams makes the following remarks on the above passage :—

“ It may be gathered from this passage that . . . a glass lens . . . may possibly have been known to the Hindus at the time when this play was written.”¹⁰

For further evidence on this topic see my paper on the *History of Spectacles in India*.¹¹

In the foregoing notes I have recorded only one reference to the production of fire by the friction of *flint* and *iron* (लोहपाषाणजं वह्निः) I shall feel thankful if the readers of this paper publish some more references to this method of producing fire especially in sources prior to A.D. 500.

¹⁰ (Page 75 of *Śākuntala* ed., by Monier Williams, Oxford, 1876).

¹¹ pp 52-54 of *Ātīhāsika Śaṅkīrṇa Nibandha*, Khaṇḍa I, B.I.S., Mandal, Poona, 1947).

POSITIVE DATA FOR THE DATE OF ŚABARASVAMIN*

By G. V. DEVASTHALI.

SINCE I wrote a paper¹ on the *Probable Date of Śabarasvāmin* (Ś.) for the *All-India Oriental Conference* at Hyderabad (Dn.) held in December, 1941 I have been continuing my studies of the *Bhāṣyas* of both Ś as well as Patañjali (Pat.); and though in the course of my studies I have come across various passages containing not merely similar ideas but even similar—nay, in some cases even identical—phraseology, yet I have not seen any reason why I should change the view about the date of Ś. as I have put it forth in the paper referred to above.

MM. Kane, however, has taken one statement made by me in the body of the above-mentioned paper and strongly objected to it implying thereby perhaps that the general conclusion arrived at there regarding the date of Ś. is also untenable.² The statement in question is: 'There appears to be no ground to suppose that Ś. was acquainted with Pat. and his work.' To show the futility of this statement MM. Kane quotes four passages from the *Bhāṣya* of Ś and points out that they are based on the *Mahābhāṣya* of Pat. and that in one of them at least Ś. has actually referred to Pat. in the term *Ācārya*. The four passages according to him are the most striking ones, though, he avows, there are a few more which

*Read at the Fourteenth Session of the All-India Oriental Conference held at Darbhanga (Mithilā).

¹ This paper is published in the *Silver Jubilee Volume of the Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Poona, pp. 84—97.

² See *Bharatīya Vidya*, Volume VI. Nos. 3 & 4 (New Series) pp. 43f.

may be relied upon for the purpose of proving that Ś. not only had Pat.'s *Mahābhāṣya* before him, but was even a close student thereof.³

Even taking for granted that the view propounded by MM. Kane regarding the passages quoted by him is right and that the conclusion arrived at by him on their strength stand scrutiny,⁴ I may declare that my suggestion regarding the probable date of Ś. yet remains unvitiated. In my above-mentioned paper I have stated that Ś. must have lived somewhere in the first century B.C.; and in support of this position I have adduced, several grounds among which absence of direct reference to Pat. is only one. It is now generally agreed that Pat. lived about 150 B.C., so that even if it is conclusively proved that Ś. knew Pat. and closely studied his work, yet my general conclusion that Ś. flourished about the first century B.C. can stand unvitiated. MM. Kane has conveniently avoided this main issue though it is apparent that he would not accept such an early date for Ś. as is vouchsafed for him by tradition and as again seems to be suggested by various circumstances, negative though they be, which I have put together more than five years ago.

I am quite aware of the danger of arguing from silence, of which MM. Kane seems to have made so much in his article; and that is exactly why I have not satisfied myself by securing only one, but have put forth several grounds which, as I have suggested in very clear terms, being only negative may not be conclusive of taken singly, but which when taken together may be strong enough to suggest at least a high probability in a certain

³ Loc. cit., pp. 43 and 45.

⁴ This I have discussed in a separate paper, where I have shown how the passages quoted by MM. Kane prove nothing definite; and how in one case at least MM. Kane has misunderstood the whole thing. In press.

direction, particularly when they all appear to point in the same direction. In spite of the note of caution sounded by MM. Kane against it, I still feel that *even argumenta ex silentio* have their own importance. They are certainly useful in showing us the probabilities which, however, to become facts—established positive facts—will certainly stand in need of some positive ground. Naturally, therefore in my above-mentioned paper I had merely pointed out the probability (and not certainty) regarding the date of Ś.; and left the issue there only to stand or fail in the light of any positive data that may be available. Now fortunately enough I have come across some positive ground which supports the probability regarding the date of Ś. as suggested by the negative data and turns it into an actuality. This I propose to set forth in the following lines.

It is well-known that there is a strong difference of opinion regarding the dissolution of such compounds as *aśva-ghāsa* between Kātyāyana (K.) on the one hand and Pat. on the other. The former would dissolve them all as Dative Tatpuruṣa which is not allowed by the latter who would take them as Genitive Tatpuruṣa compounds.⁵ Now it can be seen that there must have been a period when K. must have held the field in grammar and writers in various branches must have followed his views in dissolving such compounds. Nor is it very difficult to fix approximately the span of this period. There is a general consensus of opinion that K. flourished about 350 B.C. Assuming that about half a century might have been required by

⁵ Read: विकृतिः प्रकृत्येति चेत् अश्वघासादीनामुपसंख्यानम्। (वार्तिक 3 on अष्टाध्यायी II. 1. 36); and यदप्युच्यतेऽश्वघासादीनामुपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यमिति। न कर्तव्यम्। अश्वघासादयः षष्ठीसमासा भविष्यन्ति। etc. (पतञ्जलि's भाष्य on the above वार्तिक)

him to attain the position of a high authority (equal to or even higher than that of Pāṇini) in grammar we may conclude that K.'s influence in the field must have begun about 300 B.C. Now Pat. is dated about 150 B.C. so that arguing in a similar manner we may conclude that Pat. attained his present authority about 100 B.C. Thus the sway of K. in the field of grammar may be said to have extended approximately over two centuries between 300 B.C. and 100 B.C. And it must have been approximately about 100 B.C. that Pat. must have come to be ranked along with K. and Pāṇini—nay even higher than these stalwarts; for the traditional view about authorities on grammar in general and their mutual relation in particular is very well summed up in the two sayings: 'Trimuni vyākaraṇam' and 'Yathottaram muninām prāmāṇyam.' This supplies us with a strong and positive criterion for determining the dates of ancient authors like Ś. who flourished before the beginning of the Christian era. On the strength of this criterion we may conclude that those who follow the views of K. (even when they are not accepted or even directly rejected by Pat.) quite complacently may very well be said to have flourished about 100 B.C. at the latest; while those that follow Pat. against K. can undoubtedly be assigned to a date latter than about 100 B.C.

From a statement made by Vācaspatimiśra in his *Bhāmātī* we know that there was a period when commentators of the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa dissolved the compound brahma-jijñāsā as Dative Tatpuruṣa rather than Genitive Tatpuruṣa. Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* thereon has dissolved the compound brahma-jijñāsā as brahmaṇo jijñāsā i.e. Genitive Tatpuruṣa, commenting on which Vācaspati (V.) remarks that this should be understood as having thrown overboard the dissolution brahmaṇe jijñāsā i.e. Dative Tatpuruṣa adopted by ancient

commentators or Vṛttikāras on the *Brahmasūtra*.⁶ This clearly shows that V. had before him certain *vṛttis* on the *Brahmasūtras* wherein the expression *brahma-jijñāsā* was dissolved and explained as a Dative Tatpuruṣa compound rather than a Genitive Tatpuruṣa compound. Of the Vṛttikāras who have commented on the *Brahma-sūtras* we know of at least one viz. Baudhāyana,⁷ while we know of another Vṛttikāra who wrote a *vṛtti* on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* of Jaimini⁸ to be sure, if not also on the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa.⁹ Of these again the latter can't but be said to be earlier than the first century before the Christian era;¹⁰ and the same may fairly accurately apply to the other. Whether Śaṅkara really meant to throw overboard the dissolution adopted by the ancient Vṛttikāras we can't say; and yet an implication to that effect is there in the words of Śaṅkara as stated by V. whose statement thus makes it clear that there was a period when writers in other branches of literature dissolved the compounds like *brahma-jijñāsā* as Dative Tatpuruṣa in implicit obedience to the rule of K. and thus paying scant courtesy to the teaching of Pat. if at all they were aware of it. This action of theirs shows that they did not look upon Pat. as great authority on grammar which, in its

⁶ षष्ठीसमासप्रदर्शनेन प्राचां वृत्तिकृतां ब्रह्मणे जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति चतुर्थी-समासः परास्ती वेदितव्यः। (ब्रह्मसूत्र-शाङ्करभाष्य with भामती-कल्पतरु-परिमल (Nirnaya. Sagara Press Edition of 1917), p. 74)

⁷ Referred to by Rāmānuja in the very first sentence of his *Sri-bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*.

⁸ Often mentioned by Śabara in his *bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*.

⁹ Vṛttikāra's refutation of the Buddhistic view-point as given by Śabara in his *bhāṣya* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* I. i. 5 in what is generally known the vṛttikāra-grantha reads almost like a commentary on *Brahmasūtra* II. ii. 28—32.

¹⁰ For a discussion regarding the date of the Vṛttikāra (and also of Śabarasvāmin) see the article of K. Chattopadhyaya in *The Jha Commemoration Volume*.

turn, means that Pat. had not in their days attained that high position of authority which he is known to have attained and enjoyed for more than two thousand years. This can't but point to a period before about 100 B.C. as probable period in which the Vṛttikāras must have lived and composed their works.

Having thus discussed the nature and the application of the positive criterion thus available from the conflicting views on certain grammatical points held by K. on the one hand and Pat. on the other, let us now see how it helps us to fix the date of Ś. In the very beginning of his *bhāṣya* we find Ś. explaining the expression Dharma-jijñāsā occurring in the very opening *sūtra* of Jaimini in the following words: 'Dharmāya jijñāsā dharma-jijñāsā-Sā hi tasya jñātum icchā.' Here it would be evident to any unbiassed reader that Ś. has given us the dissolution of the compound expression in the first sentence and that in the second he has explained the term *jijñāsā*. Thus we see that Ś. has dissolved the compound *dharma-jijñāsā* as Dative Tatpuruṣa and not as Genitive Tatpuruṣa as he would have done had he known Pat.'s rule and had he had such great regard for him as to follow it. In fact Ś. seems to be so much unconcerned with the idea of any other way dissolving the compound that we doubt whether he was aware of any at all. But how-so-ever correct such a dissolution might appear to be to Ś., it was not so in the eyes of Kumārilabhaṭṭa and other commentators. The obvious reason for this difference of attitude in this matter as exhibited by Ś. on the one hand and his commentators on the other is to be found in the authority on grammar they followed. About Kumāṛila and his successors there can be no doubt that they followed literally the views of Pat. and it is, therefore, no wonder that they could not tolerate the idea that a Bhāṣyakāra like Ś. should have given the dissolution of

the expression *Dharma-jijñāsā* which was not in conformity with the teaching of Pat. In the day of Kumārila-bhaṭṭa any thing in the field of grammar that was not sanctioned or rather was denounced by Pat. was wrong, so that in the eye of Kumārila by giving the dissolution of the expression *dharma-jijñāsā* as a dative *Tatpuruṣa* Ś. would stand accused of having set at naught the *vyākaraṇa-smṛti*. This is more than what Kumārila would tolerate, and this explains why he is so anxious to show that Ś. has dissolved the compound in accordance with the correct view i.e. the view propounded by Pat. Thus it is that he tells us that the first of the two sentences quoted above is not intended to give the dissolution. For the dissolution is hinted at by Ś. in the next sentence while in the first he wants to show that the genitive in the dissolution has the sense of *tādārthya*.¹¹ Ingenious as this explanation is it has to be admitted that it is, to say the least, farfetched and on the face of it quite unnatural. Can we expect any commentator to explain the significance of the case in the dissolution before the dissolution is actually given? The most natural course to expect would be to have the dissolution first and the explanation of the significance of the case occurring therein only afterwards. But the fact in the present case is that Ś. is too far removed from the forces influencing Kumārila to be guided and governed by them. Kumārila, however, is blinded by these forces and can't see and appreciate any field which can be free from them. It is this that makes him unable to see how the dissolution of the expression *dharma-jijñāsā* as given by Ś. can be right though it certainly is at variance with the teaching of Pat. Ś. is as yet uninfluenced by Pat. and naturally, therefore, has followed the view that was current in his

day viz. the view of K. His commentators, however, being unconscious of this fact have exposed themselves to anachronism by forcing Ś. to follow the rules or views of Pat, though as a matter of fact he would have nothing to do with him.

In this connection it may be interesting to note some remarks¹² which Appaya Dikṣita (AD), the great polymath of the 17th century has made in his *Parimala* under *Brahmasūtra* I. i. 1. The *Kalpataru* there has merely quoted the relevant *vārtikas* of K.; and AD. has explained and discussed these fully in his *Parimala* and ultimately stated the view of the *Vārtikakāra* in the words: 'Evam aśvaghāśādiṣu caturthī-samāsa iti vārtikakāramatam.' A few lines below there again he states the view of Pat. also in this connection in the following words: 'Bhāṣyakāraiḥ khalu tatra vārtikam ullaṅghya yathāśru-tasūtram samarthayamānaiḥ ṣaṣṭhisamāsaḥ samāśritaḥ' more important still, however, for our purposes are the other remarks that he has made directly in connection with the explanation of the expression *dharma-jijñāsā* as given by Ś. in his *bhāṣya* and also as it has been understood by Kumārila in his *Śloka-vārtika*. Thus in very clear terms does AD. state that Ś. has adopted the dative *Tatpuruṣa* in dissolving the expression *dharma-jijñāsā* as *dharmāya jijñāsā*; and adds that in doing so he has followed the view of *vārtikakāra*. In equally clear terms again he explains the attitude of Kumārila towards the dissolution as given by Ś. saying: 'Idameva bhāṣyakāriyamatam anusṛtya bhātṭapādairapi dharmāya jijñāseti śabarasvāmivacanam' ṣaṣṭhisamāsalabdhārthikārthapradarśanaparam na tu vighrahapradarśanaparam tasya jñātum icchā iti nigamavākyaena ṣaṣṭhisamāsavibhāvanād iti vyākhyātam.'

¹² See *Brahma-sūtra-Sāṅkara-bhāṣya* with *Bhāmati*, *Kalpataru* and *Parimala* (Nirṇaya Śāgara Press Edition of 1917), p. 75.

In view of what has been stated above it may be seen that Ś. is definitely following the view of K. setting at naught that of Pat. even if, as some scholars avow it, he were acquainted with him and his work. This shows that Ś. did not look upon Pat. as an authority on grammar. Thus if at all Pat. lived at the time of Ś. and was his contemporary, he had not at that time attained any high authority in the field of grammar. This very fact is again suggested by some other circumstances which I have already referred to in my paper referred to in the very beginning here. Thus in his *bhāṣya*, Ś. has discussed some important grammatical point under *M.S.X. viii. 4* where he is discussing the construction of a negative sentence as *paryudāsa*. There the *pūrva-pakṣin* quotes the authority of K. in his support; while Ś. refutes his argument by saying that K. is an *asadvādin* and hence *apramāṇa* as against Pāṇini who is a *sadvādin*.¹³ Now here had Ś. really been acquainted with Pat. and his work, and regarded him as an authority on grammar he would certainly have quoted him and silenced the *pūrva-pakṣin* on Pat.'s authority. But the very fact that instead of doing so he has put forth the above argument shows that he did not know Pat. or that had he known him he was not prepared to look upon him as a great authority on grammar. In fact the attitude here shown by Ś. is so very dimetrically opposed to the traditional view viz.

¹³ अहं । नन्वनुयाजसम्बन्धे नशब्दस्य समासः प्राप्नोति । नित्यो हि नञ् शब्दस्य मुबन्तसम्बन्धेन समास इति वार्तिककारो भगवान् कात्यायनो मन्यते स्म । वाच्यनानर्थक्यं च स्वभाव-सिद्धत्वात् इति । नेति भगवान् पाणिनिः । स हि विभाषा इति प्रकृत्य ईदृशं समासमुक्तवान् । सद्वादित्वाच्च पाणिनेर्वचनं प्रमाणम् । असद्वादित्वान्न कात्यायनस्य । असद्वादी हि विद्यमानमप्यनुपलभ्य ब्रूयात् । तस्मात् पर्युदासः । (शबर on मीमांसा-सूत्र X.8.4.)

Here evidently Sabara takes Pāṇini as being more authoritative than Kātyāyana which is diametrically opposed to the traditional dictum 'Yathottaram munināṃ prāmāṇyam.'

trimuni vyākaraṇam and Yathottaram muṇinām prāmāṇyam that we cannot but conclude that Ś. lived at a time when the idea of the three munis of vyākaraṇa had not arisen at all.

The general conclusion now, therefore, that we can draw regarding the relation between Ś. on the one hand and Pat. on the other and regarding the date of the former is that Ś. shows no trace of the influence of the views propounded by Pat. and follows the views of K. only even when they have been denounced by Pat.; that if Pat. lived at the time of Ś. he was not at any rate looked upon as a great authority on grammar; and lastly that the latest limit for such a period can't be later than about 100 B.C. which may, therefore, be also accepted as the *terminus a quo* for the date of Śabaraśvāmin.

A TANTRIKA WORK OF VIDYAPATI

By DINESH CHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA

IT is very difficult to ascertain the exact religious persuasion of the great Maithila scholar Vidyāpati. In the devotional songs he is found to be a staunch Vaiṣṇava; in the *Śaivasarvasvāsāra* and some of the songs he appears to be a Śaiva. Perhaps ultimately, he will be regarded as a Śākta, whose outward conduct is governed by the well-known adage :—

अन्तः शाक्ताः. बहिः शैवाः. समायां वैष्णवा मताः।

नानारूपवराः कौलाः विचरन्ति महीतले॥

Vidyāpati's *Durgābhaktitarāṅgiṇī* is still counted as one of the authorised guide-books in Bengal for the performance of the greatest Śākta festival of the year—the Durgāpūjā. The latest discovery of a *Tāntrikanibandha* of Vidyāpati lends support to our surmise that he was really at heart a Śākta. The full story of this rare discovery is given below. In 1944 we examined a Ms. collection in a village named Bāhīrgāchi in the Nadia district which was the abode of a very distinguished family of scholars who were the spiritual preceptors of the Rajas of Navadvīpa. The collection was particularly rich in Tāntrika works. Among them we came across an anonymous book named *Tantrārṇava* (foll. 93 incomplete at the end), which was written about 1800 A. D. On the very first page the word Agama is explained by citing a rare passage from 'Vācaspati-Misra-dhṛta-*āgama-dvaitanirṇaya*.' We felt curious to ascertain if this rare Tāntrika book quoted as it appears by the great Maithila scholar Vācaspati Miśra has ever been referred to anywhere else. As luck would have it a fragment of

the very work was soon after discovered by us in a neighbouring village. Near Navadvīpa the metropolis of Sanskrit culture in Bengal stands a famous village named Vilvapuṣkariṇī or as it is called in common parlance Belpukur. Early in the 17th century A.D. Rāmacandra (of the Banerji family) successfully performed austerities in this village under the Śākta cult. His descendants, now scattered in many districts of Bengal, are the spiritual guides of high class Hindus initiated in the Tantra. Judging by the number of disciples Rāmacandra was by far the greatest Tāntrika saint of Bengal. His descendants still constitute the bulk of the inhabitants of Belpukur, but the book under question was discovered in the house of a Sanskrit scholar belonging to a different family though of the same original stock of the Banerjis. This family produced an unbroken line of distinguished scholars of the Dharmaśāstra.¹ The leaves of the Ms. in paper do not all bear page-marks, the total number of folios counting to be only 33. It begins:—

ससेव्यमानमृषिभिः सनकादिमुख्यैः ध्यानैकगम्यमजरं जगदादिहेतुम् ।
वेदान्तवेद्यमखिला × दमाग्रभूत-मेशं मही मनसि मे मुदमादधातु ॥१॥
नत्वा गोविन्दचरणौ श्रीमान् विद्यापतिः कृती ।
तनोति विदुषां प्रीत्यै स्वागमे द्वैतनिर्णयः ॥२॥

तत्रादौ ध्यागमप्रामाण्ये द्वैतनिर्णयः । आगमस्मृतीनां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धे श्रुतिमूलकत्वं ।
तथा तैत्तिरीयशास्त्रायां नारायणोपनिषदि × × × । किष्कायवर्षवर्षेण उपनिषद्भागे
रामपूर्वोत्तरत्तापनीये नृसिंहपूर्वोत्तरत्तापनीये च × × × ।

¹ The genealogical list is given below: Saṅkara (a descendant of Sarvānanda of the Vandyaghaṭṭya family)—Kamalākṣaṇṭha—Rāghavendra—Rājārāma Tarkasiddhānta & Sivarāma, Vācaspati and Kāśīśvara Sārvabhauma. Rājārāma's son Rāmarāma Nyāyavāgīśa—Balarāma Pañcānana—Tīturāma Tarkavāgīśa (born 1788 A.D. died c. 1850)—Aksaya Śiromani & Durgāprasanna Vidyaratana & Deviprasanna Smṛtibhūṣaṇa. Deviprasanna's son Śrī Amṛtyuhari Smṛtīrāma, the present worthy descendant of the family, is in possession of the Ms. collection and a few are

Several folios are missing after fol. 13b and the first section ends on the obverse of a page marked 'Ga' with the colophon:—

इति श्रीविद्यापतिविरचिते द्वैतनिर्णये पूजाद्वैतनिर्णयः प्रथमः परिच्छेदः।

There is a fuller colophon at the end of the next section on 'Puraścaraṇa' in an unmarked page:—

इति महामहोपाध्याय-उक्कुर-श्रीविद्यापतिविरचिते द्वैतनिर्णये पुरस्चरणद्वैत-निर्णयः (:) समाप्तः।

An alphabetical list of the authorities cited in the fragment is given below:

Kramadīpikā (fol. 3a)/ Kriyārṇava (4a)/ Kriyāsāra (often from 3a)/ Ciccandrikā (7a)/ Dīpikā (7a)/ Nārāyaṇīya (8b)/ Nārāyaṇopāniṣad (1b)/ Nṛsiṃhatāpanīya (1b)/ Padmapādācārya (10b)/ Puraścaraṇacandrikā (7b, 11a)/ Prapañcasāra (towards the end)/ Do-Ṭikā (ib.)/ Rāmatāpanīyā (1b)/ Rāmārcanacandrikā (4b, 6b)/ Vijnānamālā (Kha, 6a, 9a)/ Mantratāntrāprakāśa (end)/ Śambhuśekhara (4a)/ Sārasamuccaya (10a)/ Siddhināthasaṃhitā (end).

Two interesting passages are cited here:—

आषाढे पुत्रलाभाय श्रावणे पुत्रदो भवेत् इत्यादि तु वाक्यं प्रामादिकमत आषाढे पुत्र-नाशायेति पठनीयमनेकग्रन्थसमन्वयादिति। (fol. 4a under 'Dīkṣā')

चंद्रसूर्यग्रहे तीर्थे सिद्धभेदे सिद्धान्तये। मंत्रमात्रप्रकृत्यनुपदेशः स उच्यते॥ इत्यादि बहुषु शंभुशेखर-क्रियार्णवादिग्रन्थेषु दर्शनेन प्राह सत्यपरत्वादिति। (Ibid.)

In the following important passage the author refers to

grateful to him for allowing us to examine it. Balarāma was the author of *Sukhabodha* (a work on Jyotiṣa), *Kālībhaktitarāṅgiṇī* (a devotional poem) and an original text-book on Sanskrit grammar named *Prabodhāprakāśa* which was current in the locality. Titurāma was a distinguished Smārta and commented on Raghunāṇa's works besides commenting on the *Līṅga-saṅgrahavarga* of the *Amara-kōśa* and his father's grammar. The *Prabodhāprakāśa* was partly published with a Bengali translation by Deviprasanna in 1318 B.S. (pp. 120). Durgāprasanna, his pupil Deviprasanna (d. 1929 at 83) and the latter's eldest son Mrtyuñjaya Smṛtītīrtha (d. 1928) were leading scholars of the locality.

his own 'Sampradāya', implying that he actually belonged to a particular Tāntrika school of Mithila :—

साधकजन्मनक्षत्रमेव ग्राह्यं न तु तदीयनामाद्यक्षरनक्षत्रमित्यस्मत्संप्रदायः (4b).

. In two places (fol. 7a & 13a), moreover, he refers to the particular views of his own father (इत्यस्माकं पौत्रिकः पन्थाः)

In this connection we shall invite the attention of scholars to a much neglected work of Vidyāpati viz., the *Bhūparikramaṇa* of which a complete copy exists in the Ms., library of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta. It was written at Naimiṣa for the pleasure of king Devasiṅha of Mithila देवसिंहस्य हृदये v. 5 at the beginning) It describes the supposed itinerary of god Baladeva undertaken by him for expiating a sin. Vidyāpati commenced the work after saluting the Pañcādevatā (Gaṇeśa, Sāmba, Viṣṇu, Ravi & Ambikā). There are six sections in the book containing very important descriptions of all the famous shrines in the Drupadadeśa, Brahmāvarta, Mahāprayāga, Kāśīkṣetra, Siddhādeśa (with Balideśa) and Janakadeśa respectively. The itinerary is interspersed with eight tales all of which were subsequently incorporated in the first chapter of the *Puruṣaparīkṣā*. The very first deity worshipped by Balarāma was 'Kālī Mahāmāyā' in the Drupadadeśa. Curiously enough at the end of the above Ms. of the book the scribe has recorded the date of composition, not of the *Bhūparikramaṇa* but of the *Puruṣaparīkṣā* thus :—(fol. 50a).

मुनिवेशरामबाणशशिवत्सरे संख्यके गते ।

पुंसां परीक्षणवृत्तिं चक्रे मूपस्य बाणया ॥

The date unfortunately is difficult to interpret. Even if we read विराम and refer the year 1507 to the Vikrama Samvat (i.e., 1450 A.D.) the date is perhaps too late for Śivasinha in whose reign the book was composed. The scribe it should be noted was careless in his work and copied the book about 1800 A. D.; he has recorded the date

of composition of one book at the end of quite a different book. Nevertheless he was evidently in possession from unknown sources of the genuine date of composition of the *Puruṣaparīkṣā*. As he has carelessly transposed the two words of the verse 'vatsare' and 'sāṅkhyake', so we believe he also transposed the two words of the date 'rāma' and 'bāṇa' and the correct reading should be:—

मुनिबाणरामशशिसंख्यके वत्सरे गते ।

If this emendation is accepted we have got here a clear date for Vidyāpati and his patron Śivasinha viz. 1357 Śaka (i.e., 1435-6 A.D.). It should be noticed that Vidyāpati commenced the *Puruṣaparīkṣā* with a prayer to the supreme Goddess 'ADISHAKTI,' pointing clearly to his religious faith in Śākta doctrines.

The *Bhūparikramaṇa* is the source of a number of so-called geographical works in Sanskrit, which came to be written early in the British regime by most unscrupulous writers. The *Brahmakhaṇḍa* of the *Bhaviṣya-Purāṇa*, the *Deśāvalīvivṛti* and the *Digvijayaprakāśa* (otherwise called *Pāṇḍavavijaya*) are well known works of this class. They are full of the most unreliable concoctions of stories, traditions and geographical names, though couched in the sacred language they succeeded in attracting the notice of a section of scholars. Some genuine traditions may, however, find place in these works, specially those connected with the region of the writers. We quote below a long extract from the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa*, where a very interesting account of Vidyāpati and his family is narrated. It was discovered by us in a big Ms. now preserved in the Sanskrit College, Calcutta; it was wrongly added to a different book after obliterating the original page-marks.

“मांगरोणि”-पूर्वभागं योजनद्वयव्यत्यये ।

“उच्चितप्रानो” युगादी च प्राकट्यं प्राप्स्यति ध्रुवम् ॥

आगमभूषण-द्विजः कश्चित्त्वडंगवेदपारगः ।
 वीरभावसमापन्नो वामाचाररतः सदा ।
 आद्यादेव्याः स्थापनं च करिष्यति हि मंदिरे ।
 उचितग्रामलोकानां सदा कल्याणकारिणी ॥
 वेदवर्षसहस्रेषु पञ्चवर्षशतेषु च ।
 आगमभूषणगोत्रेषु चाशो × × × द्विजाः ॥
 विद्यापतिर्ब्रह्मणश्च सिद्धः परमवार्तिकः ।
 मासे त्रयोदशे पूर्णे गर्भादिभूमौ पतिष्यति ॥
 सर्वलक्षणसंपूर्णः प्रायः शुक्रसमः स च ।
 तैरभुक्तस्य देशस्य चालंकारो हि स द्विजः ॥
 अल्पकाले स बालश्च कुशाग्रीयमतिर्महान् ।
 विद्याभ्यासं दिवारात्रौ निरालस्यः करिष्यति ॥
 काव्यादिशास्त्रे प्रवीणः कैशोरे मुनिसत्तमाः ।
 दयावर्मयुतश्चैव माधुर्यरसपारगः ।
 विद्यापतिं तस्य नाम कीर्तयिष्यन्ति मानवाः ॥
 आद्यादेव्याः प्रसादेन कवितारचनेषु च ।
 सिद्धत्वं यास्यति मुदा विद्यापतिर्महत्तमः ॥
 अनायासेन भूदेवा विद्यापतिमुल्लाब्धतः ।
 गद्यपद्यमयी वाणी निःसरिष्यति शोभना ॥
 शृंगाररसवक्ता च वाक्दूकः स पंडितः ।
 विद्यापतिसमो नैव भावी च तैरभुक्तके ॥
 तैरभुक्तप्रदेशे स उचितग्राममध्यतः ।
 आद्या(6a)देवीप्रसादेन सशरीरो गमिष्यति ॥
 तैरभुक्तजनाः सर्वे कलिशेषावधिद्विजाः ।
 विद्यापतिसिंयशो गास्यन्ति च मुदान्विताः ॥

In this curious account there are certain facts which seem to be hitherto unknown. The ancestral village of Vidyāpati is stated to be 'Uciṣāgrāma' and the family went by the name of a distant ancestor ĀGAMABHÜ-ṢAṆA who was initiated in the Vīra cult of the Tantra. Vidyāpati himself is stated to have attained Siddhi in Tāntrika rites which was the real cause of his poetic powers. He was born, besides, in the 13th month after conception—another extra-ordinary incident in the life of an extra-ordinary man. How far these facts are cor-

roborated by local traditions we invite scholars of Mithila to investigate. The account, however, vouches for the fact that Vidyāpati belonged to a Tāntrika family of renown and our previous surmise about the poet's religious persuasion is substantially corroborated thereby. The date recorded in this account in round numbers of the Kali era (4500 K. E. corresponding to 1399 A.D.) like all such dates in these geographical works should not be taken seriously, though in the present case the date is not wide off the mark.

A NOTE ON RĀSO

By SIBENDRANATH GHOSAL

THERE is much dispute among scholars as regards the origin and true significance of the word 'Rāso' which at present stand for a big heroic poetry. Prof. Narottam Swāmin quotes several suggestions of different scholars in his article "*Pṛthwīrāj Rāso*" in a volume of the *Rajasthan Bhāratī*. But he does not support any of these suggestions. To cite him exactly

फ्रांसीसी विद्वान् तासी ने उसकी उत्पत्ति राजसूय शब्द से मानी। रामचन्द्र शुक्ल उसे रसायण का अपभ्रंश मानते हैं। अन्य कई विद्वान् उसे रहस्य से बना बताते हैं। वास्तव में ये सब कल्पनाएँ मात्र हैं। रासो का मूलशब्द रास या रासक है। रासक का अपभ्रंश और प्राचीन राजस्थानी में रासउ हुआ ⁽¹⁾ ॥

R. Bh. Bhāg 1, Aṅka 1. P. 2.

Mm. Haraprasad Śāstrī has also discussed it cursorily in his preliminary report on the search for bardic manuscripts in Rājaputāna which indicates well how the subject was a pivot of discussions among the different scholars interested in the proto—vernacular studies. So Mm. Śāstrī observes "The derivation of the word Rāso is extremely perplexing. Mm. Pandit Vindhyaśwari Prsād Dube of benares thinks that it is 'Rāja Yaśāḥ.' In prakrit j becomes y. and would become 'Rāya Yasaḥ' and later 'Rāyasā.' The bards derive it either from 'rāsa' or sport or rāsā that is quarrel. A prolonged altercation is often called Rāsā in Rajputānā. 'Kyā rāsā kurte ho' is often

¹ The French scholar Tassi thinks its origin to be the word 'Rājasūya.' Mr. Ram Chandra Sukla considers it to be a corrupt form of Rasūyana, while some other scholar holds that it comes from the word Rahasya. But, in fact, these are mere imaginations. The origin of Rāso is Rāsa or Rāsaka. In Apabhramśa and old Rājasthāni Rāsaka appears as Rāsau.

remarked when a man is talking for a long time on one subject. There is among the Jains a large number of works called 'rāsā'. My friend Mr. K. P. Jaysawāl thinks that 'rāsā' is connected with the sense 'problem' 'mystery'. In Brajabhāṣā 'rahasya' becomes rāsā." *Baradic Mss. Survey Report*, p. 25. We are of the opinion that 'Rāso' comes certainly from Rāsaka or Rāsa (without the pleonastic ka), as it has been suggested by Prof. Narottamdas Swāmin. But as he did not say anything about the meaning of Rāsa or Rāsaka and its connection with the present heroic poetry 'Rāso' we like to give some suggestions as to how there occurred an evolution in the meaning of the word. As it is yet to be substantiated by other facts the scholars are to judge it and pass their verdicts.

2. In the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* of Viśwanatha 'Rāsaka' has been explained as a form of Uparūpaka. He defines it in the words :—

रासकं पञ्चपात्रं स्यान्मुखनिर्वहणान्वितम् ।
भाषाविभाषाभूयिष्ठं भारतीकैशिकीयुतम् ॥
असूत्रधारमेकां सवीथ्यङ्गं कलान्वितम् ।
श्लिष्टतान्दीयुतं ख्यातनायिकं मूर्खनायकम् ॥
उदात्तभावविन्यास-संश्रितं चोत्तरोत्तरम् ।
इह प्रतिमुखं सन्धिमपि केचित् प्रचक्षते ॥

Chap. VI.

It should be examined in this concern, whether this particular form of Uparūpaka has any connection with the 'Rāsa' or 'Rāsaka' and the heroic poetry 'Rāso' of the present days. Needless to mention that it will throw some light on the trend of Apabhraṃśa poetry and some aspect of mediaeval Indian culture.

3. The word 'Rāsa' signifies originally the dance of Kṛṣṇa with the Gopa-maids in an autumnal moon-lit night. It is also called Hallīśa and in the old texts like *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* and the *Harivaṃśa*

reference to such a dance either by the particular name 'Rāsa' or 'Hallīśa' occurs. It is interesting to note that in none of these works we find any mention of the chief Gopi—maid Rādhā who occupied a very important place in the Kṛṣṇa legend in the posterior period. In the later days far more minute details on the 'Rāsa' dance of Kṛṣṇa have appeared in the various Vaiṣṇava texts. Prof. Sukumar Sen has made the following observations in his "*History of Vrajabuli Literature*"—Kṛṣṇa's nocturnal dance with the cowherd damsels is called Hallisa elsewhere it is Rāsa. . . . There is a fair similarity in the descriptions of the 'Hallisa' or 'Rāsa' dance in these two works. One verse [*Harivaṁsa* ii. 20, 24, *Viṣṇupurāṇa* V. 13. 57.] is common in both p. 473. It (*Padmapurāṇa*) also describes the plan of the 'Rāsa Maṇḍala' and seats therein occupied by Kṛṣṇa, Rādhā and their friends, male and female." (*Pātāla-Khaṇḍa* 38, 39. XXIII. p. 474.) We suppose, and possibly correctly too, that this Rāsa or Rāsaka (with the pleonastic *Ka*) used particularly in the sense of Kṛṣṇa's dance is the source of the modern 'Rāso' poetry. It is certainly connected with the 'Rāsaka drama' of the '*Sāhityadarpaṇa*' and we think that some discussions are necessary to show the process—the line of change, which the word 'Rāsa' underwent in the evolution of its meaning.

4. As we have already mentioned, the term 'Rāsa' signified Kṛṣṇa's dance which was certainly a passionate expression of erotic sentiments and feelings. Sometimes later, however, the range of its scope widened and the word meant not only mimic dance but also the music which accompanied it. The latter's application was unavoidable, as its appeal to the sensual nature of man was irresistible. Here the two-fold divisions as regards its gradual change took place as emphasis was laid separately

on the music and the dance element of the phenomenon. The dance element gave rise to the improvisation of the drama, where the movements of the body were the most essential components. Here Prof. Macdonell's observation on the 'origin of drama' in general should be remembered "The words for actor (nāṭa) and play (nāṭaka) are derived from the verb 'naṭ' the Prakrit or vernacular form of skt 'nṛt' to dance. The name is familiar to English ears in the form of nautch, the Indian dancing of the present day. The latter indeed probably represents the beginnings of the Indian drama. It must, at first, have consisted only of rude partsmime, in which the dancing movements of the body were accompanied by mute mimicking gestures of hand and face. Song, doubtless also formed an ingredient in such performances. The addition of dialogue was the last step in the development which was thus much the same in India and Greece." *Hist. of Skt. Lit.* p. 346-7. As the very origin of the drama presupposes dance the graceful movements of the limbs, it is quite likely that a particular name should be assigned to a particular class, which shows the exuberance of the same, or some other element of kindred nature. The very definition of the Rāsaka drama as given in the '*Sāhityadarpaṇa*' certainly testifies to the truth of our statement. In the definition already quoted an expression occurs as 'कलान्वितं' which a commentator explains as "कला-नृत्यादिकं चतुःषष्टिप्रकारं तथा अन्वितं"—Jivānanda Vidyāsagar's edition. p. 526. So, we need not doubt that in the Rāsaka drama there was a predominance of dance, which originally meant 'Rāsa' i.e. the dance of Kṛṣṇa. It should be incidentally mentioned that similar occurrence has taken place in the conception of the 'Hallīśa' form of drama. Kṛṣṇa's dance with the Gopa-maids was also, sometimes, called 'Hallīśa' or Hallīśaka (vide Prof. Sukumar Sen's observations). This

Hallīśa or Hallīśaka was certainly at the root of the conception of the Hallīśa drama which has been defined in the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* as “हल्लीशं एव एकांकः सप्ताष्टौ दश वा स्त्रियः । बागुदात्तैकपुरुषः कैशिकीवृत्तिसंकुलः । मुखान्तिमो तथा सन्धी बहुताललयस्थितिः ॥” and where, too, dance occupied a very prominent place. It should be observed in this connection that ‘Rāsaka’ drama was considerably of later origin, since it contained besides Sanskrit the derived languages like ‘Bhāṣās’ and ‘Bibhāṣās’ i.e. the Prakrits and the *Apabhraṃśas*. So, we think, we are possibly correct in assuming ‘Rāsa’ i.e. Kṛṣṇa’s dance to be the source of the Rāsaka drama. But we would have had our view confirmed had any work of this particular type been in our possession. We are really very sorry to mention that the dramas which belong to the Rāsaka and Hallīśaka classes are totally lost. So the works, which are mentioned in the *Sāhitya-darpaṇa* as illustrations to those two different types of drama are at present mere names to us.

5. It now remains for us to show the link—the intermediate stages between “Rāsa dance” and the “Rāso poetry.” We have already suggested that music followed dance, which to a great extent, enhanced the poignancy of the sentiments intended to be expressed. In course of time, music lost its tune and lyric songs changed to lyric poems which had mostly the descriptions of love, nature and the seasons as their themes. In the ‘*Śandeśa Rāsaka*’ of Abdur Rahmān a muslim poet we find, thus, very charming descriptions of the feeling of love in its different settings and in them follows, as a course of necessity, the portrayal of nature which has a great influence on the minds of the lover and the beloved. But at this time, an emphasis is perceived to be stressed on the element of ‘character’ or ‘characters’ centring whom the delineation of the feeling takes place. Afterwards, the change of political atmosphere, the overthrow of the

Hindu kings by the muslim invaders, the formers' dogged resistance to the attacks of the latter altered the trend of 'Rāsaka' poetry too. It was captured as a most suitable form for describing the heroic activities and legends of the warriors, 'whose fearless death in the field and self-sacrifice for the honour of the land needed commemoration for inspiring courage into the hearts of the posterior generations. So, henceforth, the heroic tales and legends became chiefly the subject-matter of the Rāsaka or Rāso, though the element of love was not totally neglected or lost sight of. It is substantiated too by the following remark of Babu Shyam Sundar Das and Pandit Ram Chandra Sukla.

“जैसा कि योरोप में वीरगाथाओं का प्रसंग युद्ध और प्रेम रहा वैसे ही यहाँ भी था। किसी राजा की कन्या के प्रेम का संवाद पाकर छल-बल के साथ चढ़ाई करना और प्रतिपक्षियों को पराजित कर उस कन्या को हर कर लाना वीरों का गौरव और अभिमान का काम माना जाता था। इस प्रकार थोड़ा शृंगार का मिश्रण भी इन काव्यों में रहता था पर गौण रूप से प्रधान रस वीर ही रहता था²”

नागरी-प्रचारिणी पत्रिका

भाग ९ संवत् १९८५

The remark is made with reference to the Prabandha type of poem, to which '*Prithwirāja Rāso*' and other works of similar nature do certainly belong. So we think, we are correct to assume that the Rāso poetry of the vernacular is connected with 'Rāsa' i.e. Kṛṣṇa's dance and the latter is the source of the former as well as the Rāsaka type of drama which we have already discussed.

² As in Europe the subject-matters of heroic ballads were war and love, so here, too, were the same. It was surely a glory and pride on the parts of the heroes to hear the falling in love of some Princess and to obtain her by taking to some contrivings or having defeated the adversaries who stood for her protection. So in these poems there is some blending of the feeling of love, which is merely subservient, the chief sentiment is, no doubt, heroism.

Proceedings of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute Annual General Meeting (April 9, 1949)

The Annual General Meeting of the *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* was held on Saturday April 9, 1949 in the Balrampur Hall of the Hindu Boarding House. Dr. Amaranatha Jha, M.A., D.Litt., LL.D.; F.R.S.L., Vice-president of the institute, presided. Beside the members, the following guests were present, Hon. Mr. Justice Waliullah, acting Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court, Hon. Mr. Justice Wanchoo, Hon. Mr. Justice Bindbasni Prasad, Hon. Mr. Justice Raghubar Dayal, Mr. Kripa Narain, executive officer, Municipal Board, Brigadier Jayal, Mr. Krishna Murari Lal of the Board of Revenue, Prof. K. R. R. Sastry, Raja of Sangali, Prof. S. J. Joshi and many others.

Dr. Amaranatha Jha:—"I owe you an apology for occupying the chair. We have lost our president and the other vice-president. Dr. Radhakrishnan is not present. That is the explanation for my occupying this Chair. Before we take up other items on the agenda, I shall read out to you a resolution expressing our sense of grief and loss at the passing away of our President Dr. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. What the institute owed to Dr. Sapru it is impossible to describe. Right from the beginning he gave to the idea of the scheme all the support and encouragement that he could and at every step we received inspiration from him. He took the most lively interest in this work and we shall long remember and not forget all that he did for this organisation.

The whole country mourns the passing away of a great statesman, a learned jurist, a great lawyer. But we of this Institute mourn in particular the passing

away of one who was genuinely devoted to oriental learning.

I read out this resolution and request you to kindly, pass it standing."

"The Institute places on record its sense of profound grief and loss at the demise of its President, Dr. Tej Bahadur Sapru. It is impossible to assess the services rendered by him to the Institute from its very inception, with the rest of the country it mourns the passing away of an eminent statesman, great lawyer and a learned jurist; but in particular we shall miss the safe guidance of one who was genuinely devoted to oriental studies.

The Institute conveys its respectful condolences to the Hon. Mr. Justice Sapru and other members of the bereaved family."

Resolution—

The resolution was adopted, the audience standing.

Welcome to H. E. Shri M. S. Aney

Dr. Amaranatha Jha :—"It is now my pleasant duty to offer on behalf of the Institute a respectful welcome to His Excellency the Governor of Bihar. We welcome him not because or mainly because he is the head of a neighbouring province, but welcome him particularly as a great scholar who has for many years devoted a great deal of his time to oriental studies.

At the last All India Oriental Conference held a few months ago, he read a paper which impressed every one by his profound learning and wide outlook. A few days ago he presided over the annual meeting of the Bihar Research Society in Patna and we are extremely beholden to him for the trouble he has taken to come to our annual meeting. I am sure that many like me are eagerly looking forward to his address.

But before I request His Excellency to deliver his address we have yet to go through a few formal items of business which, I assure you, will not take more than a few minutes.

Election of the new President

Dr. Amaranatha Jha:—I take the opportunity subject to the approval of the members of the Institute of proposing the name of Dr. Bhagavan Das of Benares for President of the Institute in place of Dr. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.

Dr. Umesha Mishra seconded the proposal. The resolution was adopted unanimously.

Dr. Umesha Mishra, the Honorary Secretary of the Institute, presented the annual report for the year 1947—48.

Pandit K. Chattopadhyaya proposed and Dr. Ishwari Prasad seconded the motion that the report be adopted.

It was agreed to unanimously.

Government grant of Rs. 15,000.

At this stage Dr. Amaranatha Jha informed the members that the Education Minister of these Provinces told him that the Government had been pleased to sanction Rs. 15,000 towards the building of this institute.

Dr. A. Siddiqui, Honorary Treasurer, then presented the estimated budget for 1949—50 and the audit report for 1947—48. (Printed elsewhere).

Dr. Ishwari Prasad proposed and Pt. K. Chattopadhyaya seconded that the budget estimates and the audit report be adopted and they were adopted unanimously.

Dr. Amaranatha Jha: I now request your Excellency to deliver your address.

Thereupon His Excellency delivered his address which is printed elsewhere.

Vote of Thanks: Proposing a vote of thanks to His Excellency Dr. Ishwari Prasad said—Your Excellency and gentlemen, I have received a command from the Chairman which cannot be disobeyed. It is now my pleasant duty to propose a hearty vote of thanks to Your Excellency. We are deeply grateful to you for the kindness that you have shown in coming to our meeting to deliver this address in spite of your busy engagements. Usually it does not fall to the lot of a Governor to be a very learned man, because I consider as nothing more damaging to the cultural scholarship than practical politics. But Your Excellency is an extraordinary man. In spite of the work-a-day politics, in spite of the numerous engagements of daily life you have kept alive the torch of learning and you have taken a keen interest in it.

We had in these provinces, many years ago, a Governor who was the first Chancellor of this university, a great Sanskrit scholar who possessed great learning. He used to write articles under the pseudonym of Vasudeva Sastri and these articles were published under the title of 'Asiatic Studies.' Usually we do not find many Governors taking interest in researches. But it is very heartening to think that Your Excellency takes so much interest in learning and the advancement of scholarship.

We have listened to a comprehensive survey of Indian culture and learning that you have placed before us. As a History man I am delighted to listen to the history of Balgangadhar Sastri and Indian scholarship and Indian learning. You have spoken of great men and great scholars, who have shed the splendour of their genius over this country. We are all grateful to them. We are grateful to Your Excellency for giving this address this afternoon.

This institution has been founded to commemorate the name of a distinguished scholar who devoted every minute of his life to learning. Those who have come in contact with the late Pandit Ganganatha Jha will remember that he was always engaged in studying and writing. He dedicated his life to the pursuit of learning. This he continued from the day he left his college to the day of his death. It was a great life and I hope that the Institute which has been founded to commemorate his name will send out in the world a stream of scholars which will flow uninterrupted like waters of the Ganga and the Yamuna and the researches in which they engaged themselves will enhance the reputation of not only the Institute but of the whole province.

Your Excellency has referred to one thing which touched me deeply and that is the poverty of scholars in the past. Those were times quite different from the times in which we are living. It is a pity that scholars do not find it possible to live up to those great traditions of our ancestors in ancient India. A Brahmin who accepted payment was condemned.

I hope Your Excellency will influence those who are entrusted with the government of this country to give every encouragement to scholarship and learning. In the din and bustle of politics the claims of higher learning are very much neglected and forgotten. I hope all those who are engaged in scholarship and learning will receive due recognition from our statesmen and legislators. The great countries in Europe have become famous not because of their armed power but because of their scholars profound in their learning and researches. It is necessary for the State to give all encouragement to them. Politics is not the be-all and end-all of life. Nations become great by enriching the mind of their people. The task which this Institute has set before itself, namely, the ad-

vancement of the culture of India, is very great, and unless sufficient funds are placed at its disposal it will not be able to discharge its duty efficiently. We are deeply grateful to Your Excellency for the kindness you have shown in coming here and delivering your address which I hope will long be remembered.

One word more and I have done. This is a distinguished audience of High Court judges and lawyers. High Court judges are always learned and members of the bar are also learned. There are University professors and other learned men who have honoured us by their presence. As a member of the Executive Committee of the Ganganatha Research Institute I offer them my heartfelt thanks. Let me once again thank Your Excellency for the kindness you have shown in coming here to deliver this address.

There being no other business the meeting was declared closed.

Income and Expenditure Account of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Allahabad for the year 1947-48

EXPENDITURE		INCOME	
	Rs. a. p.		Rs. a. p.
General Expenditure account	...	Donation a/c	...
Already spent	...	Life membership a/c	...
Due for March 1948	...	Annual membership a/c	...
	...	Benefactor a/c	...
	...	Interest a/c	...
	...	Sales a/c	...
Total	1,837 3 0		...
General Postage account
Journals account
Research Scholarship account
Surplus of Income over Expenditure
Total	12,374 7 0	Total	12,374 7 0

Balance Sheet at 31st of March 1948

LIABILITIES		INVESTMENT AND ASSESSMENT	
	Rs. a. p.		Rs. a. p.
Due Expenditure	...	Loan a/c	...
Surplus of Income over	...	Loan paid off	...
Expenditure on 1st April 1948
Surplus of Income over Expenditure for 1947-48
	...	Almrahas a/c	...
	...	Securities a/c	...
	...	National P O Savings Certificate a/c	...
	...	Cash at Bank	...
	...	Cash in hand	...
	...	Suspense a/c	...
Total	1,45,196 0 7	Total	1,45,196 0 7

(Sd.) M. SARAN
Hony. Auditor

(Sd.) A. SIDDIQI
Hony. Treasure

(Sd.) UMESHA MISHRA
Hony. Secretary

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GANGANATHA JHA
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ALLAHABAD FOR
1947—48

ON behalf of the Executive Committee of the *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* I place before the Annual Meeting of the General Council of the Institute a Report of its activities for 1947-48. During the year under review individual efforts continued to be made to raise funds. Due to the serious illness of the President, the rt. hon. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, his valuable help and guidance could not be secured. The non-recurring grant of Rs 2,990/- from the U. P. Government did not help us to expand our activities to any appreciable extent. It is gratifying to note that the Bihar Government has been pleased to donate a sum of Rs. 5,000/- for which we are very thankful. We are also very thankful to our Vice-President Dr. Amaranatha Jha who has continued to give us a Research scholarship and has secured donations amounting to Rs 7,500/- during the period under review. Due to continuous labour trouble in the Press we could not publish earlier Sanskrit Documents, the first publication of the Institute. Its printing has now been complete and I hope the book will be published very soon. It is due to the Press trouble again that the publication of our Research Journal is so much delayed. Efforts are, however, being made to bring it up to date before long.

The Members are aware of the various schemes which the Institute has got before it, but at present our first necessity is to have a building of our own. All our efforts are, therefore, directed towards the construction of a

portion of it as early as possible in order to shift our Library and the Office from the Hindu Boarding House where the Institute has been located for the last several years. It is not possible to expand our activities any more without a building. We have approached the Central and the Provincial Governments for a special grant for the building, and we hope the response will be quite satisfactory. But it is also a fact that we cannot entirely depend upon the Government grants. I draw the attention of generous donors, scholars and those interested in Indology towards the importance of having a full-fledged Institute of Indology well-equipped with an up-to-date library containing books in print and also in manuscripts with highly qualified research scholars working in calm and quite atmosphere for the advancement of higher researches in Indology. Without their sympathy and substantial financial help it will not be possible to equip the Institute in all its aspects. We know of no such Institutions which have grown without public help and we trust they will do their best to make this Institute worthy of its name.

MEMBERSHIP

The total number of Ordinary Members of the Institute on the 1st of January 1949 was 84 as against 96 of the previous year. The number of Life-members is 82 as against 80 of the last year. The number of Benefactors, however, is 19 as against 12 of the previous year. The total number of all the members of the Institute at present is 208. We have lost one life member during the year. The names of some of the Ordinary members have been dropped from the list for non-payment of their subscription for more than a year and those of a few others because their address could not be traced in Pakistan.

MEETINGS

There were two meetings of the Executive Committee this year. Most of the other business was transacted by correspondence.

PUBLICATIONS

During the year under review we have published parts 3 and 4 of Vol. IV and parts 1 to 3 of Vol. V of our Quarterly Research Journal containing about 541 pages. We are doing our best to bring it up-to-date, but the constant Press trouble has always come in our way to achieve the end. The publication of the Sanskrit Documents is now almost ready and before long we shall be able to place it in the hands of our scholars. We have selected some rare works for publication and if funds permit we shall take up some of them for publication in near future.

More than fifty books have been received free during the year for review in the Journal. All of them have been placed in the library after they have been reviewed. Besides, we have purchased some books for the use of our research scholars. The manuscript section has been enriched to a large extent. Over one thousand manuscripts have been classified and arranged under separate covers. But many more are still lying in loose pages; those are also being gradually arranged. A research scholar has been engaged to complete the work of cataloguing of printed books.

We have added some more research Journals to our exchange list. Through the courtesy of the editors of the various Journals we have been able to complete the sets of several of them.

This is in brief the survey of the work done during the course of the year under review. I had placed all our needs before the members in the last report. But just at present I want to emphasise the immediate need of having

a well equipped and suitable building for the Institute. We are spending over Rs. 15,000/- for the construction of a portion of it only. But if we get sufficient funds we shall be able to construct the rest of the building also. Besides, we need very badly funds for research scholarship. Just at present we have only two. But there is a great need for many more. We should not forget that we are far behind in research work done in original sources. All this needs encouragement and financial help from generous donors. The members of the Institute are reminded that it is also one of their duties to make personal efforts to secure more and more funds for the work of the Institute. It is they who can realise the importance of the work more than others and if they care to spend some time to convince people of our needs, we are sure we shall get sufficient help from them.

Lastly, it is my pleasant duty to express my sincere gratitude to those who have helped the Institute with generous donations, contributions of articles and presents of books during the year. My thanks are also due to my colleagues who have helped me with their suggestions and kind cooperation from time to time towards the growth and development of research under the Institute.

Ganganatha Jha Research Institute,
Allahabad.

Umesha Mishra
Secretary.

April 9, 1949.

FINANCIAL ESTIMATE FOR 1949—50

INCOME

	Rs.
1. Donations	... 20,000
2. Governments grants	... 10,000
Bihar Government	... 5,000
U. P. Government	... 5,000
3. Life Membership	... 600
4. Annual Membership	... 1,000
5. Non-recurring grant for buildings from the U. P. Govt.	... 75,000
6. Interest on Securities	... 3,500
7. Sales of Journal etc.	... 300
8. Donations for Research Scholarship from Dr. Amaranatha Jha	... 780
	<hr/> 1,11,180
Interest on the Reserve fund invested	... 4,000
	<hr/> 1,07,180
Total	1,07,180
Expenditure over and above the income	... 7,400
	<hr/> 1,14,580
Total	1,14,580

EXPENDITURE

	Rs.
1. Pandit 45/- p.m.	... 540
2. Clerk 30/- p.m.	... 360
3. Peon 15/- p.m. + 15/- p.m. D.A.	... 360
4. Chowkidar 15/- + 15/- p.m. D.A. from July 1949	... 270
5. Publication of the Journal	... 4,000
6. Scholarships	... 2,400
7. Purchase of books	... 1,500
8. Purchase of Mss.	... 1,000
9. Postage	... 100
10. Binding of books and Journals	... 300
11. Cloth for binding Mss.	... 100
12. Publication of books	... 5,000
13. Furniture	... 1,000
14. Contingencies	... 100
15. Auditor's fees	... 50
16. Building with its Equipment	... 95,000
17. Special grant to purchase Tibetan Tanjur	... 2,500
	<hr/> 1,14,580

Observations of the Treasurer on the Budgeted Estimates.

SIR,

I beg leave to make the following observations, on the Budgeted Estimates for the year 1949—50:—

1. The Budgeted Estimates submitted for the year 1949—50 have been based on the Institute's commitments which include a new item this year, namely that of the proposed building for the Institute, absorbing the sum of Rs. 95,000/-.

2. The income from Government grants has been estimated at approximately Rs. 85,000/- which amount includes, besides the annual grants-in-aid from the Governments of the United Provinces and of Bihar, a sum of Rs. 75,000/- as non-recurring grant for the Institute's building which is already under construction.

3. The income from membership has been estimated a total figure of Rs. 1,600/- which is only slightly higher than that of the year 1947-48 which was Rs. 1,217/8/-.

4. The total amount under the head "Donations" has been estimated at Rs. 2,780/- as against Rs. 4,890/- received in the year 1947-48.

5. The income from securities and reserve fund deposit has been estimated at Rs. 7,500/- as against Rs. 6,201/3/- received under that head in the year 1947-48.

6. On the Expenditure side practically every head shows an increase over the figures of the previous years. Provision had also to be made for certain new items of Expenditure necessitated by the growing needs of the Institution.

7. The total income for the year 1949-50 is estimated at Rs. 1,07,180/- and the total Estimated expenditure is Rs. 1,14,580/- So it is feared that the Institute must

be prepared to face a deficit of Rs. 7,400/- at the close of the current year. Owing to the increasing needs of the Institute there seems little possibility of any substantial economy in Expenditure without hampering the useful activities of the Institute. It will, therefore, have to continue, with greater vigour, its efforts at securing more and more donations and grants and also at widening the circle of its members.

Allahabad.
The 8th April 1949.

A. SIDDIQUI
Hon. Treasurer.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

COTTAGE INDUSTRIES OF INDIA—published by D. Sambasiva Rao, Silpi Publications, 10, Narsingapuram Street, Mount Road, Madras. Price Rs. 18/-.

India is passing through a severe economic crisis at present. The Partition of the country has created so many problems—political, economic, social and religious. Fortunately the peace of the land has not been disturbed on the transference of power from the British to the Indian hands. The States have been integrated and refugees are being settled gradually. But on the economic front the Government cannot claim any success. Not that our leaders are not conscious of this fact. In fact, they know it to their cost. Pt. Nehru was himself the Chairman of the National Planning Committee for some time. Since then, a number of plans have appeared and disappeared, and the Government has also appointed numerous Committees from time to time to consider the different aspects of our economic problem, but the situation has not improved an iota, rather it is worse than before.

There are different schools of thought regarding the future pattern of the country's economy. Some believe that it should be modelled on the British or American line where man has been mostly replaced by machinery. While others hold that it is a vicious system and will not suit our conditions and culture. Mahatma Gandhi was the greatest exponent of this view. He believed in the utmost decentralization of power, both political and economic. Modern Capitalism leads to concentration of economic power in fewer and fewer hands, resulting in combinations and trusts which prove too powerful for any government. His soul was agonized when he saw lakhs of people lying homeless on the pavements in Bombay or Calcut-

ta, or herded together like cattle in *chawls and bustees*. The whole atmosphere of a factory is simply choking while in case of cottage industries the artisan lives in his home with his family in spacious surroundings. He believed that the modern machine system is based on violence and exploitation. It leads to economic wars and world conflagration. It may appear to cost less by machine but when we include the social cost, I mean, the misery and monotony of the industrial worker, and loss of lives and property in economic wars, we come to the conclusion that the modern system, based too much on specialization and exchange, is not to the best interests of humanity. It makes the man an automaton and soulless. He is not allowed to develop his personality. For these reasons the Mahatma gave the artisan, particularly the weaver, a new status in society. He advocated not the mass production but production by masses.

Apart from ideological considerations even practical wisdom demands that we should develop our cottage industries. What is needed is a balanced economy. We have vast and varied resources. The nature has not been niggardly to us. What we lack is the human factor, the will to do. Japan became a formidable competitor to the western nations by her organization and discipline. Cottage industries occupied a very high place in that country as well as in Germany. India has always been famous for the art and skill of her craftsmen. It was the impact of the British economy that destroyed our old organization. Since 1920 efforts have been made to revitalize the country's cottage industries, but nothing substantial has been achieved so far except in the matter of handloom production.

The book under review is a compilation rather than a dissertation. It is a compendium and a book of reference on cottage industries. Barring a few disjointed

articles the whole work is the collection of Government reports. The book has a respectable size. It is very well illustrated and got up, but the price is rather high.

K. L. Govil.

SRIMAT THAKURBANI CHARITRA CHINTARATNA SAMGRAHA—
 edited from Mss. by Sarada Charan Dhar, Sahitya-
 bharati, Sakti Press, Sylhet; pp. 94; As. -/10/-.

With the advent of the Muslim Rule in Bengal, Islamic nations gradually and imperceptibly influenced the modes of religious thought there, leading to the more or less monotheistic systems of faith in our country. Thakur Baninath was one such 'Saint' who though born a Brahmin, soon believed that to counteract the spread of Islam, as it were, it was necessary to make the conception of God more democratic by saying that there was no difference between Ram and Rahim, between the *Sinni* of the Pirs and the Prasad from the temple. Even the untouchables were accorded a more respectable place in his 'religion' where the idea of a formless God, to be effective amongst the masses, was transformed into a loving and more direct God.

It is difficult to say if this new creed was not merely a modified offshoot of the Bhakti movement which inculcated that *Karma* is *dharma*. Ramananda, Kabir, Nanak and Chaitanya among others had already emphasised the unity of God due to Muslim influences and Thakur Baninath's faith in many ways comes near theirs. The sincerity of his faith however, as the editor of this brochure leads us to believe, cannot be denied and the story of his life would therefore be interesting for those engaged in researches on the obscure religious cults of Bengal.

Amar Mukerji.

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[Part 4

**THE NIŠPANNAYOGĀVALĪ OF MAHĀPAṆḌITA
ABHAYĀKARAGUPTA**

· *By* **B BHATTACHARYYA**

THE *Gaekwad's Oriental Series* of Baroda published very recently the *Niṣpānnayogāvalī* of Mahāpaṇḍita Abhayākara-gupta, a hitherto unpublished work on Buddhist Psychic literature. The work is of immense importance in the history of Buddhism. Buddhist rituals, and Buddhist yoga. Niṣpanna means "accomplished" or "completed," and "Yoga" means "meditation." Thus the *Niṣpānnayogāvalī* is a collection of accomplished or completed meditations. In these meditations, unlike the other forms of Sādhana, a cluster of deities, well arranged in Maṇḍalas, is visualized, and the details of these Maṇḍalas are recorded here for the guidance of neophytes and laymen.

There are altogether twenty-six such Maṇḍalas described in the *Niṣpānnayogāvalī*. Each Maṇḍala, besides describing the central deity, accurately gives minute descriptions of a large number of Buddhist deities surrounding the principal figure. Sometimes the number of these companion deities exceeds one hundred in number.

The twenty-six maṇḍalas are dedicated to the following twenty-six principal deities. Their names are:—(1)

Mañjuvājra, (2) Akṣobhya according to Piṇḍikrama, (3) Vajrasattva according to Samputatantra, (4) Jñānaḍākinī, (5) Hevajra with seventeen deities, (6) Nairātmā, (7) Vajrāmṛta, (8) Heruka of four forms, (9) Mahāmāyā, (10) Buddhakapāla with nine others, (11) Vajrahūṅkāra, (12) Sambara, (13) Buddhakapāla with 25 others, (14) Yogāmbara, (15) Yamāri, (16) Vajratārā, (17) Mārīcī, (18) Pañcarakṣā, (19) Vajradhātu, (20) Mañjuvājra with forty-three deities, (21) Dharmadhātuvāgīśvara, (22) Durgatipariśodhana, (23) Bhūtaḍāmara, (24) Pañcaḍāka, (25) Six Cakravartis, and (26) Kālacakra.

For the study of Buddhist Pantheon and of the iconography of Buddhist deities this *Niṣpannayogāvalī* is a veritable mine of new, reliable and accurate information. The volume of information on the names and forms of Buddhist deities is considerable and altogether new. With the help of these descriptions it will be possible to identify images of Buddhist deities hitherto unidentified. In view of the importance of the book I give below relevant information about the *Niṣpannayogāvalī* and its author.

The last colophon statement in the *Niṣpannayogāvalī* makes Mahāpaṇḍita Abhayākaragupta the author of the book. It is also recorded in Tibetan Tangyur that Abhayākara is the author of *Niṣpannayogāvalī*, and the Tibetan translation of this work is extant in the Tangyur collection. Mahāpaṇḍita Abhayākaragupta was a prolific writer and many of his works were translated into Tibetan. He was himself a great Tibetan scholar and translated books into Tibetan by himself. The *Tangyur Catalogue* of P. Cordier assigns twenty-four works to him including the *Niṣpannayogāvalī*.

Very little is known about our author Mahāpaṇḍita Abhayākaragupta from ancient historical sources. From information available we know that Abhayākaragupta was affiliated to the Vikramaśīla monastery, obviously as a pro-

fessor. He was respected in Tibet as a scholar and as a Tāntric author. He was contemporary of the Pāla King Rāmapāla of Bengal who flourished in A.D. 1084-1130. Many fanciful and miraculous feats are attributed to him in Tibet showing that our author was an adept in Tantra and was able to perform miracles whenever required to protect Dharma.

Since the author Mahāpaṇḍita Abhayākara-gupta was attached to the Vikramaśīla monastery, it is necessary to give here a brief account of this monastery. Those who are interested in a detailed account of this monastery of international importance in pre-Mohammadan times may refer to the admirable account of it in Professor Dr. A. S. Altekar's *Education in Ancient India*, pp. 125 ff.

The monastery of Vikramaśīla was founded by the Pāla King Dharmapāla (C. 775-800 A.D.) as a teaching institution, and it grew in course of time to be a centre of international learning where Tibetan scholars used to flock in large number to drink deep at the fountain of Buddhist knowledge. The most famous among the professors at Vikramaśīla is undoubtedly Dīpaṅkara Śrī Jñāna who was invited by the King of Tibet in the 11th century to visit the country and to reform the condition of Buddhism there. Mahāpaṇḍita Abhayākara was a scholar of no less fame and his Tibetan translations show that he also may have visited Tibet. Some authorities think that Vikramaśīla was the second name of Dharmapāla, and as he was the founder of the monastery, it received the name of Vikramśīla in consequence.

The Vikramaśīla monastery, like other sister monasteries of Nālandā and Odantapuri, was destroyed by the invading hordes of Mussalmans in the 13th century. Their destructive work was so perfect that it has become difficult to identify these places to-day. From Tibetan sources it is known that the monastery was situated in

Bihar on a hill on the right bank of the Gargā near Bhagalpur. This ancient place is now identified with the Pātharghāṭa hill where extensive ruins, antiquities, and images have been found. After destroying the monastery and slaying the shaven monks the gallant Muslim conqueror must have discovered, as he did at Odantapuri, that it was a college with huge libraries. These libraries the conquerors systematically burnt to the great relief of the antiquarians of modern days.

Abhayākaragupta of the Vikramaśīla monastery is the author of the present work *Niṣpannayogāvalī*. He wrote another work "*Munimatālaṅkāra*" in the thirtieth year of the reign of the Pāla King Rāmapāla, which is equivalent to *circa* 1114 A.D. Thus our author belongs to the fourth quarter of the 11th and the first quarter of the 12th century.

The Muhammadans destroyed Buddhism in Bengal in the beginning of the thirteenth century. Our author flourished nearly 100 years before this destruction. Buddhism at that time was in its height of glory. Buddhism of that time was not the Buddhism of Lord Buddha or of the Sūnyavādins and Vijñānavādins, but it was entirely of a different type. It was the Buddhism of the Vajrayānists of the Mahāsukha School in which all forms, yoga, tantra, mantra, magic, gods, goddesses, mudrās, Maṇḍalas, etc. were intermixed. It was a hybrid form of Buddhism in which all that was good and bad in Buddhist history was incorporated. As a result, Buddhism became extremely attractive and popular in Eastern India. The monasteries were like forts with formidable walls and gates containing innumerable temples, lecture halls, libraries, myriads of images of gods and goddesses in precious stones, gold and silver, and were overburdened with the accumulated wealth of the ages. The lure of loot attracted the invaders, and the monasteries were destroyed.

Hundred years before that destruction these monasteries were humming with academic life. Great scholars were busy writing new books, and new Śāstras, lecturing to pupils and adepts, and attracting pupils from distant lands like Tibet and China. There were mystic professors passing years in quiet meditation, and in the practice of Yoga and Tantras, and revealing their rich experiences in books on Tantras, Sādhanaś, and Maṇḍalas. These great mystics were making their new experiences known to the masses through mystic songs, books and communions. They were as it were serving as intermediaries between the terrestrial and celestial worlds, and were trying to beautify, ennoble and elevate the earthly life with light obtained from the spiritual world.

Our author Mahāpaṇḍita Abhayākaragupta was one of those great mystics whose name will remain indelibly written in the pages of the history of mysticism in India. He wrote many books on Sādhanaś and Maṇḍalas, practised meditation, visualised deities and transmitted his knowledge to posterity through excellently written monographs. Unfortunately, however, much is not known about him until now, and it is doubtful whether any of his other books is ever published and known. Thus the *Niṣpannayogāvalī* presented now in the *Gaekwad's Oriental Series* proves to be the first of his numerous works to be published. Even if Abhayākaragupta is not well-known in the land of his birth, he is no less a celebrity in Tibet where all his works are preserved in Tibetan translations; he is worshipped as a saint in Tibet, the land of mystery and snow. This valuable work *Niṣpannayogāvalī* is given an edition because this would serve to rescue the name and work of this great scholar from oblivion.

As has already been said the *Niṣpannayogāvalī* is a work on Maṇḍalas and is remarkable for its richness of information and brevity. It contains in all 26 Maṇḍalas

in twenty-six chapters some short and some long. All these Maṇḍalas describe innumerable deities of the Tantra cult. A large number of these descriptions is absolutely original, highly interesting and informative. Many of their names and forms are altogether lost, but are published for the first time. Many of the deities described accurately in the work are not to be found anywhere in printed literature. *Niṣpannayogāvalī* thus presents unique, original, useful and most valuable information which constitutes our most authentic material for the study of the images and deities belonging to the Buddhist Pantheon. The *Sādhana-mālā* published earlier in the same series indeed presents valuable material for the interpretation and correct identification of numerous Buddhist deities and images, but the *Niṣpannayogāvalī* outbeats *Sādhana-mālā*, since the material presented here is more varied, more extensive and more prolific.

What service this *Niṣpannayogāvalī* can render to Buddhism may be illustrated by a reference to the several hundreds of images of Buddhist deities discovered in the Forbidden City of Peiping in China. It will incidentally show that influence which Sanskrit exercised on China and on her Buddhism, and will illustrate forcibly the cultural penetration of Sanskrit into the deepest regions of China. This is a further monument to show how Sanskrit conquered the hearts of the Chinese people even so late as the 16th and 17th centuries.

In July 1926 the Russian Archaeologist Staël Holstein received permission from Mr. Chuang, President of the Palace Committee, to visit a number of Lama temples situated in the Forbidden City—temples which for many years seem to have been entirely neglected. In the upper storey of one of these temples, the Pao-hsiang Lou, he found a collection of bronze statuettes constituting a Lamaistic Pantheon which had consisted originally of 787

figures. These figures along with a series of photographs from three manuscripts written in Chinese were studied by the famous American scholar, Professor Walter Eugene Clark, Wales Professor of Sanskrit in Harvard University, and he published the material in two sumptuous volumes, entitled, *Two Lamaistic Pantheons* in the *Harvard Yenching Institute Monograph Series* in 1937. The first volume contains an introduction, bibliography and indices of gods and goddesses in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese. The second volume contains the illustrations of the deities.

These illustrations are of the utmost importance for the study of the Buddhist Pantheon not only of China, but also of India, Nepal and Tibet. The original images bear inscriptions in Chinese and sometimes in Tibetan and other languages, and the learned author took great pains in reconstructing their Sanskrit names. In many places it was not even possible to assign the foreign names to their Sanskrit equivalents. All the Sanskrit names which could be made out are valuable additions to our knowledge. A list of deities with Sanskrit names found in China is appended to the printed volume published in the *Gaekwad's Oriental Series*.

A large number of these names derived from Chinese sources is to be found in this *Nispannayogāvalī* presented in the *G. O. Series* to scholars for the first time. It may be remarked here that the deities discovered in China have no descriptive parallels in literature, whereas the *Nispannayogāvalī* not only gives their names but also full descriptions of at least 60 per cent of all the deities found in China either in the form of statuettes or miniatures in manuscripts. It is thus very probable that Chinese artists derived their inspiration from Sanskrit originals before they carved out or moulded the statuettes of Buddhist gods and goddesses in China, for it is quite incon-

ceivable that any artist can prepare images of such wonderful complexity from their own imagination entirely without the help of Dhyānas or descriptive texts. Another remarkable thing that can be noticed in this connection is that although the paintings in miniatures have a distinct Chinese flavour, no such thing is noticeable in the statuettes. The statuettes present characteristics such as are to be found in the images coming from Nepal or Tibet, and it is quite conceivable that these statuettes were made by Nepalese or Tibetan artists and then exported to China. It is also possible that the Chinese King of the Forbidden City of Peiping imported Nepalese and Tibetan artists to China and made them execute these statuettes under express command.

Whatever may be the circumstances under which the statuettes were made, it still remains to be seen wherefrom the artists derived their knowledge of the correctness of the form of the numerous deities for the purpose of representation.

Since our book *Niṣpannayogāvalī* gives full iconographic descriptions of most of the deities found in Peiping, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the *Niṣpannayogāvalī* formed at least one of the originals from which the artists obtained the correct idea of the form of the deities. Otherwise it is difficult to conceive how form can be given to such obscure deities as the Sixteen Bodhisattvas, the Twelve Pāramitās, the Twelve Vaśitās, the Twelve Bhūmis, the Four Pratisamvits, etc. which are described accurately in the Mañjuvajra Maṇḍala in the *Niṣpannayogāvalī*. It is not possible to prepare images of these deities without the help of the descriptions given by Abhayākara Gupta. The conclusion is thus irresistible that the images found in China correctly represent the forms described in the *Niṣpannayogāvalī*, and the artists received their inspiration directly from this work of Abhayākara Gupta. This

is one conclusive proof of how Sanskrit influenced the culture of China, and how China was deeply influenced by this cultural penetration.

According to Professor Clark who studied these statues, they were presented by emperor Chien-lung to his mother on the occasion of his mother's eightieth birthday in the year 1771. It is, therefore, conclusive that even in the 18th century China continued to be deeply influenced by Sanskrit Buddhism which she received through Tibet.

The importance of the *Niṣpannayogāvalī* in unravelling the iconographic problems of the Chinese statuettes can hardly be overrated in the present state of our knowledge. The obscure deities described in the *Niṣpannayogāvalī* can hardly be found in India to-day, but it is strange that their images could be made in Tibet and installed in China even in the 18th century.

The *Niṣpannayogāvalī* thus is a great addition to our stock of knowledge about Buddhism and its rituals, deities and pantheons. The so-called Nepalese banners containing representations of entire Maṇḍalas now can be confidently identified with the help of the *Niṣpannayogāvalī*, which no Museum curator can afford to neglect.

TAKṢAŚILĀ¹

By S. B. CHAUDHURI

THE name perhaps refers to the rock of the race of the Takkas². Pāṇini mentions the city in his *Sūtra* IV. 3.93 and in the accounts connected with the life and teaching of Buddha Takkaśilā occupies a great place especially as a famous seat of learning in Ancient India³. In the accounts of Alexander's invasion the people of Taxila appear as Taxillas whose famous city⁴ "according to Strabo was very great and wealthy and the most populous city that lay between the Indus and the Hydaspes." The king of Taxila called Taxiles by the Greeks, which was evidently his territorial title, brought rich presents to Alexander.⁵ In Aśoka's time Takṣaśilā, as we learn from the Emperor's Minor Rock Edict II, was the headquarter of a Provincial Government possibly of Uttarāpatha⁶. In the century that followed the fall of the Murya Empire Taxila

¹ The abbreviations used here are the following:

AIHT=*Pargiter Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*; BR=*Buddhist Record* by Beal; CL=*Carmichael Lectures*; CJ=Cowell's *Jātaka*; CAGI=Cunningham's *Ancient Geography of India*; MI=*Invasion of India by Alexander the Great* by Mc Crindle; MM=*Ancient India described by Megasthenes and Arrian* by Mr Crindle; MT=*Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*; PH=*Political History of Ancient India* by H. C. Roy Chaudhuri; SI=*Select Inscriptions* by D. C. Sircar, vol. I; YC=*On Yuan Chwang* by T. Watters.

² MI, p. 57, fn. 1. It is stated that it was known also as a cave city or Shih-Shih-ch'eng (YC, I, pp. 200 and 241). In a local inscription the form is given as Tathhaśi (la)e (EI. XIV. 295). For Takshasīlā and Chhadasīla of the kalawan viz. of the year 134, See S. Konow, in EI. XXI. 253.

³ Law, *Geography of Early Buddhism*, p. 53.

⁴ MM. p. 154.

⁵ MI, p. 59, fn. 3.

⁶ PH, p. 253.

passed under the rule of the Graeko-Bactrians. In the first part of the first century A.D. Taxila was visited by Apollonius of Tyana who says that the city was about the size of Nenevah and walled like a Greek city.⁷ From his account we learn that the people "wore cotton the produce of the country, and sandals made of the fibre or bark of papyrus, and a leather cap when it rained." Taxila was also visited by the Chinese pilgrims Fa-hien and Hiuen Tsang and the latter agrees in placing Ta-ch'a-shi-lo at three days' journey to the east of the Indus⁸. The site of the ancient city has been identified with the ruins of Shāh-dheri, which is a mile to the north-east of Sarai in the north-west corner of the Rawalpindi District.⁹ In *Kathā-sarīt-sāgara* Takṣaśilā appears as a city situated on the banks of the Vitastā (Jhelum), the reflection of whose long line of palaces gleamed in the waters of the river.¹⁰

Both Fa-hien and Hiuen Tsang treat Takṣaśilā as a district separate from Gandhāra and the latter says that formerly it was in subjection to Kapiśā, and laterly it became a tributary to Kasmir. To Hiuen Tsang it was the name of both the city and the district, the district being about 2000 li in circuit. So the ancient kingdom of Taxila must have covered a wide area of several miles centering round Shah-Dheri, bounded on the west by the Indus, by the District of Urasa¹¹ on the north, by the river Jhelum

⁷ *The Indian travels of Apollonius of Tyana*, by O. De. Beauvoir Priaulx, London: Quaritch, Piccadilly, MDCCCLXXIII, pp. 13-15. The book has recently been edited by Jarl Charpentier (Leipzig, 1934) who is convinced that the traveller had been actually in India.

⁸ *YC*, I, p. 240. Fa-hien makes it seven days' journey from Gandhāra.

⁹ *CAGI*, p. 120.

¹⁰ *KSSR*, I, p. 235.

¹¹ *Urasā* or *Uraśā* is mentioned in the gaṇas of *Pāṇini* IV. ii. 82. The name was given to the country between the upper reaches of the Indus and the Vitastā which is now known as the Haz-

on the east and by Sinhapura on the south¹² which is thus roughly equivalent to the modern Rawalpindi District.

But in Indian tradition Takṣaśilā is always represented as a city of Gandhāra. The combined testimony of the *Kumbhakāra Jātaka*¹³ and the *Vāyu Purāṇa*¹⁴ proves that it was a city of the Gandhāra-Viṣaya. According to the *Rāmāyaṇa* the Gāndhāra-viṣaya contained two flourishing cities, viz. Takṣaśilā and Puṣkalāvati:

Tadā samrddhe dvē purottamē takṣam Takṣaśilā-yāntu.

Puṣkalam Puṣkalāvate Gandharvadeśe rucire Gāndhāra-viṣaye ca saḥ.¹⁵

The other city Puṣkalāvati, the ancient capital of Gāndhāra was equally famous. Thus Arrian says that Peukelaitis was of great size and was not far from the Indus. The Greek name was obtained from Pukkalaoti which is the Pali form of the Sanskrit Puṣkalāvati. Two large towns namely Chārsadda, which is situated on the left or the eastern bank of the Landai river, 17 miles north-east of Peshawar city and the town of Prāng contiguous to it (which formed part of the well-known Hasht-nagar, or 'eight cities') have been identified by Cunningham, with the ancient Puṣkalāvati, capital of the land of Peukelaotis at the time of Alexander's invasion¹⁶. Puṣkalāvati was a great emporium of commerce and both Ptolemy¹⁷ (150 A.D.) and the author of the Periplus (1st cen-

ara District. Hiuen Tsang mentions the country (*YC*, I, p. 256) under the name of Wu-la-shih and in his days it was a tributary to Kashmir. To the Greeks the people were known as Arsakes (*PH*, p. 200). Cf. *Matsya Purāṇa*, 121. 46-47.

• • ¹² *CAGI*, p. 128 and p. 138; Marshall, *A guide to Taxila*, pp. 1-4.

¹³ No. 408, *CJ*, III, p. 229.

¹⁴ 88. 189-90.

¹⁵ *VII*. 114. 10-11.

¹⁶ *MM*. p. 184, and fn.

¹⁷ *MT*. p. 117.

tury A.D.) refer to it as Proklaiṣ which they correctly place on the eastern bank of the river Swat. In the seventh century A.D. Hiuen Tsang visited the city of Pu-se-ka-lo-fa-ti which he reached by travelling 50 li in the north-east from the Kaniṣka-Vihāra¹⁸. But during his time the city was no longer the capital of Gāndhāra. It appears from his account that it was then abandoned as a political capital in favour of Purushapura, Parashāwara, or modern Peshawar known to him as Pu-lu-sha-pu-la¹⁹. The great city was first noticed by Fa-hien under the name Fo-lu-sha which was the capital of Gāndhāra in his time and next noticed by Sung Yun in 502 A.D.²⁰ So Puṣkalāvati was perhaps abandoned at some period between the time Ptolemy (C.150 A.D.) and that of Fa-hien.

The Gāndhāra country thus lay extended on both sides of the Indus: Sindh-orubhayataḥ pārsve deśaḥ paramaśo-bhanaḥ²¹. The ancient application of the name seems to have comprehended some regions to the east of the Indus. According to Zimmer the tribe settled in Vedic times on the south bank of the Kubhā, and for some distance down the east side of the Indus²². Inclusion of Kasmir is indicated by the evidence of a Jataka story²³. The Matsya Purāṇa further records that the Ārvaṭṭa country famous for its horses was included in the realm of Gāndhāra²⁴ and Dr. Roy Chaudhury says that the little kingdom of Gandaris that lay between the Chinab

¹⁸ *YC*, I, p. 214.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 199; *CAGI*, p. 55.

²⁰ *CII*, I, p. XXXVIII; *BRI*, p. XXXII.

²¹ *Rām.*, vii. 113. 10-11.

²² *Ved. Ind.*, I. 219.

²³ No. 406, *Cj*, III, p. 222. Dr. Roy Chaudhury is of opinion that Kaspapyros mentioned as a Gandaric city is the same as Kasmir (*PH*, p. 124). Dr. Stein has rejected the idea that Kaspapyros was ever taken to designate Kashmir. Modern view seeks to place it to the west of Indus (*MM*, p. 157. fn.).

²⁴ 48. 6-7.

and the Rāvī was the Eastern Gāndhāra.²⁵ But excepting the inclusion of Taxila there is no strong evidence to prove the extension of Gāndhāra's former geographical limits further east. In the Persepolis inscription of Darius (521-484 B.C.) Hidush (Sindhu, i.e., district on the Indus)²⁶ is distinguished from Gadāra. This indicates that in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. Gāndhāra was commonly used to denote the Western Indus basin, covering in modern geography, the district of Peshawar in the N. W. Frontier Province. Rapson says that Gāndhāra of the old Persian inscriptions included also the district of Kabul in Afghanistan.²⁷

So the Gāndhāras of the third century B.C. mentioned in the R. E. V. of Aśoka as living on the western borders of his empire, presumably lived in the Gāndhāra country of the trans-Indus region, the river Indus being the eastern boundry of Gāndhāra. Taksaśilā does not appear to have been the capital of Gāndhāra in the time of Aśoka.²⁸ The Gandarai (Gāndhāra) country in the time of Ptolemy lay to the west of the Indus with its city Proklais, i.e., Puṣkarāvātī.²⁹ Hien-Tsang similarly records that Kant'o-lo, i.e., Gāndhāra, was about 1000 li from east to west and bordered on the east on the river Sin (Sindh).³⁰ Cunningham says that it was bounded on the west by Jalalabad and Lamgham, on the north by the hills of Swat and Bunir, and on the south by the hills of Kalabagh³¹. But

²⁵ *PH*, p. 202.

²⁶ *SI*, 7, L. 17-18. In another Persian inscription a man from Sindhu of the Indus valley is called a Hinduviya (fn. 1).

²⁷ Rapson, *Ancient, India*, p. 81. See also Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, p. 28.

²⁸ *CL*, p. 54, fn.

²⁹ *MT*, p. 117.

³⁰ *YC*, I, p. 198-200.

³¹ *GAGI*, p. 56.

the boundaries of the country must have changed at different periods in its history. In the *Vaijayantī* Gāndhāra is equated with Bihāṇḍa.³² The picture label of an illustrated manuscript dated 1015 A.D. refers to Kuṭa-parvata of Gandhāramaṇḍala.³³

The Gāndhāras were a people of high antiquity, being indirectly referred to in the *Ṛgveda*³⁴ and in the *Atharvaveda*.³⁵ Pāṇini in the *Sūtra* IV. i. 169 refers to Gandhāra as the name of a country in which a Kṣatriya tribe called Gāndhāri was living. The *Purāṇa*'s record that the country name Gāndhāra³⁶ was obtained from Gāndhāra a Druhya prince.³⁷ "It is probable that the Druhyas were a north-western people" of the Vedic age³⁸ and so the connection between the Gāndhāras and the Druhyas appears to be highly probable. In the *Mahābhārata* the Gāndhāras appear as a people of the Uttarāpatha³⁹ and are represented as an impure people⁴⁰. From the Buddhist Books we learn that the Gandhāran traders carried on business in horses and blankets⁴¹. Hiuen Tsang says that the disposition of the people of Kan-t'o-lo was timid and soft and that they loved literature⁴².

³² *Vaijayantī* of Yādava Prakāśa ed. by Oppert, p. 37, v. 24.

³³ Foucher, *Etude Sur L'Iconographie*, I, p. 198.

³⁴ 1. 126. The reference is to the wool of the sheep of the Gandhāris.

³⁵ V. 22. 14. The form is Gandhāri. In the *Chāndogya* Upaniṣad (vi. 14. 1. 2.), we have a reference to the Gandhāras.

³⁶ In a Prakrit inscription the form is Gaindhāra (El. XX. 22). In the Bahistan inscription of Darius it is Godāra (Sl. 4, L. 16).

³⁷ *ALHT*, p. 167.

³⁸ *Ved. Ind.*, I, 385.

³⁹ xii. 207. 43.

⁴⁰ viii. 45. 40; 40. 29.

⁴¹ *Tribes of Ancient India*, by B. C. Law, p. 17. cf. *Harivamśa*, 1.32.

⁴² *BR*, I, p. 98.

THE BUDHAVAKTRAMAṆḌANA OF KĪKA

By K. MADHAVA KRISHNA SARMA

THE *Anup Sanskrit Library* has a Ms. of a rare work named *Budhavaktramaṇḍana*, which has not so far received a notice anywhere. It contains thirty-six interesting Samasyās excluding the last i.e., the thirty-seventh on the author. The Ms. consists of a single folio, old, worn and damaged. I came across the leaf where recently I was examining a bundle of stray leaves. It is at least three centuries old in appearance. Krishnamachariar in his *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature* (Note 1034) mentions one Kīkarāja as the author of *Sanigītasāroddhāra* and says that he was also known as Śāradānanda. It is, however, not known if he is the same as the author of this work, who is also called Kīka. According to the last verse, Kīka was the son of Mallamantriśvara, son of Krūra of Lātakula. As for his date we have some evidence in the work itself. In verses 23 and 34 there are references to Bhoja of Dhārā. In view of this and the age of the Ms. we may tentatively place him between the twelfth and the sixteenth century. The Ms. is written in a very minute hand. It contains some gaps and is inaccurate in many places. To illustrate the first Samasyā :

शम्भुमाह्वय--भव; साधुं च--अनीच; वित् किं त्यजति--रणम्; दर्पकं संबोधय--स्मर; जः किं ब्रूते--भवानीचरणं स्मर।

I give here the entire text as it is found in the Ms.

बुधवक्त्रमण्डनम्

शम्भुमाह्वय साधुं च वित् किं त्यजति दर्पकम् ।

संबोधय जः किं ब्रूते भवानीचरणं स्मर ॥ १ ॥

जगत् कं स्तौति कुक्षमापात् कीदृग् लोकश्च का गिरौ ।

का भक्तद्वैतान् हन्ति श्रीशंकरकृतोदरी ॥ २ ॥

श्लाघ्यं तनौ किमुत का स्मररङ्गहन्त्री
कीदृग्घरिः किमजलं विधुमाह्वय त्वम् ।
मान्याश्च के सुलभमस्तु सदैव किं ते
धक्षोजराजितमुरःस्थलमब्जमुख्याः ॥ ३ ॥

याप्योज्ज्वलान् ह्रीः कथं खेचरः कः
पुत्री काब्धेः किं कुभूपः करोति ।
ब्रूते कान्तं मैथुने किं मृगाक्षी
मन्दं मन्दं वीर मा देहि पीडाम् ॥ ४ ॥

किं तेऽस्तु किं श्रयन्नष्टो दुष्टस्थः श्लाघितो मुनौ ।
कोऽवद्यो निर्विवेकी कः कन्दर्पमदमोहितः ॥ ५ ॥

का पुत्री जलधेश्च केन रमते चित्तं द्विजस्यास्तु किं
का मातंगवयस्य कीदृगरुणः किं हन्ति किं स्याद्दृढम् ।
को धाकः स्तुतिमर्हति प्रियसखी किं वक्ति रुष्टां सखीं
मानं तेन समं त्यज प्रियतमो यो लोचनाज्ञाकरः ॥ ६ ॥

संबोधय मधुके मामा भवन्तु कमरिस्तवः ।
सेवते किं यती वक्ति स्मर सित्र गदाधरम् ॥ ७ ॥

किं स्यात्पुण्यकृतां हस्तमाह्वय स्तौति कं जनः ।
वनं कः स्मरते कश्च सिद्धिदः शंकरांगजः ॥ ८ ॥

दातुः क्व कीर्तिरुदितास्ति किमन्धकारः
संबोधनं भवति भाग्यवतस्तनौ का ।
दूरीकरोतु दुरितान्निजसेवकान् का—
मी तेन का खलु मता जगदीशभार्या ॥ ९ ॥

किं दानकाले कृपणाननेषु गेहेषु के भूमिभृतां विभान्ति ।
केनोच्यते वागृन्ता न केन दग्धो मनोभूर्न गजाम्बरेण ॥ १० ॥
को न स्थिरो वसति कुत्र विवेकदीपः केषां शिवं भवतु भव्यमयाह्वय त्वम् ।
को यज्ञभुक् कथय को निजघान दैत्यं दर्पोद्धतं दशमुखं युधि रामदेवः ॥ ११ ॥
दर्पाय को भवति नीचजनस्य बाढं का सुस्तनी स्तनयुगोन्नतिमाशु हन्ति ।
को लीलया सृजति विश्वमिदं महेशं कः पूजयत्यनुदिनं दिवि राजराजः ॥ १२ ॥

का राज्ञः पालनीया प्रहरति सबलो निर्भयः किंविधास्त्रैः
कः स्त्रीमालोकयन्तं मदयति तरुणं मद्यपानं विनैव ।
कान्ते देहेषु केषां भवतु कृतमहानुग्रहा श्री भवानी
कीदृग्वा ग्रीष्मकाले तपति दिनपतिर्भूरितेजःप्रभावः ॥ १३ ॥

कं शीघ्रं किं जनो वक्ति मा भूत्कः कस्यचित्कदा ।
को भुजे राति रामश्च किंश्चक्रे दीत्यमंगदः ॥१४॥

हते कस्मिन्सुरा हृष्टा यज्ञः कस्मै न रोचते ।
भीमोज्ज्वलीत्कं किं वाच्यं त्रिपुरे रक्ष सेवकम् ॥१५॥

किलक्षणा त्वदरिचन्द्रमुखी वनान्ते
मातेह निर्मलधियां वद कीदृशी स्यात् ।
का गंहिनां सुखशतानि करोति कादौ
पुत्रीं ददौ नृपनलाय च भीमकान्ता ॥१६॥

परेषां के कुर्वन्त्युपकृतिमजस्रं गुह्यतरां
न कश्चौरौघोज्यं ..तमसि धर्तुं च विटपी ।
कुतो युक्तो नीडैः पुरुषनितया को निधनतां
क्षणाग्नीतः कीदृग्यतियतनतः संगविरतः ॥१७॥

जनानां का मान्या रिपुमुनयना दीनवचना
धवाप्त्यै किरूपा नृवर कुरुते तेऽविनिनयात् ।
न का भीरुस्त्याज्या मृतमनुपतिता का समुचिता
सतीनां का स्त्रीवाक् भवति नृमुदे मातरचिता ॥१८॥

गेही किमिच्छति सुखाय च रागिणां किं
वेद्यं द्विषां युधि निहन्ति न कं कुलीनः ।
श्लाघ्यश्च कीदृशसुरो भजते सती कं
कीदृक् प्रियास्यकमलं सुरतान्तकान्तम् ॥१९॥

शत्रुः सतां वसति क्षत्रभयेन कुत्र
प्राप्ते चिरान्निशि धवेन किमिच्छति स्त्री ।
संसारलोभविमुखः क्व करोति नाशां
वाच्यं सभासु न कदा विदुषां प्रसंगे ॥२०॥

वाक् सूनृता जयति कस्य गुरुश्च कीदृग् ।
गर्भं बिभर्ति सुमुखी किमवाप्य संगे ।
आद्यो युगः क इह कीदृगरिस्त्वदीयः
कीदृग् समीरणसुतः समरे कृतान्तः ॥२१॥

कं देवकी सुतं जज्ञे कस्मिन्न मनसो रुचिः ।
व्रतस्थः को भवेत्पूज्यः कानुगच्छति कौशिकम् ॥२२॥

अमरसेना ।

भोजं नृपालमधिगत्य पति पुरी का
भाति स्म .कोऽमृतमयो मृगलोचनायाः ।

का मंगलस्य जननी परिनिन्दकैः कः

संपूरितस्तु भुवनत्रयजीवनं कः ॥२३॥

धाराधरः । द्विव्यस्तमेकदा समस्तम् ।

त्रस्मन्ति पापात् के केषां धर्मे धीरस्तु कः सुहृत् ।

कर्तव्यः श्रियमासाद्य नीचो भवति कीदृशः ॥२४॥

समानः । एकदा व्यस्तं द्विः समस्तम् ।

धातुः सम्बोधनं किं नृपसदसि भवान् कीदृगामन्त्रयस्व

श्रीपुत्रं को दुरापो भवति तनुभूतामुद्यमैर्वैजितानाम् ।

कीदृग् ते काननान्ते वसति रिपुरभूत् कीदृशः सूर्यवंशः

क्षमेशः प्राप्तः कुतोऽस्तं कुत उत तरुणीं हर्षपात्रं गुणी कः ॥२५॥

अजराजितः ।

दिव्यस्तन्त्रिः समस्तं...का सेषोरगमूद्भिन् का नतिमतां कल्याण दास्यात् सुखी ।

किं कृत्वा.....वामचरणं वीरः करोमीति च ॥२६॥(?)

पृष्ठः पुण्यकृता गुरुर्वदति किं काब्धिः सुता चासती ।

संगं कांक्षति कस्य चापि मरणं भूपास्य भीमावभूत् । कुरु मान्यस्य ॥२७॥

विधाय बलिभिर्वैरं यात्यधीरो विहाय किम् ।

चौरस्य चित्ते किं चौर्यं कुर्वतोऽवति को दिवम् ॥२८॥

पुरंदरः । एकदा व्यस्तं समस्तम् ।

प्राप्य प्रीतिमतीं सतीं सहचरीं कामी भवेत् कीदृशः

कः पारावतरूपवान् रतसुखं जह्ने शिवाशर्वयोः ।

कीदृग् जल्पति पण्डिते वद जडः श्रीमत्करः कीदृशः

को रत्नानि चतुर्दश प्रमथतः प्रासूत पूर्वं सुरैः ॥ २९ ॥

समुद्रः । एकदा व्यस्तं त्रिः समस्तम् ।

मित्रामन्त्रय माधवं नृपतिना का पाल्यते किं रवे—

राहानं हनुमान् जघान गहनं भुङ्क्त्वा तमामन्त्रय ।

का कान्ता मुरहन्तुराह्वय पतिं केनाहितः स्तूयते

नो भाव्यं यतिभाविशुद्धमतिना किं लक्षणेनात्मना ॥ २९ ॥

अक्षमेन । द्विव्यस्तं द्विः समस्तम् ।

वद मदयति पीता कावधीद्वन्द्वकं कः

क्व विमलकुलजानां निश्चला चित्तवृत्तिः ।

कुसुतं तुरगहृतिं कोऽदहत् ! खाण्डवाख्यं

वनमपि सुमुखीं को लेखमुख्यः सिषेवे ॥ ३० ॥

सुरेश्वरः । द्विव्यस्तं एकदा समस्तम् ।

परनरकरसङ्गो का न धत्ते प्रमोदं

विरहविधुरवक्त्रद्वन्द्वशोकापहः कः ।

न वचनकठिनत्वं कुत्र निद्रोहपात्रं

भवति सदनगानां कोर्चितो भूतिदः कः ॥ ३१ ॥

सतीनः । द्विव्यस्तं एकसमस्तम् ।

पृथुकलुषभाजामीक्षते का न काये

भवतु पटुतरासद्गुणेक्ष्मी ।

अजयदहितसेनां कीदृशः सव्यसाची

हरति दुरितपङ्क्तिं दूरतश्चिन्तिता का ॥ ३२ ॥

भागीरथी । एकदा व्यस्तं समस्तम् ।

नाकं श्रीदेवीः किमधरनरादपि (?) गतं

कठोरं किं कर्म पुनरसु मदाह्वानमपि ।

न कः कर्णघ्नेनावधि सुररिपुः खाण्डववने

ज्वलत्यादिः कीदृग् कथय रथजानी सोऽमृतमयः ॥ ३३ ॥

अन्तर्लापिका । द्विव्यस्तमेकदा समस्तम् ।

कां कान्तारगता जहारलंकाधिपो वक्रता

पुच्छे केन धृता कवीन्द्रपदवीं प्राप्य प्रसिद्धाऽभवत् ।

का श्रीभोजनरेन्द्रसंसदि तमः केना

तप्ता केन विधीयते विरहिणी दुःखेन शीतांशुना ॥ ३४ ॥

मातुर्गर्भे पुनः को वसति च महानुद्यमी कार्यमाद्या—

रब्धं कुर्यात् कदा का जलनिधिमथनादुद्गता विश्ववन्द्या ।

को नारीणां विलासी वदति च पुरुषं वेदवित्किं पुराणं

केषां सिद्धिर्दुरापा त्रिजगति करणीयस्य मुक्तोद्यमानाम् ॥ ३५ ॥

किं गौरीभर्तुराह्वानं का न स्याद्गुरुसेवया ।

किं वव्रे कमला देवी पूज्यते किं शिवापदम् ॥ ३६ ॥

श्रीमल्लाटकुलेऽमले विमलधीर्जीयान्महीमण्डले

श्रीक्रूरस्य सुतः सतां हितकरः श्रीशिवेश्वरः ।

तत्सूनुः सुतपा ...गुरोरासाद्य कीकाभिध—

श्चक्रे यद्बुधवक्त्रमण्डनमिदं तत्पठ्यतां पण्डितैः ॥ ३७ ॥

इति श्रीकीकविरचितं बुधवक्त्रमण्डनं समाप्तम् ॥

TATTVA—HITA—PURUṢĀRTHA IN RĀMĀNUJA'S PHILOSOPHY

By K. SESHADRI

TATTVA represents the nature of ultimate reality, and tells us of the Brahman the supreme; puruṣārtha is the *summum bonum*, the highest object of human aspiration, while 'hita' reveals the means for the attainment of the highest. These are fundamental concepts in any system of philosophy. I propose to give in this paper an outline of Rāmānuja's exposition of these ideas with particular reference to the section known as Ānandavallī in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*.

Rāmānuja's view is that the Supreme as revealed by the scriptures is Viśiṣṭa-Brahman, not quality-less or attributeless Being. Mokṣa, which is the highest target of all human endeavour and which on its negative side consists in liberation from the vortex of saṁsāra, is visualised as a positive state of incomparable bliss or Ānandānubhava attained by the liberated Jīva, who remaining distinct from the Parāmātman acquires the privilege of equality with Him in most respects (Paramam Sāmyam). Bhakti or devotion implying the practice of dhyāna or meditation is the *hita*. Devotion born of enlightenment and knowledge shaped and sustained by unwavering devotion are the means prescribed for the aspirant. It is claimed that the Śrutis reveal these as Tattva, hita and puruṣārtha. In the Ānandavallī of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* the opening words are "Brahmavid-āpnoti param," which may be taken as presenting in a nutshell the Tattva, hita and puruṣārtha revealed in the Śrutis as a whole. "He who knows the Parāmātman attains the highest" is what the words say in literal translation.

But does Brahma-vit merely mean one who has knowledge of the Brahman or does it imply one, whose enlightenment has taken the shape of active devotion? Rāmānuja interprets it to mean Bhakti to the Lord, which is not divergent from Jñāna but constitutes its very quintessence. In his *Laghu Siddhānta* he points out that “ Veda ” in “ ya evam veda ” has the same connotation as “ *upāsīta* ” which occurs elsewhere in “ Mano Brahmetypāsīta.” In explaining again the nature of Bhakti he cites the Brhadāranyaka-Upaniṣad-vākyam, “ Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ,” which means that it is the Ātman, who deserves to be seen, heard, thought about and meditated upon. The real emphasis here is upon the importance of meditation or dhyāna, without which what is seen or heard from the ācārya or thought about under his guidance would be altogether useless. Elsewhere the Upaniṣads clearly lay down that hearing (śravaṇa), thinking (manana) and meditating (dhyāna) would prove to be utterly inadequate if unaccompanied by intense love (adhikapṛīti) for the Lord, who on His part is unequalled in His responsiveness to true love. (Nāyamātmā pravacanena labhyaḥ etc.). The Jñāna that is held up as superior to any other type of knowledge is prītirūpāpanna Jñāna. Hearing of the Paramātman and His Kalyāṇa guṇas results in śabdajanyajñāna, which marks but an initial stage in the development of bhakti. This leads to meditating on the Paramātman and His excellences through a continuous process of recollection in which the memory-stream taking its source in the śabda-janya-jñāna flows through consciousness in unbroken continuity. This smṛti or recollection gradually acquires a vividness of detail and clarity of conception through the practice of unswerving, one-pointed meditation, and increasingly reveals the stamp of authenticity, which renders it equivalent to direct experience or

true pratyakṣānubhava. Bhakti includes all these stages, for it is rightly described as “pratyakṣa-samānākāra-prīti-rūpāpanna-smṛti-santati.” It is such a bhakti that can effect Mokṣa; not a mere intellectual awareness or understanding. The Sūtra, “Āvṛttīrasakṛdupadeśāt” (4—1—1) is cited in this connection to show that Vyāsa himself has conclusively expressed that bhakti is the type of knowledge referred to here.

What really is the nature of the Brahman that is commended here as the object of devotion? What is the fruit attained, the aspiration realised? It is in elucidation of these points that the Upaniṣadic section proceeds to state “Satyam-Jñānam-anantam Brahma, yo veda nihitam guhāyām paraṃ vyoman, sośnute sarvān kāmān saha Bhahmaṇā vipaścitā.” The first vākyam says that the Parabrahman, unlike the sentient and non-sentient things of the world of creation, never undergoes any real change in its nature or form, that it always shines with the undimmed brilliance of highest Jñāna, and that being present in all places and at all times it has the entire world of sentient and non-sentient things as its śarīra, in a manner which admits of no comparison. The other vākyas speak of meditation on the Parabrahman as described above as the means leading to the highest puruṣārtha, and affirms that he who enters on the path of bhakti reaches the Parama-pada through divine grace and enjoys the innumerable excellences of the Infinite.

The first word “Satyam” in Satyam-Jñānam-anantam expresses that the Brahman is different from both Prakṛti (matter) and Jīva (the finite individual), in that it undergoes no vikāra, no change or modification as a result of karma, to which both Prakṛti and the Jīva are subject. Vikāra may be of two kinds—Svarūpa and Svabhāva-vikāra. Prakṛti is subject to both these kinds of vikāra. The Jīva has svabhāva-vikāra alone, as its Jñāna

is subject to the vicissitudes of *saṅkoca* and *vikāśa*, of dim obscurity and full radiance. It is this last point of difference, which is emphasised in the next word 'Jñānam' as describing another aspect of the nature of the Brahman. The Paramātman is Jñāna always in full brilliance. Never was a time when its radiance was eclipsed or dimmed. In this respect the Brahman is different even from a Mukta or liberated individual, whose career necessarily implies a prior state of bondage and its concomitant ignorance. The third expression 'anantam' indicates the unique character of the Brahman, its infiniteness which implies its transcendence of the limitations of time and space and the absence of any other object comparable to itself (*deśa-kāla-vāstu-pariccheda-rāhityam*). This expression, 'anantam' is exclusive in its applicability to the Brahman, the Supreme, both in its derivative sense and by usage (*yogārtha* and *rūḍhyartha*). The vākyam as a whole thus brings out the truth so significant to Viśiṣṭādvaita that the Paramātman is different from (1) the *acit-tattva*, (2) the *baddha Jīva* and (3) the *Mukta* as well as the *Nitya*. The difference is re-emphasised in a number of other vākyas within the same upaniṣadic section. The very next group of vākyas to the opening lines describing the *tattva*, *hita* and *puruṣārtha* proceeds to state that all the elements *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu*, etc., have originated from and been caused by the Brahman, who is thus pointed out as their material cause and indeed as the material cause of everything. The Brahman is the *sarvopādāna Kāraṇa* or universal material cause. This *sarvopādāna Kāraṇatvam* of the Brahman clearly establishes the *vastu-pariccheda-rāhityam* already mentioned. The Brahman must be understood as unique, with nothing else like itself in all the worlds (*sakaletara-vilakṣaṇa*). In order to facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of the Brahman the *vākyas* thereafter lead us step by step through statements describ-

ing the Brahman variously as Annam, Prāṇam, Manas and Vijñānam and finally speaks of it as Ānandamayāḥ, in accordance with the procedure known as Sthūla-Arundhatī-Nyāya. The first four are mentioned solely in the interests of clarity and precision, and the reference should not be taken to express absolute identity between any of them and the Brahman. The Annamaya-śarīra, Prāṇamaya-śarīra, Manomaya-śarīra and even the Vijñāna-maya, which stands for Jīvātman may all be pictured as so many sheaths, each outer one enveloping the next within it; innermost of all being the Parabrahman, who is described as Ānandamayāḥ, who is the Soul of Souls, and who does not stand in any subordinate relation of śarīra to śarīri, there being nothing transcendental to His. It is of utmost importance here to note that the Brahman has no kārmic śarīra, in the sense in which a baddha-Jīva or bound individual has. He cannot be grasped by the physical senses, in the sense in which an acit-vastu may be. He cannot be classified as belonging to any species, as a mukta may be, for there is nothing else like Him to form a class with. He is different even from a Nitya, who needs an Ādhāra to sustain him, the Lord being the ādhāra of all, the one ultimate Antaryāmin of all who sustains, animates and rules all. It is on the Paramātman of such unique excellences that the aspirant for Mokṣa must keep constantly meditating.

That Jīva, who knows the Lord enthroned in the cavity of his heart, who in total surrender to the Lord offers His unremitting dhyāna, gets freed from fear of all kinds, and attains the highest knowledge and the loftiest peaks of bliss. He reaches the Paramapada, where the Lord and His innumerable, infinite excellences constitute the object of his matchless experience of Ānandānubhava.

The Upaniṣadic vākyaṃ, "Eṣa hyevānanda yāti" tells us, that the Paramātman is the cause of the Jīvātman's

Ānandam. This obviously implies difference between the Jīvātman, of whose Ānanda the Paramātman is said to be the cause, and the Paramātman who is Himself the cause of it. Moreover, the reference to the Paramātman in the Upaniṣad as a Rasasvarūpa, who is of the very essence of bliss (Raso vai saḥ-Rasam hyevāyam labdhvānandī bhavati) and the statement that, when the Jīva attains Him, experiences transcendental bliss, gives yet another support to the recognition of difference between the two. Indeed, the Jīva with his finite nature can by no means cause, or even form an adequate estimate of the Ānanda of the Infinite. The Ānandam of the Brahman, who is spoken of as the "Ānandamayaḥ" is verily immeasurable, but a faint conception of something approximating to it may be formed by the human mind, which starting with its own notions of 'perfect' human happiness, could ascend step by step by a process of progressive multiplication hundred-fold at each stage, and arrive at an idea of the Ānandam of the four-faced Brahman, the creator of the fourteen worlds, which represents after all a fraction of the highest Brahmānandam exceeding all human computation and defying all verbal description yato vāco nivartante aprāpyamanasā saha, ānandam Brahmano vidvān na bibhēti, kadācana).

The Mukta-state has been characterised as essentially equal to that of the Lord Himself. Rāmānuja would emphasise that it is equal, but not absolutely identical, for the Mukta does not acquire *all* the divine faculties and powers including those of creation, destruction and preservation. He does not become the Ruler of the worlds. These are the asādhāraṇa dharmas of the Lord, and "Paramam sāmyam" does not mean absolute or perfect equality, but only essential equality, which excludes the possession of those unique attributes, which the Śrutis themselves assert as belonging to none other than the Lord. Jagadvyā-

pāra-varjam' Bhogamātra sāmyalingāt. Sāmyam refers to parity in the measure of the Ānandam experienced by all the Muktas, and the Parama Puruṣa Himself.

The words "so'snute sarvān kāmān saha Brahmaṇā vipaścitā" reveal that the direct blissful experience of the divine excellences (guṇānubhava) is the be-all and end-all of the Mukta. Rāmānuja would point out that this must not be taken to imply a passive state of bare contemplation, but to mean activity in service (kaiṅkarya) at the feet of the Lord. This is necessary in view of the Śarīra-śarīrī relation between the Jīvātman and the Parabrahman. The relationship is permanent, unalterable and irrevocable. The Jīva cannot and will not relinquish his right to serve his Lord at any stage. If the Mukta-Jīva should take his proper, rightful place as part of the Śarīra of the Paramapuruṣa and function accordingly he must serve the śarīrī. Indeed the high honour of such service is described as "Kaiṅkarya Śrī" and valued as the most precious privilege, that one can ever enjoy.

SHORT NOTES

I

A VERSE FROM SKANDAGUPTA'S JUNAGARH INSCRIPTION

By DASHARATH SHARMA

The latter half of the second verse of Skandagupta's *Junagarh inscription* runs as follows :—

*Narapati-bhujagānām mānadarppotphaṇānām
pratikṛti-Garudājñā[m] nirvviṣī[m] cāvakarttā*

According to Fleet it means,

“ and who plucked (and utilised) the authority of (his local) representatives who were so many Garuḍas, and (used it as) an antidote against the (hostile) kings who were so many serpents, lifting up their heads in pride and arrogance.”

To me Fleet's rendering does not seem very happy. The large number of words put within brackets shows that he himself could not have been very sure of the correctness of his interpretation. 'How could a *Vaiṣṇava* like Cakrapālita' represent his *Vaiṣṇava* master, Skandagupta,² as plucking the authority of so many Garuḍas, his representatives? This deity, half-man half-bird, the vehicle of Viṣṇu, must have been too sacred to both Cakrapālita and Skandagupta to be treated with such impertinence. And even if we concede the correctness of Fleet's translation, how are we to believe that the plucked authority of a Garuḍa could be used as an antidote against serpents,

¹The inscription was put by Cakrapālita in a temple dedicated to Viṣṇu and begins with Viṣṇu's praise.

² See Skandagupta's Bhitari inscription and the legends on his coins.

specially against such as had “ lifted up their heads in pride and arrogance ” ?

Re-interpretation of the lines or their emendation is obviously very necessary. *Garudājñā* does not, I think, mean “ authority of Garuḍas,” but a command carried through the “*Garuḍamadaṅka-śāsanas*,” about which we read in the Allahabad Pillar inscription of Samudragupta. Secondly it signifies also a *Garuḍa-mantra* beleived to be so efficacious in dealing with serpents. The word, *pratikṛti*, in the compound “ *pratikṛti-Garuḍājñā* ” would, if this new interpretation be accepted, signify “ retaliatory or punitive measures,” though the sense of a “ picture,” too is not unlikely,³ and “ *pratikṛti-Garuḍājñā* ” may have to be analysed as *pratikṛti-yutayā Garuḍājñayā* or *pratikṛti-rūpayā Garuḍājñayā*. Secondly, if Fleet’s reading is allowed to stand, we have to give the prefix *ava* in *avakarttā*, the added sense of “ *niścaya* ” or surety.

Keeping these considerations in view, we might give the following two alternative syntactical orders to the lines, provided we keep to Fleet’s reading:—

- (a) *(yaś) cha pratikṛti-Garuḍājñām mānadarp-
potphaṇḍnām narapatibhujagānām nirv-
viṣim-avakarttā.*
- (b) *(yaś) ca pratikṛti-Garuḍājñām nirvviṣim=
ava-karttā mānadarppotphaṇḍnām narapati-
bhujagānām avakarttā.*

In the first of these, *avakarttā* would have merely the sense of “ one who surely does a thing,” and the rendering would be, “ and who surely made retaliatory measures, accompanied by orders bearing the figure of Garu-

³ See D. C. Sircar, *Select Inscriptions*, I p. 300. “ *Pratikṛti-Garuḍājñā* ” may mean “ command conveyed through Garuḍa in its representation ”.

ḍā, an antidote (*nirvviṣi*) against the kings who were so many serpents raising their heads in pride and arrogance." In the second, *avakarttā* would have the additional sense of "one who destroys, cuts or renders innocuous." Skandagupta was the *avakarttā* of poisonous serpent-like kings ready to strike; and the antidote (निर्विषी) that he used with sure and certain effect against them was *pratikṛti-Garuḍājñā*.

In view of the fact, however, that Fleet's reading makes us give *avakarttā* a sense which it does not generally bear in classical Sanskrit, even though we separate it into its two components, *ava* and *karttā*, we propose to read the second half of the verse as follows:—

*Narapati-bhujaḡānām mānadarppotphaṇānām
pratikṛti-Garuḍājñām nirvviṣīm vāva karttā*

The only change introduced is that of reading " *vāva karttā* " instead of " *cāvakarttā* " ; and this, we might note, is no radical change, for *va* and *ca* are so similar in the Gupta script that it is easy to read the one instead of the other, especially when the surface of a record be as damaged as that of the Junagārh stone inscription. *Vāva*, in the sense " certainly, surely indeed " is to be found not merely in Vedic but also Paurāṇika literature.⁴ Skandagupta made *pratikṛti-Garuḍājñā* a sure (*vāva*) antidote against the kings who were like so many serpents with their heads raised in pride and arrogance; and *pratikṛti-Garuḍājñā*, as already pointed out, while primarily having the sense of *Garuḍamaḍaṅka-Śāsana*s accompanied by retaliatory or punitive measures, can also have the sense of the *Gāruḍa-mantra*, which is believed to be the best *pratikāra* for poisonous serpents.

⁴ See Monier-Williams' *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*.

II TWO EPIGRAPHIC NOTES

By G. S. GAI

IN his paper on the *Māñkaṇi Grant of Taralasevāmin*, published in a previous issue of this *Journal*,¹ Principal V. V. Mirashi observes: "the earliest record from North India which contains a date in decimal figures is the Shergaḍh Buddhist inscription of Sāmanta Devadatta dated V. 847 or A.D. 791-2. In South India also the numerical symbols held the field for a long time. The earliest record from that part of the country which uses the decimal notation is the Dhulia grant of the Rashtrakūṭa prince Karkarāja, dated Ś. 701 (A.D. 789—90). It would seem, therefore, that the decimal notation began to supersede the numerical symbols both in the North and South India about the same time viz., in the last quarter of the eighth century A.D." In the course of my studies I have come across the use of this decimal notation in some inscriptions whose dates are earlier than those of the Shergaḍh and Dhulia records mentioned above. In North India, the date of the Sakrai Stone Inscription,² which has been read as V.S. 699 by Dr. B. Ch. Chhabra, is expressed in decimal figures and the corresponding English date of this record would be 642-43 A.C. In the Dhiniki (Kathiavād) grant³ of King Jāikadēva dated V. S. 794 or 737 A.C., the date is also in decimal figures. As regards South India, Dr. Hultzsch has shown⁴ that in the Purle,⁵ Chicacole⁶

¹ Vol. I, pp. 392-93.

² *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 29-32.

³ *Ind. Ant.*, Vol. XII, p. 155 and plate.

⁴ *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 307-8.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. XIV, p. 362.

⁶ *Ind. Ant.*, Vol. XIII, p. 123.

and Tekkāli⁷ plates of Indravarman and the Chicacole⁸ plates of Dēvēndravarman the years are recorded as 100 37, 100 38, 100 54 and 100 83 respectively, so that the decimal notation is partly used in these dates. In the last mentioned record *viz.*, Chicacole plates of Dēvēndravarman the day 20 is also mentioned by the decimal figure '2' followed by a cipher 'o.' And the entire date of the Siddhāntam plates of Dēvēndravarman *viz.*, year 195 is expressed by decimal notation. To these inscriptions pointed out by Dr. Hultzsch, we may add the Tekkali plates¹⁰ of Dēvēndravarman where the year is recorded as, 100 92 (for 192). The year 204 in the Sudava copper-plate Grant¹¹ of Anantavarman is expressed in decimal figures. The dates of these Gāṅga grants vary from 635 to 702 A.C. And lastly, the regional year 57 and the day 30 of the Lodhia plates of Mahāśivagupta Bālārjuna are known to have been recorded in decimal figures¹². This record may be referred to about the middle of the 7th century A.C. Thus we see that the use of the decimal notation is found in the inscriptions of North and South India as early as the second quarter of the seventh century A.C.

⁷ *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XVIII, p. 310 and plate.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, p. 123.

⁹ *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XIII, p. 215.

¹⁰ *Ind. Hist. Quart*, Vol. XI, pp. 301-2 and plate.

¹¹ *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXVI, p. 67 and plate.

¹² *All India Or. Conf. Proceedings*, p. 596.

III

USE OF *B* FOR *V* AND VICE VERSA IN EARLY INSCRIPTIONS

By G. S. GAI

One of the important considerations which has led Dr. D. C. Sircar to show that the Nalanda plate of Samudragupta to be spurious is the use of *b* for *v* and *vice versa* found in that record.¹³ Mr. A. Ghosh, who has edited this inscription, considers it "a feature remarkable for the Gupta period."¹⁴ and Dr. Sircar observes that there is not a single instance of such use in any of the genuine records of the Gupta kings and that its earliest use is to be found in the Koh grant of Hastin dated in the Gupta year 156.¹⁵ But attention may be drawn to some examples showing this alphabetic characteristic in the inscriptions of the period under reference which seem to have escaped the notice of these scholars. In the Damodarpur plates¹⁶ of Kumāragupta dated in the Gupta year 124, we have the use of *b* for *v* in the word *paradattāmbā* for *paradattām vā* where the *b* form can be clearly seen in the facsimile. In another Copper-plate Grant¹⁷ from the same place and of the same king and dated in the Gupta year 128, we get *samvaddha* for *sambaddha* and *vahubhi*— for *bahubhi*—

¹³ *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXVI, pp. 135-6. For a detailed discussion on other points raised in this paper regarding the forged nature of the grant, see Dr. R. C. Majumdar's article in *Indian Culture*, Vol. X, pp. 225-30.

¹⁴ *Ep. Ind.* Vol. XXV, pp. 49-52.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. XXVI, p. 136.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 131, text 1.12 and plate.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 134, text 1.11 and 12.

showing the clear use of *v* for *b*. In the Mankuwār image inscriptions of the same king with the date Gupta year 129, the year has been read as *sambat* for *sāmvat*¹⁸. The Bobbili plates¹⁹ of the Kālīṅga King Chaṇḍavarman, which are paleographically referred to the first half of the 5th century A.C., use the word *sāmbatsarikam* for *sāmvatsarikam*. And lastly an important example is furnished by Muṇḍeśvarī stone inscription of the time of Udayasīna,²⁰ the characters of which have been shown to bear close resemblance to the Allahabad pillar inscription of Samudragupta and the date (year 30) of which is assigned to the Gupta era. In this inscription we have the word *sambatsara* for *sāmvatsara* used twice in lines 1 and 2. Thus the above discussion would show that this alphabetic feature was in vogue in the Gupta period and therefore it is admissible in the Nalanda plate of Samudragupta.

¹⁸ *Select Inscriptions*, Vol. I, No. 20, p. 288, text 1.2.

¹⁹ *Ep Ind.*, Vol. XXVII, p. 35.

²⁰ *Ind. Ant.*, XLIX, p. 27.

²¹ *C. I. I.*, Vol. III, pp. 6-10.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

BUDDHIST TEXTS AS RECOMMENDED BY ASOKA with an English translation by Mahamahopadhyaya Vidhushekharā Bhattacharya, University of Calcutta. pp. xv.+40. 1948.

The Book under review contains the texts of the Second Bairāt Rock Edict. Among the minor rock edicts of Aśoka the one with which we are concerned here is also known as Bābru Edict. This Bairāt is in the Jaipur State in Rajputana. As the place of the Edict is 12 miles from a camping station named Bābrū, the Inscription is also called by that name. The Edict is in Brāhmī script. The text of the Edict is the same as published by Dr. Woolner in the Punjab University Oriental Publication comparing it with that published by the University of Calcutta. The Editor has given a Sanskrit *Chāyā* of the texts and he has identify all these texts from the various sources. He has also given in full all the eight oriental Pali texts along with their English rendering.

The book is very useful as it gives in one place all that is needed to be learnt about these texts.

SANGĪTARATNĀKARA OF ŚĀRNGADEVA Vol. I—Chapter I translated into English with detailed notes by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, University of Madras. The Adyar Library series No. 51 pp. xiv+175. Price Rs. 4-8-0 1945.

Saṅgītaratnākara is one of the most important books on classical music. It has been published with an elaborate Sanskrit commentary in the Anandashrama Sanskrit

Series long before and is widely read. The 'Adyar Library itself has published a portion of it with the commentaries of Kallinatha and Śimhabhūpāla. An English translation with copious notes to explain its technicalities was a great desideratum. It is a matter of great satisfaction that Dr. Raja has put before the scholars a portion of it and has promised to complete it gradually. The translator has tried to make the work much more intelligible by adding copious notes to it. An English translation of such works without notes is of very little use. The Adyar Library deserves our congratulations for this attempt. The students on music will be very much benefitted by this work.

KĀŚYAPAJÑĀNAKĀṆḌA (KĀŚYAPASAMHITA) edited by Pandit R. Parthasarathi Bhattacharya. Published in the Venkateshwara Oriental Series, No. 12. pp. 32 +174. Price Rs. 5/- 1948.

The work under review is one of the important works of Vaikhānasa literature. There is Vaikhānas Kalpasūtra attached to the Kṛṣṇa-Yajurveda and there are Samhitās by Marici, Atri, Kāśyapa and Bhṛgu. The authorities of the Venkateshwara Oriental Institute have already published some books on this literature and this is an addition to those. The present book deals with various aspects of Karmakāṇḍa and Jñānakāṇḍa in a very lucid way. Its treatment of the various problems are quite good and appealing. The Venkateshwara Institute has done a great service by undertaking its publication and has really preserved an important aspect of our literature. The book is very useful. It has a fairly long Introduction in Sanskrit which adds to the utility of the book.

RGVEDAVYĀKHYĀ BY MĀDHAVA. Part II—Aṣṭaka 1, Adhyāyas V to VIII. Besant Century Volume, Published by the Adyar Library. Edited by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja. pp. viii+473-817. 1947. Price Rs. 15/-

The first volume of this book was published by the Adyar Library in 1939 and this is the second volume. With this the available portion of this very rare commentary on the *Rgveda* by Madhava comes to an end. This Madhava is different from Madhava, the son of Venkataraya who also has written a commentary on the *Rgveda* which has been edited by the late Dr. Lakshman Swarup. The book under review contains both the commentaries and it gives us an opportunity to study them together. It is very difficult to say anything either for or against definitely about the identity of the authors and the two commentaries. In matter there is no difference but there is a good deal of difference in language though sometimes the latter is also very much similar. Anyhow the two commentaries published will very much help us to scrutinise the points of similarity and dissimilarity which may help us to know more about the authors.

NEW CATALOGUS CATALOGORUM. Edited by Dr. V. Raghuvan and Published by the University of Madras. pp. xxxvi+380. Price Rs. 25/- 1949.

The volume under review has filled in a great desideratum. The work of Dr. Aufrecht was published long ago and since then a good deal of new material has been brought to light. It was very necessary to make a fresh attempt to collect all the material since available. The University of Madras has done a great service by publishing this volume. The work of editing has been on the same lines as we find in Aufrecht's work. Among the new additions we may mention the inclusion of Buddhistic,

Jain and Prakrit works and authors. Almost all the Oriental Institutes and also individual scholars having manuscripts have helped in the preparation of this important work. It is needless to remind our country men that the treasures of Indian scholarship are found in the manuscripts scattered all over the country and it is our most important duty to preserve them and also to bring into light their contents. No doubt some efforts are being made in different quarters towards this but it is not at all sufficient. Manuscripts are lost every day and they cannot remain safe unless immediate care is taken to collect them and place them in safe custody. We should give more attention to this aspect of our studies. I may be permitted to add that the *Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* has done a good deal towards this and it has during this short period collected a large number of rare and important manuscripts. We are eagerly awaiting the publication of its other volumes. The Editorial Board should continue to get information about recent collections in order to incorporate them in volumes still under preparation.

THE PROBLEM OF SANSKRIT TEACHING (संस्कृतानुशीलनविवेकः)
Published by the Bharat Book-stall, Kolhapur City.
PP. 700. 1949. Price Rs. 12/8/-.

श्रीहृयरीकररचितः संस्कृतविद्यानुशीलनविवेकः ।

विदुषामाह्लादको बालानां मार्गशोधकरः ॥

The Problem of Sanskrit Teaching (संस्कृतानुशीलनविवेकः)
by Professor G. S. Huparikar, Sanskrit Department,
Rajaram College, Kolhapur, is a most comprehensive and
unique work on the subject of teaching Sanskrit to all the
different categories of students according to both the
(traditional) and critical methods. The exposition of the

subject in Sanskrit as well as in English bespeaks the author's full and equal command over both the languages and bears direct testimony to his thorough mastery of the numerous branches of Sanskrit learning, covering as it does almost the entire field of Sanskrit studies, besides Methodology of Education.

While going through the First (Sanskrit) Part of the book one gets the real pleasure of enjoying a standard classical work written in very attractive and impressive style. The second and Third (English) Parts respectively on Theory and Practice happen to be a sort of lucid commentary on the First one. Śrī Huparikar's presentation of the subject, argument and conclusion are at once clear, convincing and legitimate. There will hardly be a vital point or an important detail concerning the problem which has not been aptly noticed in a suitable place and given the adequate thought it deserves.

The book is so far the only one of its kind and really one of the very best products of the present century. Sanskrit forms the sole unifying cultural link of our multifarious nation and thus deserves to be the basic and common matter of knowledge for every citizen, *i.e.*, a *sine qua non* of the civic life, of all the United States and Provinces of our new Republic of Bhāratavarṣa. Prof. Huparikar's book has appeared at the right time when the study of this most important and sacred of all the languages of our Republic has received a vehement set-back under the weight of the foreign domination on our civilization for a considerably long period. The survival of our civilization is due to the healthy influence Sanskrit has wielded on our dwindling national existence. Since the Vedic age down to the present day Sanskrit has been permeating the life of our masses and with its tight grip over them it has always stood as a peculiarly strong factor and served as a sustaining force in our nation's time-to-time struggle

against all odds. How much, therefore, have we needed the spread and method of the teaching of Sanskrit to be placed on a sure and scientific basis. The present book has, squarely met with our this long-felt need.

The world of the teachers and learners of Sanskrit shall for long remain indebted to the author of the work under review, which has been written on modern and most up-to-date lines of education and which at the same time sheds a flood of genuine light on every nook and corner of the ancient store house of Sanskrit learning in its various branches, bringing in high relief all that is valuable and worth retaining in the traditional method of its teaching. As the real torch-bearer in the present rugged and dark path of Sanskrit teaching, Professor Huparikar has rendered yeoman's service and earned our gratitude.

We cordially welcome this most useful book and heartily congratulate its author for the unusual success achieved by him in his endeavour yielding the proper and opportune solution of what has generally appeared to be a rather knotty and to some extent baffling problem.

—R. M. Shastri.

VYUTPATTIVĀDA-LAKĀRARTHAVICĀRA of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭāchārya with *Vivaraṇa* by Pandita Raja V. Subrahmanya Sastri, Lecturer in Sanskrit, Annamalai University and with a foreword by His Highness Ramavarma Pareekshit, the Maharaja of Cochin and a preface by Dr. P. S. Subrahmanya Sastry, M.A., Ph.D., Annamalai University Sanskrit Series No. 10. pages xxiv+pp. 249. Annamalainagar, 1948.

The book under review is a commentary by the senior Nyāya lecturer in the Annamalai University, on the *Vyutpattivāda* of Gadādhara. Gautama, the sūtrakāra of the Nyāya Darśana expounded methodically the basic

principles of the dialectics and ratiocinative machinery of Nyāya system. This machinery was amplified, perfected and refined by Gangeśa Upādhyāya of Mithila in the 13th century, by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi of the 16th century, and later in the 17th century by Jagadisa and Gadadhara. The dialectic literature of the later (Navya) Nyāya has been justly compared to a vast banyan tree which had its roots struck deep and its huge trunk fully developed in Mithila in the *Tattva-Cintāmaṇi*, had its immense foliage stretched out and ramified in the *Dīdhiti* in Nuddea and fruit in the rich fruitage of *Jāgadīśi* and *Gādādhari* which formed the colossal monuments of Indian dialectics in the 17th century. Perched on such broad-based and ever growing dialectic eminence the Nyāya dialecticians of recent centuries have been carrying on their Śāstric discussions and making all their contributions to Śāstraic thoughts in Sanskrit, as is clear from *Jayā* which Mm. Jayadeva Mishra has written on the *Vyūtpatti-Vāda*. Pandit Subramania Sastry has added a good explanatory commentary to an important section of the *Vyūtpatti-Vāda*.

The importance of continuing the study of Sanskrit on the traditional lines cannot be over-rated in spite of some criticisms to the contrary. The Nyāya dialectics possess an educative value of the same kind as that of Pāṇini or as that of Euclid and not much inferior to them in value; and at the hands of Gangeśa Upādhyāya and his successors has been perfected into a science of Debate which has won its way into all forms of intellectual activity in the country including Purva Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and not excepting Vyākaraṇa. With the recovery of India's independence we stand the risk of losing the rich culture so assiduously preserved all these centuries and it, therefore, behoves every one of us to encourage the study of Nyāya dialectics.

The portion covered in the work deals with one of the most important topics in the Nyāya Śāstra on the meaning of tenses, and the same subject is dealt with by the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Mīmāṃsākas. Hence, the view point of each of the schools is attacked by others with great alertness and dialectical skill. Without deciding the claims of final victory for any side among the three disputants Grammar, Logic and Philosophy it would be sufficient for the student to note the pros and cons of the question so lucidly set forth in the commentary and this itself would give him the greatest intellectual find.

—A. S. Nataraja Ayyar.

TIRUKKURAL OF TIRUVALLUVAR—Tamil text with English Translation by V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar, M.A., Professor of Indian History and Archaeology, University of Madras, with a foreword by Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, Dewan of Mysore. pp. xvii and 271. The Adyar Library Series No. 68. Price Rs. 3/-. Adyar 1949.

2. *Do. Tamil text in Roman Transliteration.*

A distinguished professor of Tamil has stated that the best works in the Tamil language are the *Tirukkural* of Tiruvalluvar and *Rāmāyaṇa* of Kambar. The first belongs to the 2nd century A.D. (according to some to the 1st century B.C.) and the second to the heyday of Chola supremacy. R. Rost writing in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* states: "The *Tirukkural* is the finest poetical production in the whole range of Tamil composition. It consists of 1330 stanzas on Virtue, Wealth and Pleasure—(Dharma, Artha and Kama). It has often been edited, translated and commented upon. See the introduction to the excellent edition of Rev. Dr. G. U. Pope."

Hence we could easily understand as to why the

Tirukkural is now translated into English with the text in Tamil and Roman scripts for the benefit of the non-Tamil-knowing public in India and abroad. The *Tirukkural* may really be styled as the universal text book of religion and politics. The whole book contains 133 Adhyayas and each Adhyaya contains 10 stanzas. The first four Adhyayas are introductory, on God, on Rain, on the greatness of ascetics and on the importance of Dharma. They form in brief the directive principles of state policy of any good state: to impart religion and make the subjects godly, to preserve the rain water in proper ways for cultivation, to train selfless workers and to cultivate Dharma as its ideal at home and abroad. The first part is entitled Dharma and deals with the house-holder and his duties in 21 Adhyayas and with the ascetic and his rules in 13 Adhyayas. Then follows part 2 on Artha—Government dealing with the King, the Minister, the ambassador, fort, army, etc., in 70 Adhyayas. The 3rd part deals with Love in the form of lyrical addresses between a husband and his wife in 25 Adhyayas. *Tirukkural* has received universal praise at the hands of scholars eastern and western. The translation is well done by the Professor of Indian History who is a scholar in history and Tamil.

It is our duty to remind the sponsors of the undertaking as to how the book should be made really useful to the Indian public. Firstly a transliteration of the Tamil verses in Hindi Devanagiri script is urgently called for. Secondly a further supplemental volume should be brought out which should emphasise the comparison of the contents of the Tamil work with (1) The Dharma Śāstras like the *Manu Samhitā* in the treatment of the Dharma of the householder and ascetic, (2) The *Artha Śāstra* of Kaṭilya in the second book and (3) with the *Kāma Śāstra* and works like *Amaru Śataka* in the third book. This was

done in a way in the edition of the second book with translation and notes in English brought out by C. Rajagopalachariar, Governor-General of India and a further edition with the first book also brought out in 1949. Elaborate Sanskrit parallels were given in the edition of Dr. P. S. Subramania Sastry of the Annamalai University. An improved edition on these lines would bring out the greatness of the Kural and also indicate that the culture of India had been one uniform and continuous and will continue to be the same in spite of the languages of South India belonging to a different philological group. To give an instance verse 55 of the Kural "Waking up she worships no other god than her husband. Verily at her very bidding it rains" may be aptly compared with the following:

भर्तुः शुश्रूषया नारी लभते स्वर्गमुत्तमम् ।

अपि या निर्ममस्कारा निवृत्ता देवपूजनात् ॥

Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa II 24. 26.

Such a work alone would further at least impede if not destroy the differentiating tendencies discernible in modern India composed of provincial language groups. With these two improvements the *Tirukkural* would command the attention of the whole of India. In fact the the second book of *Tirukkural* would be a good text book for the Diplomacy classes of our universities along with works on English and American diplomacy. With the Dewan of Mysore and the Adyar press as its patron and printer, we expect the second volume to be published soon to realise the ideal mentioned in the foreword of "spreading these great divine truths of the *Tirukkural* to as wide a populace as possible thereby extending that knowledge to races and peoples whose mother tongue is not Tamil."

—A. S. Nataraja Ayyar.

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